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Director: Forest L. Grieves
In 1998, the United Nations finalized an International Criminal Court (ICC) Statute. 
The purpose o f this Statute is to create an international tribunal through which the 
international community could investigate, and, if  required, prosecute crimes o f 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. An overwhelming majority o f  the 
United Nations delegates signed the treaty Statute, with the United States being one o f 
only seven states to oppose the Statute. This study examined the thesis posited by the 
United States that deficiencies in the institutional structures o f the ICC will render the 
criminal court unable to accomplish its stated objectives o f punishing and deterring the 
worst forms o f international criminal atrocities. The study’s scope was limited to 
examining four aspects o f the Statute: the jurisdiction, the criminal subject matter, the 
Prosecutor’s office, and the role assigned by the ICC for the United Nations Security 
Council.
The greatest developments in international criminal law come from the two world 
wars and the efforts they inspired to punish war criminals. W orld W ar E ’s Nuremberg 
trials overturned the centuries old practice o f  granting international criminal immunity to 
heads-of-state through the conviction o f Nazi war criminals. After Nuremberg, for the 
first time in international law, individuals could be held criminally liable for crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide.
Unlike the Nazi trials at Nuremberg, which were made possible by the occupation of 
Germany by the victorious Allies, the ICC must rely on state cooperation to investigate, 
apprehend, and prosecute defendants. An independent prosecutor, with the power to 
investigate information from all sources and decide which cases to try, will complicate 
the functioning o f the ICC. Additional problems for the ICC are created by the lack o f 
specificity o f the crimes defined within the Statute. As the only institution capable o f 
forcing states to comply with the dictates o f the world criminal court, the Security 
Council must protect citizens from their own governments by referring the most heinous 
international atrocities to the ICC for prosecution.
The most serious weakness o f the ICC Statute, the ICC jurisdiction exposes 
peacekeeping forces operating in foreign countries to potential ICC prosecution, yet 
allows states to exempt its forces from war crimes prosecution while charging another 
country for those same crimes. While purporting to preserve national sovereignty, the 
Statute actually allows the ICC to sit in judgment o f national courts. The result may be 
disastrous as states, unwilling to allow their courts to be judged, refuse to cooperate with 
the ICC, resulting in an ineffective international criminal court unable to prosecute or 
deter war crimes.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
On July 17, 1998, as the Final Act o f the United Nations Diplomatic Conference 
o f Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f  an International Criminal Court, one hun­
dred and twenty nations voted for the adoption o f the Statute creating a permanent In­
ternational Criminal Court (the “ICC” or the “Court”).’ The United States joined six 
other nations in voting against the treaty, while twenty-one nations abstained in the 
vote. The Statute enters into force after sixty states officially ratify it. Thus far, over 
twenty nations have ratified the treaty.^ U.S. leaders have made it clear their nation will 
not be one o f them.^
The United States objects to perceived legal deficiencies in the Statute that the 
U.S. claims will ultimately undermine the effectiveness and purpose o f the ICC.'’ This 
study examines the thesis postulated by the United States that certain deficiencies in the
’ United Nations, “Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court,” 17 July 1998, 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f an 
International Criminal Court. U.N. GAOR, 53"  ̂sess., 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 
(hereafter cited as ICC Statute; See copy o f Rome Statute in appendix.)
 ̂United Nations, “Rome Stamte o f the International Criminal Court, Ratification 
Status,” United Nations Official W ebsite, [ratification status on-line]; available from 
http://www.un.org/ law /icc/statute/status.htm; Internet; accessed 16 May 2001.
 ̂Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Interna­
tional Operations, Is A U.N. International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest? 
105"" Cong, 2"*̂  sess., 23 July 1998, 1-65.
'’ ibid.
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ICC Statue will produce a flawed criminal court that will be unable to achieve its objec­
tives of punishment and deterrence for the worst forms o f international criminal atroci­
ties. The scope of the thesis is limited to examining four aspects o f  the ICC Statute that 
form the core o f the U.S. objections:
( 1 ) The jurisdiction o f the ICC;
(2) The authority and powers o f the Office o f the Prosecutor;
(3) The role o f the United Nations Security Council; and,
(4) The crimes that the ICC will be enforcing.
U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for W ar Crimes Issues, David Scheffer, who led his
country’s delegation at the Rome Conference, described the U.S. objections as follows:
Unfortunately, a small group o f countries, meeting behind closed doors in 
the final days o f the Rome conference, produced a seriously flawed take-it-or- 
leave-it text, one that provides a recipe for politicization o f  the Court and risks de­
terring responsible international action to promote peace and security. M ost prob­
lematic is the extraordinary way the Court’s jurisdiction was framed at the last 
moment. A country whose forces commit war crimes could jo in  the treaty but es­
cape prosecution o f its nationals by “opting out’’ o f the Court’s jurisdiction over 
war crimes for seven years. By contrast, a country that does not join the treaty but 
deploys its soldiers abroad to restore international peace and security could be vul­
nerable to assertions that the Court has jurisdiction over acts o f  those soldiers.
Under the treaty, the Court may exercise jurisdiction over a crime if  either 
the country o f nationality o f  the accused or the country where the alleged crime 
took place is a party to the treaty or consents. Thus, with only the consent o f a 
Saddam Hussein, even if  Iraq does not join the treaty, the treaty text purports to 
provide the Court with jurisdiction over American or other troops involved in in­
ternational humanitarian action in northern Iraq, but the Court could not on its 
own prosecute Saddam for massacring his own people.^
In an address to the UN Sixth Committee, he said:
 ̂David Scheffer, “America’s Stake in Peace, Security and Justice,’’ 31 August 
1998; quoted in Leila Sadat Wexler and others, “Panel discussion: Association o f the 
American Law Schools Panel on the International Criminal Court,’’ American Criminal 
Law Review 36 (1999): 260.
2
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All o f us in Rome shared a common goal that an international court should 
be able to prosecute tyrants who commit mass murder, mass rape, or mass torture 
against their own citizens, while at the same time not inhibiting States from con­
tributing to efforts to help protect international peace and security. The irony o f 
the Rome outcome on Article 12 is not lost on us.
Consider the following. A State not a party to the treaty launches a cam­
paign o f  terror against a dissident minority inside its territory. Thousands o f inno­
cent civilians are killed. International peace and security are imperiled. The 
United States participates in a coalition to use military force to intervene and stop 
the killing. Unfortunately, in so doing, bombs intended for military targets go 
astray. A hospital is hit. An apartment building is demolished. Some civilians 
being used as human shields are mistakenly shot by U.S. troops. The State re­
sponsible for the atrocities demands that U.S. officials and commanders be prose­
cuted by the international criminal court. The demand is supported by a small 
group o f other states. Under the terms o f the Rome treaty, absent a Security 
Council referral, the court could not investigate those responsible for killing thou­
sands, yet our senior officials, commanders, and soldiers could face an interna­
tional investigation and even prosecution.^
The U.S., while supporting the ICC in principle, remains opposed to its creation.’ 
The U.S. objects to the overly broad scope o f the Court’s jurisdiction and the authority 
o f the prosecutor, and the inadequate role assigned to the United Nations Security 
Council. The concern o f the U.S. is that an unrestrained Prosecutor’s Office will be 
drawn into political controversies within intrastate and interstate conflicts.^ Addition­
ally, prospects for the ICC’s success are made more difficult by definitional problems 
within the criminal subject matter o f the Court.
 ̂David Scheffer, “The International Criminal Court Remarks Before the Com­
mittee o f the 53"* General Assembly,” 21 October 1998; quoted in Wexler, “Panel Dis­
cussion,” 260.
’ David J. Scheffer, “Developments in International Criminal Law: The United 
States and the International Criminal Court,” The American Journal o f International Law 
93 (January 1999): 13.
 ̂Ibid., 14.
3
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In regard to the ICC’s jurisdiction the thesis examines the following question; 
Does the jurisdictional scheme o f the ICC support the U.S. contention that the worst 
forms of interstate violations o f humanitarian law will be largely outside the jurisdiction 
o f the ICC, while exposing a nations’ peacekeepers operating in a humanitarian mission 
to the potential risk o f prosecution by the ICC?
The thesis also assesses the U.S. claim that the ICC Prosecutor’s authority is 
overly broad and contains too few checks and balances. Furthermore, the thesis as­
sesses the U.S. contention that too little authority is given to the Security Council in de­
termining what cases come before the Court. Finally, the thesis examines theoretical 
problems associated with the lack o f clarity and preciseness in the ICC’s definition o f 
crimes that may undermine perceptions that the ICC is operating under the Rule o f  
Law.^ The research will be on two levels. First, the research will review the history o f 
war crimes trials following the First and Second W orld Wars to gain a greater under­
standing o f the unique issues, problems and difficulties associated with international 
criminal trials. Second, the research will analyze the language o f the disputed articles 
o f the ICC Statute that are the source o f U.S. objections.
Chapters 2 and 3 describe the historical background behind the ICC’s creation. 
Chapter 2 is in three sections. The first section examines the nature and scope o f  the 
laws o f war that form the foundation o f  the law that the ICC is enforcing. The second 
section examines the post-W orld W ar I efforts to punish German and Turkish suspected 
war criminals for violations o f  the laws o f war. The third section o f chapter 2 examines
 ̂William K. Lietzau, “Checks and Balances and Elements o f Proof: Structural Pil­
lars for the International Criminal Court, ” Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999): 
478.
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the developments o f  international criminal law during the interwar period between the 
First and Second W orld Wars.
Chapter 3 describes the successful post-W orld W ar II war crimes trials that prose­
cuted German and Japanese nationals for war crimes. The trials examined include the 
judicial prosecutions o f the International Military Tribunal (IMT), better known as the 
Nuremberg trials, the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), or the 
Tokyo trials, and the Allied prosecutions conducted in Germany under Control Council 
Number 10.’° Chapter 3 concludes with the developments in international criminal law 
in the period following W orld W ar II leading up to the initiation o f proposals to estab­
lish the ICC in the late 1980’s.
The purpose o f Chapters 2 and 3 is to introduce to the reader the concept o f  inter­
national war crimes tribunals while highlighting the unique legal and political issues 
and difficulties involved in creating such courts. These two chapters will also trace the 
developments of substantive international law in the last century that form the legal 
foundation upon which the ICC is based. This discussion sets the context for an exam i­
nation of the U.S. objections to the International Criminal Court created by treaty in 
Rome in 1998.
Chapter 4 assesses specific United States objections to the ICC Statute. The chap­
ter opens with a summary o f the official U.S. position regarding the type o f court sought 
by the U.S. prior to the start o f  the Rome Conference in 1998. Next, the chapter de­
scribes the key U.S. positions on the ICC’s jurisdiction, the Prosecutor, and Security
M. Cherif Bassiouni, “From Versailles To Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The 
Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court,” Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 10 (Spring 1997): 11-12.
5
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Council’s relationship with the ICC. Chapter 4 then describes the general institutional 
features o f the ICC Statute as finalized at the Rome Conference. Finally, the chapter 
examines the actual language o f articles pertaining to the jurisdiction, the Prosecutor’s 
functions, and the role o f the Security Council. The goal o f analyzing the language o f 
the ICC’s Articles is to assess the validity o f  U.S. claims about how the Court will func­
tion, or as the case may be, how the Court will malfunction. Specific articles examined 
include Articles 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 124.
Chapter 5 focuses on problems o f the ICC’s criminal definitions with respect to 
the principle o f legality. In particular, the chapter examines the problem o f the ICC’s 
crimes from a theoretical perspective using legal theorist Lon Fuller’s analysis o f  the 
rule o f law. In the context o f the theoretical problems with the ICC’s definition o f 
crimes, the critique o f Major William K. Lietzau, the Deputy Legal Counsel to the 
Chairman o f  the U.S. Joint Chiefs o f  Staff is explored. M ajor Lietzau has raised con­
cerns that the lack o f clarity and preciseness in the ICC’s definition o f crimes will cast 
doubt that the ICC is operating under the Rule o f  Law. ' ' Such a determination would 
undermine international confidence in the Court and weaken its effectiveness. Chapter 
6 presents the conclusion of the assessment and restates the major points o f  each chap­
ter.
The ICC’s creation is the culmination o f  a century long development in interna­
tional law. At the first Hague Conference in 1899, a Russian proposal to establish a 
compulsory court to resolve international disputes had been roundly opposed, not just
"  Lietzau, 478.
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by the U.S., but also by all the major world powers.'^ Nearly a hundred years later, the 
U.S. is again opposed to the idea o f an international court, only this time the U.S. is 
nearly alone in its opposition.'^ The passage o f two world wars, the Nuremberg trials, 
genocide in Rwanda, and mass war crimes in Yugoslavia in the early 1990’s has radi­
cally altered world opinion regarding the viability o f  a world criminal court.
The Rome Conference and the adoption o f  the ICC Statute represented a truly ex­
traordinary achievement both in terms o f  actual drafting and composition o f the treaty 
and the developments it portends in international criminal law. One scholar described 
the Statute’s creation, in a phrase borrowed from international legal expert Richard 
Falk, as a “Grotian moment” in international law; the Statute’s creation was a momen­
tous leap forward in the progress o f the law o f nations.
From a purely compositional and technical standpoint the task o f finalizing the 
Statute was Herculean. The Court Statute was finalized and adopted in just over a 
month, from June 15 to July 18, 1998.'^ One hundred and sixty countries, 137 non­
governmental organizations, and 2000 delegates worked simultaneously in six lan-
While the Russian plan’s tenth article introduced at the First Hague Conference 
in 1899 called for the powers to submit minor quarrels to arbitration, thus ferreting out 
issues o f “high politics” from judicial review, the radical element o f the proposal was its 
compulsory nature which made the submission o f disputes obligatory upon all nations. 
See Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and The First Hague Peace Conference 
(Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1962), 146-213.
Although the final vote on July 17, 1998 for the adoption o f the ICC Statute was 
non-recorded, after the vote the U.S. State Department announced in a press conference 
that the U.S. had voted against the treaty. See United States, Department o f State, Dallv 
Press Briefing 20 July 1998, available from http://www.secretary.state.gov/ briefings 
/9807/980720db.html; Internet; accessed 16 May 2001.
Wexler, “Panel Discussion,” 235.
“ICC Statute.”
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guages with a 173-page draft statute containing 116 articles and 1,300 brackets for op­
tional provisions and word choices.'^ The result was, admittedly and expectedly, a 
Court that is not a perfect institution.
Professor Leila Sadat W exler, a participant at the Rome conference, has stated 
that “the first thing one observes in glancing at the Statute is how complicated it is.” ’’ 
With 128 articles it dwarfs the Nuremberg Charter, which only contained thirteen arti­
cles. As an example o f the Statute’s complexity, bringing an indictment before the ICC 
requires referring to Articles 12, 13, 17, 53 and 56.'® Nevertheless, the ICC’s creation 
contains elements that have the potential to influence dramatically international law. 
These elements include supranational judicial, enforcement, and quasi-legislative 
mechanisms and functions that will place state and non-state actors in an international 
judicial body with the authority to put “real people in real jails.” '^
The Statute adopted in Rome produces a comprehensive judicial organization pro­
jected to secure convictions for violations of the most serious international crimes. The 
Statute begins with a Preamble that provides historical reasons for the establishment o f 
an International Criminal Court and sets forth the intention o f the Statute:
Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced to­
gether in a shared heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shat­
tered at any time.
Leila Sadat Wexler, “A First Look at the 1998 Rome Statute for a Permanent 
International Criminal Court: Jurisdiction, Definition o f Crimes, Structure and Referrals 
to the Court,” in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed. International Criminal Law. 2d ed., 3 vols. 
(New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1999), 3: 655.
Wexler,“Panel Discussion,” 235.
'® Ibid.
Wexler, in Bassiouni. International Criminal Law. 3: 656.
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M indful that during this century millions o f children, women and men have been 
victims o f unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience o f humanity, 
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being o f 
the world,
A ffirm ing that the most serious crimes o f concern to the international community 
as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be 
ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international 
cooperation?®
The ICC, while being the first permanent international criminal court, is not a new 
idea. In 1474, Peter von Hagenbach was brought before the judgm ent o f  27 judges o f  the 
Holy Roman Empire, and found guilty for war crimes against civilians committed by 
troops under his command.^' Similarly, in 1815 a British naval squadron captured the 
international fugitive Napoleon Bonaparte. However, Napoleon’s fate, unlike von 
Hagenbach’s, was exile, and not prosecution before an international criminal court.
Yet, while international crimes and tribunals have existed far back into human 
history, it was the events o f the twentieth century that gave rise to deliberate attempts to 
establish a permanent international criminal court to prosecute effectively international 
war crimes. The tremendous destruction o f lives and property in the two world wars 
drew public demands for trials to prosecute those responsible.^^
Numerous scholarly treatments o f the evolution o f the proposal for an international 
criminal court document the difficulty o f transposing the idea into reality.^'’ All attest to the
“ICC Statute,” Preamble.
Paul D Marquardt, “Law W ithout Borders: The Constitutionality o f an Interna­
tional Criminal Court,” Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law 33 (1995): 76-77.
Economist, 19 July 1997,45.
Howard Ball, Prosecuting W ar Crimes and Genocide (Kansas: University Press 
of Kansas, 1999), 17-25.
Ibid.; 78-148; Bassiouni, “From Versailles To Rwanda, 11-12; Bassiouni, Interna­
tional Criminal Law, 3 vols.; Colleen R. Donovan, “The History and Possible Future o f
9
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
fact that, until recently, the proposal has had a long and largely disappointing history. Most 
notable is the dismal failure o f the post-W orld W ar I efforts to prosecute German and Turk­
ish nationals suspected o f war crimes.
Following the aborted W orld W ar I war crimes trials various proposals for a world 
criminal court were introduced by the International Law Commission and other scholars 
throughout the 1920’s and 30’s, all o f  which met with failure.^^ Even the successful post- 
W orld W ar II Nuremberg and Tokyo trials o f German and Japanese war criminals raised 
moral and legal controversies over accusations o f  victor's iustice.̂  ̂ Nevertheless, antic ip a-
Intemational Criminal Law,” Brookings Journal o f International Law 13 (1987): 89-90; 
John B. Anderson, “An International Criminal Court - An Emerging Idea,” Villanova 
Law Review 15 (1991): 433-434; Telford Taylor, The Anatomv o f the Nuremberg Trials 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992), 8; James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The 
Politics and Diplomacy o f Punishing W ar Criminals o f the First World W ar (London: 
Greenwood Press, 1982), 5.
Willis, 1-176.
For example, in 1924 the International Law Association adopted a resolution for 
an international criminal court providing that "in [its ] ... opinion ... the creation o f an In­
ternational Criminal Court is essential in the interests o f justice, and ... a matter o f ur­
gency.” Several objections were raised and the proposal was defeated. The idea was re­
vived after the assassination o f King Alexander o f Yugoslavia in 1934, and in 1937 a 
convention was opened for signature on the creation of an international criminal court that 
would try persons accused o f an offence established in the Convention for the Prevention 
and Punishment of Terrorism. See Leila Sadat Wexler, “The Proposed Permanent Inter­
national Criminal Court: An Appraisal,” Cornell International Law Journal 29 (1996): 
571-573.
In regard to victor’s justice Immanuel Kant noted that “where no tribunal em­
powered to make judgments supported by the power of law exists,” judgments would be 
determined by might and power as “neither party can be declared an unjust enemy and the 
outcome of the conflict determines the side on which justice lies.” In Plato’s Republic. 
Thrasymachus says “[E] verywhere justice is the same thing, the advantage of the 
stronger.” WWE General Curtis LeMay, who targeted sixty-three Japanese cities for 
American bombs remarked, “I suppose if  I had lost the war, I would have been tried as a 
war criminal. Fortunately, we were on the winning side.” Quoted in Gary Jonathon Bass, 
Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics o f W ar Crimes Tribunals (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2000), 9.
10
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tion was high in various quarters that the international legal precedents set at Nuremberg 
would translate into the creation of a permanent war crimes tribunal. The Nuremberg and 
Tokyo tribunals served as both inspiration and as potential models for the idea o f a perm a­
nent criminal court. However, that anticipation faltered in the post-W orld W ar II reality of 
the Cold War. At that time, neither the USSR nor the United States was particularly inter­
ested in establishing an international judicial body with the power to scrutinize their foreign 
policy military decisions.^®
During the Cold W ar period the idea of a permanent international criminal court 
was kept alive mostly due to the efforts o f international legal scholars. The idea gained 
renewed support with the breakup o f the former USSR and the reports o f war crimes 
and genocide coming out o f the Balkans in the early 1990’s. The collapse o f the Soviet 
Union and the creation o f ad hoc war crimes tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda gave momentum to the 1989 proposal by Trinidad and Tobago for a permanent 
international criminal court,^^ In 1989 the UN General Assembly seized upon the idea 
and commissioned the International Law Commission to produce a draft o f such a
court.^®
Bassiouni, “From Rwanda to Versailles,” 39; Marquardt, 85.
The idea for a permanent international criminal court was revived by Trinidad 
and Tobago who argued for the merits o f such a court to combat international drug traf­
ficking and other transnational crimes. See United Nations, Letter dated 21 August 1989 
from the Permanent Representative o f Trinidad and Tobago to the Secretary-General. UN 
General Assembly Official Records, 44* Sess., Annex 44, Agenda Item 152, 1989, UN 
Doc. A/44/195, as cited in Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, “Developments in International 
Criminal Law: The Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court,” The American 
Journal o f International Law 93 (January, 1999), 22.
United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 44/39, UN General Assembly Of­
ficial Records, 44* Sess., Supp. No. 48, 1989, UN Doc.A/44/195, 311.
11
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The reports o f atrocities in the former Yugoslavia led to the creation in 1993 by 
the United Nations Security Council o f a war crimes tribunal to investigate and prose­
cute suspected war criminals. One year later genocide in Rwanda led to another Secu­
rity Council created war crimes tribunal. The General Assembly took advantage o f the 
favorable international support for an ICC and took steps towards its creation.^'
Following the UN General Assembly’s requests, events toward the establishment 
o f a world criminal court moved rapidly. In 1994, the ILC reported back to the General 
Assembly with an initial draft. On December 9, 1994 the General Assembly created 
an Ad Hoc Committee to initiate a review o f the unresolved substantive and administra­
tive issues needed to bring the ILC’s draft o f the ICC to treaty form.^^ In 1995, the 
General Assembly, following a recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee, created a 
Prepatory Committee (PrepCom) to hold a series o f meetings to assist in the work o f 
establishing the ICC. In December 1996 the General Assembly scheduled a date to 
convene a diplomatic conference to finalize the ICC draft statute and produce a perma­
nent ICC. The international community accepted Italy’s offer to host the event, and the 
conference was set to convene in Rome in July 1998. '̂*
Four years after the completion o f the ILC’s first draft for the ICC, delegates from 
countries all over the world, along with over 3,000 non-govemmental organizations,
William S. Shepard, “Restraining Gulliver; American Exceptionalism and the In­
ternational Criminal Court,” Mediterranean Ouarterlv 11 (2000), 56.
United Nations, Report o f the International Law Commission on the Work of the 
Forty-Sixth Session, UN General Assembly Official Records, 49*’’ Sess., Supp. No. 10, 
1994, UN Doc. A/49/10, 44.
United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 49/53. UN General Assembly Of­
ficial Records, 49*'’ Sess., Supp. No. 49, 1994, UN Doc. A/49/49, 239.
Ball, 195.
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met in Rome in June and July o f 1998 to finalize the draft statute and create a treaty es­
tablishing the world’s first permanent international criminal court. In the last half o f the 
last decade o f the twentieth century the international community accomplished in under 
a decade what it could not accomplish in seventy-five years.
13
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CHAPTER 2
IMPETUS FOR A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
Throughout the twentieth century proponents o f a permanent international crimi­
nal court have sought to make their vision o f establishing such a court a reality. Fol­
lowing the First and Second W orld Wars efforts were made to create international tri­
bunals to prosecute war crimes committed during those wars. The W orld W ar II war 
crimes tribunals in Nuremberg, Germany, marked the first time in the modem era that 
the international community attempted to hold individuals and states accountable for 
serious violations o f international law.* The legacy o f Nuremberg made the Interna­
tional Criminal Court (ICC) possible.^ The purpose o f this chapter is to explore the 
evolution o f the twentieth century efforts to create a permanent international criminal 
court by examining their development through history. This discussion will set the 
context for an examination o f the U.S. objections to the International Criminal Court 
created by treaty in Rome o f 1998.^
‘ Paul D Marquardt, “Law Without Borders: The Constitutionality o f an Interna­
tional Criminal Court,” Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law 33 (1995): 83.
 ̂United Nations, “Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court,” 17 July 
1998. United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment 
o f an International Criminal Court. U.N. GAOR, 53'̂ '* sess., 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
183/9 (Hereafter ICC Statute or Rome Statute).
^Ibid.
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The following chapter contains three sections. The first section examines the na­
ture and scope of the laws o f war. The second section studies the post-W orld W ar I 
efforts to punish German and Turkish suspected war criminals. Section three explores 
the developments o f international criminal law during the interwar period between the 
First and Second World Wars. The purpose o f this chapter is to describe the historical 
background o f the post-W orld W ar I attempts at conducting international war crimes, 
and to explore the developing law these courts were endeavoring to enforce.
The Law s of W ar: Beginnings o f Codification
The remarkable events o f the twentieth century that have led to a permanent 
world criminal court are best punctuated by the two W orld Wars and the post-war at­
tempts to introduce international accountability for crimes committed in the conduct o f 
those wars. The more successful o f the efforts to punish war criminals followed the 
Second World War with the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals. The Interna­
tional Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg, the International Military Tribunal in the 
Far East (IMTFE), and succeeding Allied prosecutions provided significant interna­
tional legal precedents necessary for the ICC’s creation.'*
But what law were these international criminal tribunals enforcing? National le­
gal systems are based on laws created by sovereign nations. International tribunals, in­
cluding the IMT, are not the products o f any national system. The IMT was created by 
the United States, Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union, and the laws adjudicated
'* M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed. International Criminal Law. 2d ed., 3 vols. (New York: 
Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1999), 1: 21-23.
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by the IMT were based on international “laws o f war,” breaches o f which are referred 
to as “war crimes.” However, Nuremberg while almost synonymous with “war 
crimes” in our culture, is not the source o f these “laws of war.”
Traditionally, international law governed relations among nation-states, not indi­
viduals.* Thus, while nation-states could be held liable to pay reparations for breaches 
o f international law, national leaders that authorized the violations were considered be­
yond its jurisdiction. Criminal law systems were largely confined to national law, even 
if the criminal actions were international in nature. Consequently, criminal jurisdiction 
was territorially based, and state jurisdiction was limited to acts committed on its terri­
tory or vessels flying its flag. *
Nevertheless, certain international conduct by individuals has long been univer­
sally recognized as criminal, thus enabling states to prosecute even in the absence o f 
territorial jurisdiction. It was typically the case that if  a country could gain custody o f 
an individual then a trial could occur. The problem then became one o f apprehending 
the accused. Two o f the earliest crimes recognized as permitting universal jurisdiction 
for state prosecution are piracy and the slave trade. Piracy in international law is 
considered outside the protection o f any state such that any state may arrest and
* Colleen R. Donovan, “The History and Possible Future o f International Criminal
Law.” Brookings Journal o f International Law 13 (1987): 89-90
John B. Anderson, “An Interna 
nova Law Review 15 (1991): 433-434
ational Criminal Court - An Emerging Idea,” Villa-
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prosecute individuals for acts o f piracy no matter where they are found / Violations o f 
the laws o f war also warrant state prosecution o f individuals even if  the conduct oc­
curred outside of a nation’s territory. ®
However, up until the twentieth century prosecution for these few international 
crimes was limited to national criminal courts. International criminal tribunals were 
virtually non-existent.^ The First and Second World W ar changed that fact. Out o f  the 
aftermath of the suffering and destruction wrought by the two W orld Wars grew the 
idea o f creating a permanent international criminal court to try individuals for viola­
tions o f the laws o f war.
The twentieth century, beginning one year after the first Hague Convention in 
1899, is infamous as both the deadliest century in recorded human history, and the cen­
tury in which humanity did the most to create laws and institutions to protect humanity 
from the barbarity o f their fellow man. It was most remarkable for criminalizing the
 ̂While piracy has long been viewed as a serious international problem meriting 
universal condemnation, criminal prosecution and prevention poses numerous practical 
and legal difficulties for nation-states. See Rupa Bhattacharyya, “Establishing a Rule-of- 
Law International Criminal Justice System,” Texas International Law Journal 31. no. 57 
(1996): 66.
* The Romans and Greeks prohibited certain actions in the conduct o f war. For 
example, the Greeks prohibited poisoning o f springs and wells. See “Remigiusz Bier- 
zanek. W ar Crimes: History and Definition,” in Bassiouni, International Criminal Law.
3: 87.
 ̂There have been exceptions, but they have been rare. In 1474, an international 
tribunal consisting o f  22 judges firom the Holy Roman Empire condemned Peter von 
Hagenback to death for permitting his troops to attack civilians. See Robert B. Rosen- 
stock, “ 1994 Mclean Lecture on World Law: The Proposal for an International Criminal 
Court,” University o f Pittsburgh Law Review 56 (Winter 1994): 271; Possibly the first 
recognition in "modem times" that an international tribunal might be useful in fighting 
international crime was at the Congress o f  Vienna in 1815 during discussions on the sup­
pression o f the slave trade. See Anderson, 433.
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very notion o f  war, thus turning back centuries o f state and society acceptance o f  war 
as a state prerogative, a sentiment most eloquently espoused by Clausewitz when he 
wrote, “War is the continuation o f politics by other means.” ’®
W ithin this revolutionary change in criminalizing war, three major developments 
in international law occurred. First, international law prior to the twentieth century had 
legally recognized states as having complete sovereignty, which meant they were not 
bound by any outside authority or law for which they did not grant their consent. This 
meant that the laws o f one nation could not bind another. Force alone determined if  
one nation ruled over another.”
Ancillary to this principle is that states enjoyed complete freedom within their do­
mestic jurisdiction in that nations could not intervene in the affairs o f other states re­
gardless o f how states treated their nationals. Second, individual actions performed 
through state sanction were immune from international prosecution with one exception, 
that being the laws o f piracy on the high seas, which was universally condemned and 
punishable. Therefore, heads-of-state and military commanders were not criminally 
liable in international law for the actions o f their militaries. This principle o f sovereign 
immunity for heads o f state prevented their prosecution for conduct committed while
’® Carl von Clausewitz, On War, quoted in David Marcella, “Grotius Repudiated: 
The American Objections to the International Criminal Court and the Commitment to 
International Law,” Michigan Journal o f International Law 20 (Winter 1999): 341.
”  H. Lauterpacht, The Function o f Law in the International Community (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1933); reprint Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1966), 1-21 (page citations 
are to the reprint edition).
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serving in their official capacities. Third, the laws o f war at the beginning o f the cen­
tury only applied during armed conflict in war. Yet, as the century progressed the laws 
o f war expanded to include the protection o f  individuals, both combatants and non- 
combatants, within the context o f officially declared wars, as well as outside official 
state declaration o f hostilities against another state.
The Treaty o f W estphalia (1648) at the conclusion o f the Thirty Years W ar 
(1618-1645) is generally acknowledged as the starting point for the emergence o f the 
modem state system. Usage and practice o f m les governing the exercise o f hostilities 
gradually became the laws o f war. The core elements o f the laws o f war were mostly 
unwritten and known as “customary law.” Prior to the nineteenth century these cus­
tomary laws o f war were largely u n c o d i f i e d . A m o n g  the first attempts to codify and 
embody the laws o f war into an officially adopted code occurred in the United States 
during the Civil War.*"*
Francis Lieber, a German émigré to the U.S., is credited with the first codification 
o f the law o f war. After emigrating from Germany to America, he became a legal 
United States citizen in 1832. He later became a professor in South Carolina before 
moving to New York in 1857, where he secured a professorship at the newly created 
Columbia Law School. A visit to a wounded son in Tennessee led to a chance meeting
'^Michael Howard, George J. Andreopoulos, and Mark R. Shulman, eds.. The 
Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World (New Haven: Yale Univer­
sity Press, 1994), 1-11.
Telford Tavlor. The Anatomv o f the Nuremberg Trials (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1992), 8.
Ibid., 8; Howard, Andreopoulus, and Shulman, 6.
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with General Henry W. Halleck, who was impressed with Lieber’s combination o f le­
gal, political, and military interests.'^
Later, upon becoming military advisor to President Lincoln, Halleck, him self the 
author o f an international law treatise, appointed Lieber to draft “a code o f  regulations 
for the government o f  [U.S.] Armies in the field o f battle authorized by the laws and 
usages o f war.” '^ The results were issued by President Lincoln as General Orders No. 
100, entitled “Instructions for the Government o f Armies o f the United States in the 
Field.” ’’ For over half a century they remained the official United States army code of 
conduct on the laws o f land warfare. As the first comprehensive codification o f the 
laws o f war, the Lieber Code figured significantly in the first international codification 
for War Crimes at the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899.’^
The Hague Conference in 1899 is notable for two major developments in interna­
tional relations and law. The first major development was the internationalization of 
the laws o f war, or at least what passed for international at that tim e.’  ̂ The 1899 
conference produced the first general international codification on the laws o f land
Taylor, 9.
Ibid; Howard, Andreopoulus, and Shulman, 6.
”  Taylor, 9.
Ibid., 10; W. Michael Reisman and Chris T. Antoniou, The Laws o f War: A 
Comprehensive Collection o f Primary Documents on International Laws Governing 
Armed Conflict (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), 131.
Only twenty-six states, predominately European, participated in the 1899 con­
ference. Inis Claude Jr., referred to this “international” gathering o f heads o f state as a 
“Board o f Directors o f the European corporation.” Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into 
Plowshares: The Problems and Progress o f International Relations. 4th ed. (New York: 
Random House, Inc., 1971), 29.
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warfare ever concluded in the form o f a multilateral t r e a t y . T h e  “Convention with 
Respect to the Laws and Customs o f  W ar on Land” was signed by the United States, 
Mexico, Japan, Persia, Siam, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and fifteen other 
European nations.^' The 1899 conference also produced a Convention on Maritime 
War, and three prohibitory declarations on the use o f explosives dropped from bal­
loons, on the use o f asphyxiating gases released from projectiles, and on expanding 
dumdum bullets.^^
The second major development represents the most ambitious effort at the 1899 
Hague c o n f e r e n c e . T h e  third committee at the 1899 conference labored from late 
May to the close o f July to address the proposal to create a permanent international 
court. On May 26, the second meeting o f the third committee had their first serious 
discussion o f the plan for that session, o f  which the first sentence read:
The contracting nations will mutually agree to submit to the International 
Tribunal all questions o f disagreement between them, excepting such as may re­
late to or involve their political independence or territorial integrity.^"*
Additionally, the idea was proposed that states should accept obligatory jurisdiction, a
non-voluntary and compulsory method o f forcing states to resolve their disputes before
^*^Adam Roberts, “Land Warfare: From Hague to Nuremberg,” in Howard, An­
dreopoulus, and Shulman, 121.
Taylor, 10.
Reisman, 49, 57-58, 130-132.
Calvin DeArmond Davis, The United States and The First Hague Peace Confer­
ence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), 137.
24 James B. Scott, The Hague Peace Conference, vol. 2 (Boston: Ginn, 1910), 2:
15; quoted in Davis, 137.
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a neutral arbitrator.^^ The proposal never had a realistic chance o f being approved.
The United States was opposed to any international court that would sit in judgm ent o f 
its actions, claiming as a defense the principle o f national sovereignty.^^ Nor was the 
U.S. the only state unwilling to sacrifice national sovereignty to an international or­
ganization.^® The European states likewise were unwilling to forego their sovereign 
rights as a nation to be the ultimate judge o f their own actions.
In 1907 at the second Hague Convention forty-four nations attended, including 
the majority o f Latin American states. The second conference constituted the most 
universal gathering o f nations to date as stated by the president o f  the conference: “This 
is the first time that the representatives o f all constituted States have been gathered to­
gether to discuss interests which they have in common and which contemplate the good 
o f all mankind.^^
Many believed that the two Hague Conferences marked the first stage in the 
gradual evolution o f global cooperation among s t a t e s . T h e  American delegate, Jo­
seph H. Choate, commented on the expectation o f regular and future conferences;
Friends o f peace, friends o f  arbitration, may now depend upon it that every 
seven to eight years there will be a similar conference, and that where the last 
conference left the work unfinished the new conference will take it up, and so 
progress from time to time be steadily made...^'
Davis, 137.
Ibid.
Ibid., 138.
Ibid., 138-140.
Claude, 29.
Ibid., 32
James B. Scott, ed. American Addresses at the Second Hague Peace Conference. 
(Boston: Ginn, 1910), xxv., as quoted in Claude, 31.
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However, the First World W ar shattered the expectation by Choate and others for a fu­
ture conference in Hague in 1915.
Yet, while the Hague Conferences failed to secure a lasting peace, they did set a 
precedent for international organization designed to solve difficult problems o f interna­
tional cooperation and peace through the creation o f  institutions to aid in the regulation 
o f conduct between nation-states.^^ The Hague approach, which recognized the need 
for international cooperation among nation-states, dominated international relations in 
the twentieth century.^^
Still, at that time the two Hague conferences were considered by many to be a 
complete failure.^"* The London Times newspaper wrote that the 1907 conference “was 
a sham, and has brought forth a progeny o f shams, because it was founded on a 
sham.”^̂  Nonetheless, the Hague meetings are considered to be a turning point in in­
ternational efforts to use the rule o f international law to regulate war.^^ Although ef­
forts to reduce armaments ended in failure, the conferences did produce a number of 
agreements to internationalize both preexistent and new laws and regulations for fight­
ing wars.^^ There was never real consideration o f governments relinquishing their sov-
Claude, 35. 
”  Ibid.
34 Davis, 209-213; For an alternative perspective, see Willis, 3-6.
Scott, ed. American Addresses at the Second Hague Peace Conference, xiii; as 
quoted in Claude, 29.
Claude, 28-34; Davis, 209-213; Taylor, 8-11; James F. Willis, Prologue to 
Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy o f  Punishing W ar Criminals o f the First World 
War (London: Greenwood Press, 1982), 5.
Claude, 30; Willis, 6.
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ereign legal right to make war, but the establishment o f a Permanent Court o f Arbitra­
tion and a Convention for the Pacific Settlement o f Disputes advanced the still radical 
concept o f  states seeking peaceful remedies for the resolution o f  disputes rather than 
resorting to redress o f grievances by armed force and w ar/^
The greatest achievements o f The Hague conferences were in developing laws 
designed to mitigate the more horrific effects o f  modem warfare through the laws gov­
erning the use o f force in war.^^ Customary international law restraining excessive vio­
lence on the battlefield had been recognized for centuries, and efforts at codification o f 
these laws o f war had been underway even prior to the national militaries adopting 
such rules o f war, the first being Lieber’s United States General Orders No. 100 drafted 
for guidance o f Union armies during the American Civil War.
Comprehensive international agreements on the laws o f war were adopted for the 
first time by governments at the Hague conferences.'^^ The two Hague Conventions on 
the Laws o f War on Land in 1899 and 1907 included numerous provisions that forbade 
actions such as the bombing o f undefended towns, the use o f poison gas, the declara­
tion o f no quarter, misuse o f the flag o f  truce, assaulting soldiers that have surrendered, 
mistreatment o f prisoners o f war, the destruction o f enemy property, and permitting 
occupying armies to abuse enemy civilians.'^' The Convention on the Rights and Du-
Davis, 137-145 
Taylor, 11.
Ibid., 10.
“Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs o f War on Land, with 
Annex o f Regulations, 18 October 1907, reprinted in Bums H. Weston, Richard A. Falk, 
and Anthony D ’Amato, Basic Documents in Intemational Law and World Order. 2d ed.
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ties o f Neutral Powers and Persons in W ar on Land o f 1907 provided certain protec­
tions to neutral states, including an assurance o f the inviolability o f territorial integrity 
o f a neutral state.'*^
The problems o f implementing the Hague Conventions relating to the conduct o f 
war, which First W orld W ar combatants would grapple with, were num erous/^ One 
problem is the doctrine o f  military necessity and reprisal/'* Reprisals are actions con­
ducted by states to redress a grievous during times o f a peace. The doctrine o f  military 
necessity and reprisal grants to states the right to exceptions from strictly obeying the 
laws o f war when retaliating against an enemy or pursuing a military objection.'*^ 
However, as individual nation-states are left to interpret their own use o f  reprisals and 
acts o f military necessity, the problem o f varying interpretations and circumventions is 
introduced.
There was also the problem o f enforcement. The Hague Conventions contained 
no criminal sanctions in the event o f violations, only claims for compensation. Article 
3 o f the Convention on the Laws and Customs o f W ar on Land in 1907 made belliger­
ent parties in violation o f  the laws o f  war “liable to pay compensation,” and to be “re-
(St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1990) , 128-135 (hereafter cited as 1907 Hague 
Convention).
Ibid., 130.
Taylor, 11.
Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, Intemational Law and the Use of 
Force (New York: Routiedge, 1993), 17-18; Willis, 6; Louis Henkin, Richard Crawford 
Pugh, Oscar Schachter, and Hans Smit, eds., Intemational Law Cases and Materials 3'̂ '* 
ed. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1993), 570, 870-871.
Ibid.
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sponsible for acts committed by persons forming part o f its armed forces.”'*̂  Individual 
soldiers would be punished as they had been in the past, in accordance with the m ili­
tary laws and courts o f each state.
Participants at The Hague conferences never conceived o f creating an intem a­
tional criminal court to prosecute war crimes.'*^ Instead, the 1907 Conference created 
an Intemational Prize Court for the resolution o f disputes between states arising out o f 
captured merchant ships and cargoes in war at sea, but the court was never established. 
The failure to establish the Prize court was due to govem m ents’ reluctance to sacrifice 
state sovereignty. This fundamental problem weakened the effectiveness o f the Hague 
Conventions. The inherent problem o f limiting the power o f sovereign states through 
intemational law is captured by John Randolph, who stated, “You may cover whole 
skins o f parchment with limitations, but power alone can limit power.”"**
Thus, when the First W orld W ar broke out in Europe no acknowledged intem a­
tional law existed that made states or individuals criminally liable for violating the laws 
o f war. But the Hague Conventions had internationalized the subject o f limiting war 
through intemational laws and opened up the possibility o f  limiting state sovereignty, a 
major breakthrough in the development o f intemational relations and criminal law.
The Hague conference had also laid the foundation for extraordinary developments that 
were to take place in the political and public mindset regarding war crimes during and 
after the First W orld War.
Ibid., 130.
Davis, 137-140.
John Randolph as quoted in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. 6*’’.
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World W ar I and W ar Crimes Trials
The First W orld W ar represented a significant departure from previous wars for a 
number o f reasons. It was the first war since the two Hague conferences o f  1899 and 
1907, and called into question many, although not all o f  the agreements o f  the Hague 
Conventions. It was the world’s first total war, involving over 65 million combatants 
from thirty-two nations."*^ W ar was fought on the European continent, the Balkans, 
Africa, the Middle East, the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, and the North Sea. Twenty 
one million men were wounded, and nine million were killed.
Administratively, the war required increased mobilization o f soldiers through 
conscription and massive coordination o f state and industrial re so u rc e s .T e c h n o lo g i­
cally, the war was fought with improved battlefield communications, newer, deadlier 
weapons, and improved methods o f destruction, including trench and submarine war­
fare, poison gas, barbed wire, aerial bombardment, machine guns, powerful long-range 
artillery, tanks, and airplanes.^' It was the first major industrial war that gave rise to 
the military industrial complex involving state and industrial cooperation o f such large 
companies as Dupont in the United States, Krupp in Germany, Vickers in Great Brit­
ain, and France’s Cruesot company.^^
ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 1948), 189.
49 Howard Ball, Prosecuting W ar Crimes and Genocide (Kansas: University Press
o f Kansas, 1999), 17.
^«Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Finally, the war had a strong ideological component that fostered a storm o f  en­
emy propaganda/^ The Germans in the early months o f the war had managed to gen­
erate a considerable amount o f hostile world public opinion against them. First they 
had attacked neutral Belgium as a means to outflank French defenses in violation o f  the 
Belgium neutrality t r e a t y . T h e  German invasion o f  Belgium brought with it reports 
o f atrocities and ruthless destruction. The ancient city o f Louvain was sacked, and its 
world-famous library was set afire; civilians were taken hostage, some o f whom were 
shot; and, invading soldiers were alleged to have raped women and killed children. 
Shortly thereafter, comparable reports were coming in from France regarding alleged 
German brutalities in that country.^*^
In January o f 1915, German zeppelins began bombing raids over England, which 
resulted in over 200 civilian deaths by the end o f the year.^^ In February 1915, Ger­
many declared a “war zone” around the British Isles and began sinking ships with no 
warning using their submarines. In April, the passenger ship, the Lusitania was sunk in 
the Atlantic, and 1,200 lives were lost. That same month the Germans used poison gas 
for the first time in the battle o f  Ypres. Later in 1915, the Turkish government, an ally 
o f Germany, began the ruthless deportation and extermination o f the Armenians in the 
Syrian Desert. Then in October the British public was further outraged upon hearing of
Ibid.
54 Ibid., 17-18,
Ibid., 18.
L. Mirman, G. Simon, and G. Keller, Their Crimes (London: Cassel and Com­
pany, Limited, 1917).
; Ball, 16-19.
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the execution o f Edith Cavell, the director o f a Brussels nursing school. The night after 
CavelTs execution was reported, a German zeppelin raid killed 175 people in Great 
Britain.^^
The list o f alleged German and Turkish actions was long and sordid, and earned 
for the Germans the invidious label o f  “Huns” and their military policies as “frightful- 
ness.”^̂  However, in nearly every case, there were serious evidentiary or legal ques­
tions” that cast doubt on whether or not the Central Powers’ actions constituted “war 
crimes.”®® As it turned out, many o f the reports regarding German atrocities in Bel­
gium, including indiscriminate murder, rape, and infanticide, were exposed as fraudu­
lent propaganda stories®' The neutrality treaty o f Belgium, violated on the first day of 
the war by Germany, bore no criminal sanctions, and when Belgium citizens resisted 
occupation they ceased to be regarded as a neutral country.
The execution o f Edith Cavell was the result o f her public admission that she had 
assisted Allied soldiers trapped behind enemy lines to escape. The punishment o f  Cav­
ell, while severe, did not constitute a legal violation o f war crimes. The destruction of 
Louvain was clearly in contravention o f  several Hague Convention provisions, but tak­
ing and even killing o f hostages did not so constitute a violation o f the Hague Conven­
tions.®^
Ibid.
Ball, 18.
®® Taylor, 13. 
®' Ibid.
®̂ Ibid.
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The zeppelin raids similarly, fell between the gaps o f the war crimes violations. 
The Hague Convention on land warfare prohibited the bombardment o f undefended 
cities, but London was not an undefended city. The declaration o f the 1907 Hague 
Convention prohibiting the discharge o f explosives from “balloons, or by other new 
methods o f  a similar nature” had never been ratified by Germany, and therefore were 
not in force.^^ There were no agreements regarding the restriction o f  submarine war­
fare, excepting protection for hospital ships.^
The use o f poison or asphyxiating gas, while much less defensible, could be ar­
gued as being permissible since the Hague Convention on land warfare only prohibited 
their diffusion by “the use o f projectiles.” The Germans could argue they had used cyl­
inders, not projectiles.̂  ̂ The extermination o f  the Armenians by the Ottoman Empire 
was inapplicable to the Hague Conventions as the Armenians were citizens o f  the O t­
toman Empire, and thus were not protected under the terms o f any existing convention 
or treaty. The Hague Conventions were silent regarding the treatment o f a nation’s 
own citizens.^^ Thus, how the Ottoman Empire treated its own citizens, the Arm eni­
ans, was the prerogative o f the Ottoman Empire.
In one o f  the most detailed studies o f the First World W ar and war crimes, James
63 “ J9 0 7  Hague Convention,” reprinted in Weston, Falk, and D ’Amato, 128-135. 
^^Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
The long established principle o f territorial sovereignty involves the exclusive 
right o f nation-states to exercise power autonomously within their territory free from ex­
ternal authority or interference. See Henkin, Pugh, Schachter, and Smit, 1-50.
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Wilford Garner concluded that with respect to a wide range o f state conduct during the 
war, “the existing conventions are either silent, inadequate, or out o f  harmony with pre­
sent-day conditions. There is hardly one o f the Hague conventions that cannot be 
greatly improved in light o f the experience o f the recent w ar.” ®̂
Nevertheless, three main factors contributed to the favorable political climate for 
conducting war crimes trials against the Axis powers at the end o f  the First W orld 
War.®^ First, the public and political leaders in Great Britain and France had been sen­
sitized to the idea o f war crimes by Allied and Central Pow ers’ war crimes trials con­
ducted during the war. The French tried German soldiers for the commission o f crimi­
nal activity in the plunder o f Rheims Cathedral and failing to grant quarter to French 
soldiers. German courts tried French and British prisoners o f war for their alleged 
criminal activity, and the British tried German sailors for the waging o f unrestricted 
submarine warfare, treating captured Germans not as prisoners o f war, but as war 
criminals.^'
Second, the fierce propaganda against the German “Huns”, the brutality which 
Germany conducted the war, and the alleged war crimes committed by the Central 
Powers nations created a public outcry for their punishment, particularly Germany.
James Wilford Gamer, Intemational Law and the World War. 2 vols. (London; 
Longmans, Green, 1920) , 2: 463, as cited in Roberts, “Land Warfare: From Hague to 
Nuremberg,” in Howard, Andreopoulus, and Shulman, Andreopoulos, and. Shul­
man, 153.
Ball, 19.
Ibid.
”  Ibid.
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Third, the Hague Conventions had internationalized and legitimated acceptance o f the 
idea o f  limiting warfare and punishing transgressors o f the laws and customs o f war.
Thus, the war crimes issue became the first action o f the peace settlement discus­
sions at Versailles in 1919/^ At the insistence o f Britain’s Lloyd George and France’s 
George Clemenceau, the Committee o f Enquiry into the Breaches o f the Laws o f War, 
comprising fifteen intemational law jurists from the Allied countries, was created on 
the first day o f the conference on January 18, 1919/^ The Commission was charged 
with looking at and reporting back to the peace conference delegates on three issues:
(1) The facts surrounding the responsibility for starting the world war;
(2) W hether the Central Powers had violated the Hague Conventions or other 
laws o f war; and,
(3) Proposing a process o f trying accused war criminals.^"*
Robert Lansing, the American Secretary o f State, chaired the Commission. Lans­
ing was skeptical regarding the efficacy o f intemational law and opposed punishing 
Kaiser Wilhelm II or establishing a war crimes court.^^ In March 1919, the Commis­
sion reported back its findings. The Commission charged Germany and the Central 
Powers with widespread violations o f the laws o f war.’  ̂ The report also charged that
Willis, 68; Taylor, 15. 
Willis, 69.
Ball, 21.
Willis, 74.
“Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors o f the War and on Enforce­
ment o f Penalties,” 29 March 1919, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Confer­
ence, American Journal o f Intemational Law 14 (1920): 95-96 (hereafter cited as 1919 
Commission Report).
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the Central Powers had acted with premeditation to launch a “war o f aggression” in 
violation o f treaties/^
However, the report took notice that launching an aggressive war violated no in­
temational laws, but in the future such conduct should be condemned and made a penal 
offense. In advocating the trial o f the Kaiser, the report most notably repudiated the 
defense o f sovereign immunity for state officials in the conduct o f  warfare. The French 
and British believed Germany’s head o f state, Kaiser W ilhelm H, “was responsible for 
intemational crimes and that superior orders might not serve as a defense in every case; 
[these views] added a new dimension to legal developments in intemational penal 
law.”^̂
To implement the war crimes trials, the report recommended creating an intem a­
tional criminal court consisting o f judges from all Allied nations to try German and 
Turkish heads o f state and top military commanders for violating the laws o f  war and 
the laws o f humanity The laws o f humanity were primarily derived from the Pream­
ble to the Hague Convention o f 1907, referred to as the Martens Clause, named after 
the distinguished Russian intemational law jurist.*^ The Commission charged that the
Ibid.
Ball, 19.
Willis, 75; M. Cherif Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda in Seventy-Five 
Years: The Need to Establish a Permanent Intemational Criminal Court,” Harvard Hu­
man R idits Journal 10 (Spring 1997): 35.
Ibid.; “ 1907 Hague Conference,” reprinted in Weston, Falk, and D ’Amato, 128. 
The M artens’ Clause contained in the Preamble o f the 1907 Hague Convention reads:
Until a more complete code o f the laws o f war has been issued, the High Contract­
ing Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the
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Central Power’s leadership had violated the laws o f war by ordering their militaries to 
commit illegal acts or had failed to prevent them. The final report listed some 895 al­
leged war criminals for prosecution, which ultimately were incorporated into the Ver­
sailles Peace Treaty in Sections 227 to 230.^' For the first time in history the Versailles 
Treaty established the precedent that punishment o f war crimes could follow the cessa­
tion of hostilities, rather than the traditional granting o f  general amnesty for civilian 
and military personnel and leaders.^^
The 1910 Commission Report, while unanimous, contained Lansing’s resounding 
“reservations,” which in effect amounted to a dissent.®^ President W ilson was con­
cerned about “victor’s justice,” and instructed Lansing to issue a minority report reject­
ing the creation of a High Tribunal and the trial of the Kaiser.*"* However, Lloyd 
George was adamant in announcing he would not sign a peace treaty that did not pro­
vide for the trial of the Kaiser. The two sides achieved a compromise, embodied in
rule of the principles o f the law o f nations, as they result fi"om the usages established 
among civilized peoples, fi*om the laws o f humanity, and the dictates o f the public con­
science.
*' Sources conflict as to the number o f alleged war criminals listed for prosecution. 
Telford Taylor stated that the Allies presented a list o f 854 individuals. See Taylor, 17; 
Bassiouni stated that the Allies named 895 war criminals; see Bassiouni, “From Rwanda 
to Versailles,” 26; Remigiusz Bierzanek, “W ar Crimes: History and Definition,” in Bas­
siouni, Intemational Criminal Law. 3 vols. (New York: Transnational Publishers, 1999): 
34. Bierzanek states that the number o f individuals listed was 901.
82 Ball, 22. 
Taylor, 15. 
Ibid.
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Articles 227 to 230 o f  the Treaty o f  Versailles.®^ The compromise however, was not 
without its detractors. These war crimes sections o f the Versailles Treaty were referred 
to as the “shame paragraphs,” or the Schmachparagraphen by Germany.®^ Attempts by 
the post-war German government to implement the “shame paragraphs” resulted in 
violent political upheavals that threatened to topple the government.®^
Article 227 called for the creation o f a five-member tribunal to try the Kaiser,®® 
One judge from each o f the five countries o f the United States, Great Britain, France, 
Italy, and Japan would comprise the five-member tribunal. However, the Kaiser was 
not charged with war crimes, but rather “a supreme offence against intemational moral-
®̂ Willis, 80; Carnegie Endowment for Intemational Peace, “The Treaty o f Ver­
sailles,” The Treaties o f Peace, 1919-1923. 2 vols. (New York: Camegie Endowment for 
Intemational Peace, 1924), 1:121-122.
®̂ Ball, 23.
®’ The leader o f the British Mission at the Leipzig Trials reported that the post-war 
German Government convinced the Supreme Council that an attempt to arrest many o f 
those named on the Allies' list o f  war criminals would bring down the govemment. 
Claude Mullins, The Leipzig Trials: An Account o f the W ar Criminals’ Trials and a 
Studv of German Mentality. (1921): 9, as cited in Bassiouni, “From Rwanda to Ver­
sailles,” 19; Ball, 23; Willis, 85.
®® “Treaty o f Versailles,” Article 227, The Treaties o f Peace. 1919-1923. 1:121; 
Article 227 reads:
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II o f Hohenzollem, 
formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against intemational morality and the 
sanctity o f treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby as­
suring him the guarantees essential to the right o f defense. It will be composed of five 
judges, one appointed by each o f the following Powers: namely, the United States of 
America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. In its decision the tribunal will be 
guided by the highest motives o f intemational policy, with a view to vindicating the sol­
emn obligations of intemational undertakings and the validity o f intemational morality.
It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed. The Al­
lied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Govemment o f the Netherlands 
for the surrender to them o f the ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial.
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ity and the sanctity o f treaties.”®̂ Additionally, the Netherlands, who had granted asy­
lum to the Kaiser, was requested to “surrender to them [Allies] the ex-Emperor in order 
that he may be put on trial.”’® Articles 228, 229 and 230, called for trials o f  “persons 
accused o f having committed acts in violation o f the laws and customs o f war” before 
military tribunals and required the German govemment to “hand over” the accused to 
the Allied nations for prosecution.”  Comparable provisions to that o f Articles 228-230 
were also written into peace treaties with Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria.
Section 228 required the German govemment to “recognize the right o f the Allied 
and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused o f having 
committed acts in violation o f the laws and customs o f war.” Such persons, if  found 
guilty, were to “be sentenced to punishments laid down by law.”’  ̂ Section 229 out­
lined the process o f prosecution for the accused, and Section 230 required Germany 
and other defeated nations to “fumish all documents and information o f every kind, the 
production of which may be considered necessary to ensure the full knowledge o f the
Ibid.
Ibid.
“Treaty o f Versailles,” Article 228, 229, and 230, Treaties o f Peace, 1919-1923. 
1:121-122. Article 228 states:
The German Govemment recognizes the right o f the Allied and Associated Powers 
to bring before military tribunals persons accused o f having committed acts in violation 
o f the laws and customs o f war. Such persons shall, if  found guilty, be sentenced to pun­
ishments laid down by law. This provision will apply notwithstanding any proceedings 
or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory of her allies. The German 
Govemment shall hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or to such one o f them 
as shall so request, all persons accused o f having committed an act in violation o f the 
laws and customs o f war, who are specified either by name or by the rank, office or em­
ployment which they held under the German authorities, (emphasis added)
Ibid.
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incriminating acts, the discovery o f the offenders and the just appreciation o f responsi­
bility.”^̂
The trial o f the Kaiser never materialized as the Dutch refused to turn over the 
Kaiser for trial. The Dutch refused on the grounds that the charge against the Kaiser 
was unknown to Dutch law, and was not contained in any treaties which Holland had 
ratified. The Allied powers were divided over the wisdom o f pursuing the matter fully 
through formal extradition procedures. Meanwhile, Holland attempted to discourage 
the Allies from making a formal extradition request. Holland was also bolstered in 
their refusal by diplomatic indications that the Allied request to hand over the Kaiser 
would not be backed by coercion.^"*
Netherlands could justify its refusal based on a number o f valid legal reasons. 
The language of Article 227 only requested that the Dutch “surrender” the Kaiser, and 
contained no formal extradition language. Article 227 also charged the Kaiser for a 
crime that was not contained in any intemational criminal convention. Extradition, 
properly understood, was a formal legal process that required specification o f  a crime 
contained in a formal extradition treaty whereby one person may be transferred from 
one nation’s jurisdiction to another country’s jurisdiction to stand trial for that crime.^^
“Treaty o f Versailles,” Article 229, and 230; Treaties o f Peace.. 1919-1923.
1:122.
Taylor, 16.
Bassiouni, “From Rwanda to Versailles,” 19.
Over a decade later in 1933, the U.S. Supreme Court in Factor v. Laubenheimer. 
290 U.S. 276, 287, 54 S.Ct. 191, 193, 78, L.Ed, 78 L.Ed 315 (1933), the court stated that 
‘[t]he principles of intemational law recognize no right to extradition apart from treaty. 
While a govemment may, if  agreeable to its constitution and laws, voluntarily exercise 
power to surrender a fugitive from justice to the country to which he has fled...the legal
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W ithout a specific treaty governing the crime charged to Kaiser Wilhelm n , the Dutch 
were under no legal obligation to turn over the Kaiser to the Allies. Therefore, the 
Dutch could characterize the charges brought against Kaiser Wilhelm II as “political” 
and thus, the Dutch Govemment had valid legal grounds to reject Allied calls for the 
Kaiser’s surrender. Consequently, the Dutch refused to turn over the Kaiser, and he 
never left Holland — remaining there until his death in 1941 at his castle in Doom.
Article 227 highlights the highly politically sensitive nature o f  war crimes issues. 
It enabled the Dutch legally to refuse compliance with Allied demands, while placating 
the public who desired punishment o f the German Kaiser.^^ Yet, public outcry in 
France, Belgium, and Great Britain remained strong for the punishment o f German na­
tionals for atrocities committed during the war. However, Lloyd George and Clem­
enceau were also aware that German anger and resentment to Article 228, which called 
for Germany to surrender its own citizens for foreign prosecution, was potentially 
strong enough to topple the fragile W eimar Republic govemment.^® Faced with a dif­
ficult choice, George and Clemenceau chose to implement Article 228, and presented
right to demand his extradition and the correlative duty to surrender him to the demand­
ing country exist only when created by treaty,” as cited in Henkin, Pugh, Schachter, and 
Smit, 1111.
Bassiouni, “From Rwanda to Versailles,” 19.
The leader o f  the British Mission at the Leipzig Trials reported that the post-war 
German Govemment convinced the Supreme Council that an attempt to arrest many of 
those named on the Allies' list o f war criminals would bring down the govemment. 
Claude, Mullins, The Leipzig Trials: An Account o f the War Criminals’ Trials and a 
Study o f German Mentalitv. (1921): 9, as cited in Bassiouni, “From Rwanda to Ver­
sailles,” 19; Ball, 23; Willis, 85.
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Germany with a list o f over 800 individuals to stand trial, including many German 
military heroes and political leaders.^^
Reaction in Germany was one o f fierce indignation and defiance. The political 
crisis was resolved by the German proposal to try the accused individuals before the 
German Supreme Court in Leipzig. Lloyd George, sensing an opportunity to appease 
public desires for war crimes trials while helping preserve the fragile W eimar Repub­
lic, impressed upon the French the advantages o f accepting the proposal. The French 
agreed with George, and on February 17, 1920, the Germans were duly notified that the 
Allies had accepted their compromise proposal.’®®
Germany, in order to satisfy Allied demands, passed legislation creating national 
laws to prosecute accused offenders before the Supreme Court. The Allies initially 
submitted a list with forty-five named individuals to stand trial before the German Su­
preme Court. Under German law, the Procurator General o f the Supreme Court had 
discretionary authority to decide which cases to bring to trial.’®'
The Leipzig trials, as they are commonly referred, began on May 23, 1921 with 
four German enlisted men named by the British. Three men were accused o f beating 
British prisoners with rifle butts. Three o f  the men were convicted and sentenced to six 
to ten months in prison. The fourth individual named by the British was a German U-
Willis, 117.
’®® Taylor, 17; see note 81. 
101 Taylor, 17.
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boat submarine commander who was acquitted o f the charge o f sinking a British hospi­
tal ship on the defense o f  following superior orders.
The next case involved a charge brought by the Belgians against a German mili­
tary policeman accused o f torturing young children the policeman had arrested for al­
leged sabotage. The defendant was acquitted. The outraged Belgians condemned the 
trials and recused themselves o f any further involvement. A similar response was pro­
voked in the French whose case against General Stenger and four lower ranking mili­
tary officers resulted in the acquittals o f the General and three o f  the other four defen­
dants. During the trials the German public spat upon the French delegates, who with­
drew their delegation in protest and also refused further participation.'®^
O f the forty-five individuals named for prosecution in the initial list drawn up by 
the Allies, only twelve military officers were ultimately prosecuted before the German 
Supreme C o u r t . F o l l o w i n g  the initial list o f  forty-five, the Allies did not participate 
in, nor held any proceedings against, any o f the other 895 individuals named by the 
1919 Commission. On January 6-7, 1922, the Germans were informed of a joint Allied 
declaration that the Leipzig court’s decisions would not be considered as valid prosecu-
Ibid.
Ibid.
Sentences for the convicted ranged from six months to four years. However, 
several o f those convicted had their sentences suspended. The German crowd assembled 
outside the courtrooms cheered the accused during the trials, hailing the men as heroes 
and victims o f foreign oppression. Consequently, the attempt to use the trials as a deter­
rent to future violations o f humanitarian law failed, and instead devolved into a rallying 
point for nationalistic sentiment against perceived persecution and humiliation o f Ger­
mans by the Allies. See Bassiouni, “From Rwanda to Versailles,” 20.
40
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
tions under the terms o f  the Versailles T r e a t y . T h e  declaration also announced that, 
while repudiating the validity o f the Leipzig trials, the Allies reserved all rights under 
Articles 228-230 o f the Versailles Treaty to prosecute suspected German war crimi­
nals.*®^
Thus, articles 228 to 231 continued to be a source o f contention and animosity 
between Germany and the Allies, especially France.*®^ The Allies found the German 
war crimes trials at Leipzig highly unsatisfactory, and the retaliatory actions taken by 
France against Germany agitated Franco-German relations throughout the 1920’s. The 
Allies had good reason to believe that Germany had failed to make good faith efforts to 
prosecute their own war crim inals.’®® The German Supreme Court -  the Reichsgericht 
-  convicted only a few defendants, and the two most notorious convicted war criminals 
escaped and disappeared. Even these two convictions were later overturned in a secret 
session o f the Reichsgericht. Great Britain was satisfied to let the matter o f war crimes 
go, favoring reconciliation with Germany over punishm ent.’®̂ But Belgium and 
France pushed ahead for further punishment.
’®̂ The Inter-Allied Commission on the Leipzig Trials was responsible for report­
ing on the progress o f the trials. After two days o f discussion on January 6 and 7, 1922 
they issued their report calling the Leipzig trials “highly unsatisfactory.” See Willis, 140, 
quoting the New York Times. 15 January 1922, 19.
'®̂  Ibid.
’°̂  Ibid.; Willis, 142.
'®® Ibid.
'®® A majority o f British politicians wanted to see the issue o f war crimes trials dis­
appear, reflecting the view o f a British military intelligence report on the subject: “every­
body concerned -  most o f all the Attorney-General -  is only too anxious to let the whole 
war criminals question sleep. It only brings us trouble both with the French & with the 
Germans.” See Willis, 140, quoting Foreign Office, “Minute by R. F. Wigram on dis-
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Subsequently, France and Belgium conducted hundreds o f  trials against German 
war crime suspects. The two countries also used the war crimes issue as a diplomatic 
weapon to force Germany to comply with the terms o f the Versailles Treaty, particu­
larly the war reparations.' The Belgium and French trials ended completely in 1925 
when the Locarno pact formally established German, French, and Belgium borders. 
Nevertheless, France continued to denigrate Germany by refusing to allow convicted 
Germans from entering French territory until 1929. German politicians, most notably 
Adolph Hitler would use these French slights as political capital to engender nationalis­
tic fervor against the Allies in the interwar years. Germany bitterly resented having its 
soldiers convicted as war criminals by French and Belgium courts, and actively strove 
to erase the national humiliation they felt at the hands o f their Allied victors in W orld 
War I . '"
The Commission also charged Turkish officials and other individuals with 
“crimes against the laws o f humanity” for the 1915 massacres o f  Armenians."^ The 
charge o f violating the laws o f  humanity was based on the Martens Clause included in 
the Preamble o f the 1907 Hague Convention. The Martens Clause states;
patch [sic] from Captain Woolcombe to C.H. Tufton,” 14 October 1921, Great Britain. 
Papers o f the Foreign Office. Public Record Office. 371/5864, C 20103/29/18.
A new French Govemment, headed by Premier Poincaré took a harsher view 
toward German war guilt than former Premier Briand. Poincaré sought the court- 
marshal over 2,000 Germans, and used the issue as diplomatic pressure to continue 
French occupation o f the Ruhr and as means to exact unfulfilled reparation payments 
from Germany. See Willis, 143.
Willis, 145.
112 “ J9 J9  Commission Report,” reprinted in American Journal o f Intemational
Law. 95-96.
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Until a more complete code o f the laws o f war has been issued, the High Con­
tracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the 
Regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under 
the protection and the rule o f the principles o f the law o f nations, as they result 
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws o f humanity, 
and the dictates o f the public conscience.'
Turkey, in response to Allied pressures, convicted two individuals in April 1919 for
murdering Armenians."'* However, the Turkish nationalist movement was growing,
and Greek atrocities against Turks during that time elicited charges o f hypocrisy for
prosecuting Turkish individuals while excusing Greek crimes.' Along with charges
o f hypocrisy, continued political instability in Turkey prevented further efforts to bring
to justice those who had massacred the Armenians in 1915.
On a legal note the case involving the Armenians had serious legal problems as
all the potential witnesses were among the massacred, in which case the prosecution
was overly dependent on the cooperation o f the uncooperative Turkish government."^
As a result o f  these issues, the Allies declined to seek criminal prosecution, and in 1923
the Treaty o f Lausanne officially shielded the Armenians’ killers from prosecution with
a grant o f amnesty."^
"3 “ 1 9 0 7  Hague Convention,” reprinted in Weston, Falk, and D ’Amato, 128. 
""T aylor, 18.
"^Ibid .
"^Ib id .
Ibid; Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 17.
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Inter-War Period: T o  N u rem b erg  
Despite the failure o f the war crimes provisions o f the Versailles Treaty, the sav­
agery o f W orld W ar I provoked public demands for new methods o f  limiting the exces­
sive violence associated with modem warfare. Political leaders at the Paris Peace Con­
ference understood however that any new measures would likely face stiff political op­
position from nations more concerned with nationalist self-interests and self-defense. 
Nevertheless, the interwar period witnessed several efforts aimed at controlling the un­
restricted waging o f war. The most notable o f these efforts were attempts at strength­
ening the Hague Conventions, defining and outlawing aggressive warfare, codifying 
international war crimes, and creating a permanent international criminal court. These 
four issues and the problems they pose for establishing an international criminal justice 
system are the same ones facing the establishment o f the ICC nearly seventy-five years 
later in the last decade o f the twentieth century."®
A meeting o f the Advisory Committee o f Jurists in 1920 to draft a statute for the 
Permanent Court o f  International Justice also looked into the possibility o f establishing 
a permanent criminal court. The Advisory Committee offered as the rational for setting 
up a permanent criminal court that only a permanent judicial institution would be 
largely immune to the political problems that had plagued Allied attempts at pursuing 
war crimes trials following W orld W ar I.'
"® Willis, 164-176; Ball, 30-34; Taylor, 18-20.
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Albert de Lapradelle argued for the merits o f an institution that could impartially 
“take action against those guilty o f crimes against international justice, no matter what 
nation they belonged to.” '^° Lord Phillimore, who had drafted the first official British 
plan for the League o f Nations, supported such a court believing it would contribute to 
the League’s goal o f reducing international violence. Raoul Fernandes o f Brazil, said 
in a statement that nearly echoes the present day U.S. position opposing the ICC, that 
“serious technical and political difficulties,” unless adequately addressed, may actually 
be “a menace to peace.” '^'
American jurist Elihu Root, while opposed to granting to the League or its judi­
cial institutions de facto authority o f a “super-state,” favored a gradual approach that 
allowed an international criminal tribunal to grow as states became more confident in 
the new system’s ability to f u n c t i o n . R o o t  thought that the manner in which the 
slave trade was increasingly suppressed could serve as a prudent model for how nations 
might approach the outlawing o f international criminal activities.
Although the Advisory Committee was acutely aware o f the political and legal 
difficulties involved in such a proposal, they nevertheless recommended to the newly 
formed League the creation o f a High Court o f International Justice to try violations o f 
international law.'^^ The League’s Assembly ignored the committee’s report and ac-
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.; Benjamin Ferencz, An International Criminal Court: A Step Toward 
World Peace -  A Documentary History and Analysis. 2 vols. (New York: Oceana Pub­
lishers, 1980), 1:196-224.
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cepted it without debate. As the report was submitted at the first meeting, it was not 
surprising that the Assembly members did not wish to consider a measure that pro­
posed such sweeping changes to the international political system prior to the League’s 
demonstrating its ability to f u n c t i o n .S o v e r e i g n t y ,  newly acquired by some nations 
and so dearly preserved by others during the world war, would not quickly be sacri­
ficed to the altar o f an untested, and potentially oppressive, authoritarian international 
judicial body:’^̂
The League was strongly imbued with the W ilsonian conviction that the na­
tion is the natural and proper unit o f world politics, and that the only sound and 
moral basis for international order is a settlement which enables peoples to 
achieve autonomous existence within a system dedicated to the sovereignty o f na­
tions. Sovereignty was not a naughty word for the League; it was a symbol o f 
liberty in international relations, comparable to democracy as a symbol o f domes­
tic freedom.
Thus, in the 1920’s discussions and debates concerning an international criminal tribu­
nal failed to materialize in the League or among governments.
Instead, the idea was preserved through study by private organizations composed 
o f international lawyers, including Hugh H. Bellot, Vespasien V. Pella, Nicolas Politis, 
Henri Donnedieu de Vabres, Mégalos Caloyanni and Quintiliano Saldana.*^’ These 
international lawyers drafted statutes for an international criminal court and code, pub­
lished materials on the subject and advocated for the adoption o f their proposals.
Ibid.
Claude, 53.
Ibid.
Willis, 164-176. 
Willis, 168.
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In 1925, one o f Pella’s proposals was approved by the Interparliamentary Union, and 
the International Law Association in 1926 favored Bellot’s draft statute. Later in 1926, 
the Association internationale de droit pénal was founded by several o f these scholars 
to further advance the study o f the issue.
The first post-war efforts aimed at limiting armaments met with failure. At the 
five-power Washington Conference o f  1922, the attendees found it impossible to for­
mulate a treaty limiting aerial warfare,'^® Elihu Root, the American jurist, was o f the 
opinion that the conference missed a great opportunity to initiate an international 
criminal code. Root’s proposal to outlaw unrestricted submarine warfare by equating it 
with piracy, and thus universally enforceable by any nation, was met with derision by 
military representatives.'^'
Largely due to the influential and widely read book Command o f the Air (1921) 
by Italian air general Giulo Douhet there were no significant treaties regulating air war­
f a r e . D o u h e t ’s book, which preached the supremacy o f  air power in future wars, was 
viewed favorably among British and United States military commanders who conse­
quently were investing heavily in the production o f aircraft bombers for defense pur­
p o s e s . T h e r e f o r e ,  the failure o f governments to reach agreements limiting aerial 
combat was not surprising.'^''
Ibid.
Taylor, 18. 
Willis, 166. 
Taylor, 19. 
Ibid.
Ibid.
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However, the 1925 Geneva Protocol successfully prohibited poison gas. A ma­
jority o f nations signed the poison gas prohibition Protocol, and thus it was considered 
legally binding upon signatory nations. The United States failed to ratify the Protocol 
until 1975 largely due to objections over its application regarding tear gas and herbi­
cides.'^^
In 1930, the London Treaty for the limitation o f naval armaments was signed by 
eleven nations. The London Treaty provided that, “with regard to merchant ships, 
submarines must conform to the rules o f International Law to which surface vessels are 
subjected,” and explicitly prevented the sinking o f merchant ships unless the merchant 
ships had refused to stop or attacked the submarine and the “passenger, crew and ships 
papers” had first been put “in a place o f safety” in consideration o f  location and sea and 
weather. In 1936, these rules were circulated to all other nations for the purposes o f 
ratification, and thus at the onset o f World W ar II, forty-eight countries had accepted it, 
including Germany and all other major powers.
Despite the enormous political and legal hurdles associated with creating institu­
tional mechanisms to preserve peace, punish international war crimes, and codify war 
crimes, several international jurists worked diligently to produce international treaties 
and agreements towards these ends. Among the scholars working on the problem o f 
defining and outlawing the waging o f aggressive warfare was Nicolas Politas, the
Ibid.
Ibid.
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prominent Greek ambassador to France. Politas, on account o f his close governmental 
ties, was keenly aware o f the political difficulties associated with the outlawing o f war 
and the creation o f an international criminal tribunal. Speaking before Columbia Uni­
versity in 1926 Politas recognized that “there was no use blinking the fact that any in­
novation in this direction tends to upset the ingrained habits o f  centuries.” ' P o l i t a s  
along with many other international legal scholars viewed aggression in the form o f 
warfare as the greatest evil from whose source sprang all other war crimes. Therefore, 
tackling the problem o f aggression became the centerpiece o f many o f  the efforts at this 
time in formulating mechanisms for the preservation o f peace.
An early attempt to define and outlaw aggressive war was the 1924 Protocol for 
the Peaceful Settlement o f International disputes, which Politas helped draft. The Pro­
tocol created a relatively simple formula for defining aggression. I f  any state resorted 
to war rather than except compulsory arbitration, as required by the Protocol, that state 
was designated as an aggressor nation and therefore subject to the imposition o f sanc­
tions by members states o f the League o f Nations. The treaty was accepted by all the 
League members and was poised to go into effect when a newly elected conservative 
British government balked at the idea citing concerns over practicality and national se­
curity. With the refusal o f the British to join, the Protocol was dead.'^^
Willis, 169.
Ibid., 170.
Benjamin Ferencz, Defining International Aggression: The Search for World 
Peace, A Documentary History and Analysis, 2 vols. (Dobbs Ferry, NY : Oceana Publica­
tions, 1975), 1:10-18.
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Given the difficulty o f defining aggression, the League adopted a different tactic. 
Instead, the League adopted resolutions in 1925 and 1927 denouncing aggression as an 
international crime without defining aggression per se.’"*® The Pan American Confer­
ence, meeting in Havana in 1928, resolved that a “war o f aggression constitutes an in­
ternational crime against the human species.” '' '̂ Although these devices indicated the 
evolving international climate o f a moral aversion to war, they were not backed by any 
political or legal means o f enforcement, and thus they were ineffective at preventing 
nation-state aggression.
W ithout exception the most notable o f the interwar attempts at outlawing war was 
the Peace Pact o f Paris o f 1928, more widely known as the Kellogg-Briand treaty, 
which attempted to outlaw war outright.''*^. The Kellogg-Briand treaty was produced 
in the climate o f international amity that occurred between France and Germany in the 
mid-to-late 1920’s.''^  The Locarno Pact o f 1925 had finally guaranteed the borders 
between the two nations. At that time France withdrew from the Ruhr, and Germany 
had begun making war reparations again, thus earning admittance to the League o f Na­
tions in 1926. For their efforts, the Foreign ministers o f both countries, France’s Aris-
WilUs, 170.
Ibid.
Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force bv States. (Oxford: Clar­
endon Press, 1963), 66-111.
League o f Nations, “Treaty for the Renunciation o f War as an Instrument o f 
National Policy,” 27 August 1928. League o f Nations Treaty Series 94, no. 57, 1928, 
Stat. 2343: 46, reprinted in Reisman, and Antoniou, 4-5, (Hereafter the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact).
Taylor, 19.
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tide Briand and Germany’s Gustav Stresseman, had shared the Nobel Peace Prize in 
1926.
W hen the tenth anniversary o f the United States entry into W orld W ar I was cele­
brated on April 6, 1927, France’s Briand proposed honoring the date with a mutual re­
nunciation o f  war between France and the United S t a t e s . U n d e r  public enthusiasm 
and pressure, American Secretary o f  State Frank B. Kellogg sought to extend their bi­
lateral treaty to allow other nations to join. On August 27, 1928, representatives o f  fif­
teen nations met in Paris to sign the international treaty for the Renunciation o f W ar as 
an Instrument o f National Policy, more popularly referred to as the Kellogg-Briand 
t r e a t y . F o r t y - f o u r  nations ultimately signed the treaty including all the Great Pow­
ers, among them, Germany, with the exception o f the Soviet Union.
While the treaty was lauded for its universal condemnation o f war as an instru­
ment o f national policy, whether or not it made waging war criminal was debatable.'"*^ 
By failing to offer any specific remedies or criminal sanctions for its violation, the 
treaty legally resembled more o f a non-binding resolution than a legally binding treaty 
backed with enforcement provisions.
In summary, at the start o f W orld W ar II in 1939 as Telford Taylor notes in his 
book The Anatomy o f  the Nuremberg Trials, the laws o f war were essentially the same 
as those established in the Hague and Geneva conventions, with the exception o f treaty
Ibid.
“Kellogg-Briand Pact,” reprinted in Reisman, and Antoniou, 4-5. 
Taylor, 20.
51
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
provisions on poison gas and su b m a r in e s .H o w e v e r , one major shift that had oc­
curred was the internationalization o f the subject o f war and peace that was motivated 
by the ideals o f establishing a world community.’"'̂
The First World W ar had exposed the political and legal difficulties, including 
the substantial gaps in international law, regarding the successful prosecution o f war 
c r i m e s . T h e  First W orld W ar had also developed in the minds o f the public and of 
statesman the possibility that nation-states could be held accountable for their actions 
in the course o f a war.
Furthermore, the idea o f  preserving the peace through international organization, 
cooperation and international law, which helped regulate the conduct between nations 
during war and peace, had gathered enough support to sustain the creation o f the 
League o f Nations. As Professor Inis Claude has written “the League was the manifes­
tation o f  a reform movement, an effort to improve the procedures and assist the opera­
tion o f the world political system.” It was not intended to replace the multistate sys­
tem. On the contrary, the League was “established in the faith that the goals o f  peace 
and security were to be achieved not by the revolutionary repudiation o f sovereignty, 
but by the fulfillment o f  the constructive and cooperative potential o f sovereign, self- 
governing peoples.” '
Taylor, 20. 
Willis, 176. 
Taylor, 13. 
Claude, 55. 
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As the failed attempts at post W orld W ar I war crimes trials demonstrated, the 
foundational principles o f  the multistate system inhibited the successful prosecution o f 
the violators o f the laws o f war. Heads-of-state and military leaders still enjoyed sov­
ereign immunity from international prosecution. Sovereign nations were under no ob­
ligation to cooperate with international prosecutions. There was neither uniformity nor 
universality regarding the international laws o f  war. Nor was their uniform and uni­
versal agreement on the political and legal wisdom o f establishing international war 
crimes tribunals. However, the legal thought behind the idea o f  holding individuals 
accountable for their actions in international community existed. In order to succeed, 
the post-W orld W ar II war crimes trials would need to challenge and alter those foun­
dational principles o f the multistate system.
In short, the international legal precedents established by the Nuremberg trials 
are built upon the idea o f international war crimes tribunals arising out o f the failed Al­
lied attempts after WWI. The legal precedents established by the Nuremberg trials 
were created in the crucible o f the Second W orld W ar whose brutality and barbarity 
exceeded even that o f the First W orld War. As a result, the conclusion o f the Second 
W orld War proved to be quite different from the events that followed the First W orld 
War.
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CHAPTER 3 
THE LEGACY OF NUREMBERG
On August 8, 1945, the four occupying powers o f France, Great Britain, the Soviet 
Union, and the United States issued the London Charter establishing the International 
Military Tribunal (IMT), more commonly referred to as the Nuremberg trials.’ The tri­
als were named after the geographical location where they were held in Nuremberg, 
Germany. More than one year later on October 18, 1945, U.S. Supreme Court Justice 
Robert H. Jackson opened the Nuremberg trials with the following words:
The privilege o f opening the first trial in history for crimes against the peace 
o f  the world imposes a grave responsibility. The wrongs which we seek to con­
demn and punish have been so calculated, so malignant, and so devastating, that 
civilization cannot tolerate their being ignored, because it cannot survive their be­
ing repeated. That four great nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, 
stay the hand o f vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the 
judgment o f the law is one o f the most significant tributes that Power has ever 
paid to reason.^
The abortive efforts at punishing war criminals after the First W orld W ar influ­
enced Allied decisions to prosecute German and Japanese individuals following W orld 
W ar n. Individual scholars in favor o f punishing war criminals o f  the Second W orld
’ United Nations, “Prosecution and Punishment o f Major W ar Criminals o f the 
European Axis,” 8 August 1945, United Nations Treaty Series 279, 59, 1946, Stat. 1544: 
82 (hereafter cited as London Charter).
 ̂Telford Taylor, The Anatomy o f the Nuremberg Trials (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1992), 167.
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War studied the legal precedents and political difficulties o f that earlier experience and 
wrote numerous articles articulating the lessons learned from the first attempt to prose­
cute war crim es/
Further discussion for an international criminal tribunal was stimulated by the ru­
mors o f  widespread Nazi atrocities. The earliest calls for the creation o f an interna­
tional court during W orld W ar II came in 1941 from the London International Assem­
bly o f Parliamentarians.'* The Allies issued commitments for war crimes trials in the St. 
James Declaration o f  January 1942. On the following day the Allies issued the Moscow 
Declaration pledging to prosecute Nazi leaders before an international court, while re­
manding for national courts lesser war criminals. On that day Churchill, Roosevelt, and 
Stalin warned “let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood 
beware lest they join the ranks o f the guilty, for most assuredly the three allied powers 
will pursue them to the uttermost ends o f the earth and will deliver them to their accus­
ers in order that justice may be done.”  ̂ In October o f 1943 created the United Nations
 ̂ James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg; The Politics and Diplomacy o f Punish­
ing War Criminals o f the First W orld W ar (London: Greenwood Press, 1982), 173.
Paul D Marquardt, “Law W ithout Borders: The Constitutionality o f an Interna­
tional Criminal Court.” Columbia Journal o f Transnational Law 33 (1995): 81.
 ̂United States, “Declaration on German Atrocities,” 30 October 1943, Documents 
on American Foreign Relations, vol. VI. Julv 1943-June 1944 (Washington, D C.: Gov­
ernment Printing Office 1945): 231-232, cited in Bryan F. MacPherson, “Building an In­
ternational Criminal Court for the 2U* Century,” The Connecticut Journal o f International 
Law 113 (Winter 1998): 8.
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W ar Crimes Commission (UNW CC) to investigate war crimes violations and explore 
proposals for creating a war crimes court.*^
The international lawyers and governmental representatives assigned to the 
UNW CC drew heavily on the war crimes investigative work o f  the 1919 Commission 
Report^ in their deliberations. In fact, the UNW CC was designed with the premise that 
the mistakes o f lack o f  preparation and agreement, that had been the fatal flaw o f the 
First W orld W ar attempts at war crimes trials, would not be repeated. The Chairman o f 
the UNW CC stated that everyone concerned with that organization was mindful not to 
repeat the “fiasco o f  the Leipzig trials.”^
A s the UNW CC collected evidence, the Four M ajor Allied Powers deliberated on 
how to deal with the issues o f  war crimes prosecution, as called for in the M oscow Dec­
laration signed in 1943 by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill. British leaders, particularly 
W inston Churchill, who had first hand experience with the issue o f  war crimes in W W I, 
wanted to avoid those earlier mistakes, and thus, favored summary execution o f  high- 
ranking war criminals, like Hitler or Himmler. British leaders believed that “their ‘guilt 
was so black’” it was “beyond the scope o f  any judicial process.”  ̂ British Foreign Min-
* Ibid.; CherifM . Bassiouni, “From Versailles To Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: 
The Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court,” Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 10 (Spring 1997): 21-23.
 ̂“Commission on the Responsibility o f the Authors o f the W ar and on Enforce­
ment o f Penalties,” 29 March 1919, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Confer­
ence, American Journal o f  International Law 14 (1920): 95-96 (hereafter cited as 1919 
Commission Report).
* United Nations W ar Crimes Commission, History o f  the United Nations W ar 
Crimes Commission and the Development o f the Laws o f  W ar (London: His M ajesty’s 
Stationary Office, 1948), 2-3,10-11, 111, 170-171; cited in Willis, 174.
® Taylor, 29.
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ister Anthony Eden told the W ar Cabinet, “I am convinced that we should avoid com­
mitments to ‘try the war crim inals’ and to ‘hang the Kaiser (alias H itler).’” *® Conse­
quently the British favored summary executions for captured leaders and court-martial 
by national tribunals o f  lesser offenders upon conclusion o f  the war.* * Great Britain 
feared German defendants would use the trial as a platform for propaganda to justify 
their misdeeds.'^
President Roosevelt and the French disagreed with the British, and instead leaned 
toward the necessity o f  holding international w ar crimes trials for suspected war crimi­
nals. The Americans and French wanted the tribunal to record history, educate the 
world, and serve as a future deterrent.*^ An unlikely ally, Josef Stalin also strongly fa­
vored war crimes trials for suspected war criminals.*'* Stalin, as early as the St. James 
Declaration in 1942, advocated having international war crimes trials following the 
war.*^
The Americans believed that their isolationism in the years following W orld W ar I 
and their failure to jo in  the League o f  Nations were contributing factors in the causes o f
*® United Kingdom, “Action o f  the German Authorities in Occupied Territory; 
Memorandum by the Secretary o f  State for Foreign Affairs,” 5 October 1941, Papers o f 
the Cabinet. 66/19, W.P. 41 (London: Public Record Office): 264; cited in Willis, 174.
** Willis, 173.
*̂  Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 24.
Howard Ball, Prosecuting W ar Crimes and Genocide (Kansas: University Press 
o f  Kansas, 1999), 54.
*'* Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 23. However, within their territory the 
USSR was dealing with alleged war criminals by summary execution. See Taylor, 52.
*̂  Taylor, 25.
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W orld W ar II.'* Thus, the Americans were determined to not make the same mistake 
twice, opting instead for a strongly international interventionist position in their foreign 
policy as a means for preserving world p e a c e . T h e  United Nations was an integral 
part o f  the U.S. vision for how to translate the mistakes o f  the League o f Nations into 
the new organization’s vital role in preventing future wars.'*
The American international position was strongly advocated by Secretary o f  W ar 
Henry L. Stimson.'^ Stimson, a protégé o f  Elihu Root, vociferously supported the crea­
tion o f  war crimes tribunals to try suspected German and Japanese war criminals. Stim ­
son was opposed however by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, who rejected the 
war crimes trials approach, preferring the British view o f  summary executions for Axis 
military leaders.^® Morgenthau also authored a radical proposal to deindustrialize the 
German industrial zone in Ruhr by destroying factories and closing down the mines to 
force the region to become pastoral and agrarian.^' That proposal, although soundly 
defeated, displayed the level o f frustration by Morgenthau and others toward German 
aggression and the potential for future aggression.^^ In the end, Stimson and Roose­
velt’s views prevailed among the U.S. government and in Great Britain, and the four 
major Allied powers created the IM T to punish German war criminals.
'* Willis, 174. 
' ’ ibid.
'* Ibid.
Ibid.; Ball, 46. 
Ibid.
Ball, 46.
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However, the Allied decision to establish an international criminal court was only 
the first step. The drafting o f  the Charter o f  the International M ilitary Tribunal had to 
overcome procedural and legal h u r d l e s . O n e  difficulty was the four major Allied 
Powers had different national criminal procedures. The British and the United States 
shared common law and adversarial judicial systems, but France used a civil law sys­
tem, and the Soviet Union relied upon a unique “socialist justice” judicial model.^"* The 
solution to the problem o f  different legal systems created a mixed system.
The IMT and its Charter were established jointly by the London Agreement o f 
August 8, 1945.^^ The legal compromise contained both advantages and disadvantages 
to defendants, issues that would resurface in the operation o f the International Criminal 
Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICCFY).^^ According to Justice Jackson, the mixed 
legal Charter worked to the defendants’ advantage as they could choose either to take 
the stand or testify under oath in their own defense, or they could present an unsworn 
statement -  an affidavit— at the end o f  the trial without having to be cross-examined.^’ 
However, the Charter worked to the defendants disadvantage by denying them  the right 
to confront and cross-examine witnesses available to the prosecution, a right guaranteed
Bassiouni, “From Rwanda to Versailles,” 24-25.
’^Ibid.
“Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment o f the Major War Criminals o f 
the European Axis,” 8 August 1945, Charter o f the International Militaiy Tribunal, United 
Nations Treaty Series 59, 1946, Stat. 1544,1546: 82 (hereafter cited as the Charter o f the 
IMT).
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 24-25.
Ibid.
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in United States criminal law.^* Instead, defendants had to rely on affidavits from the 
witnesses.
The London Charter contained seven articles and an annex.^^ The annex set forth 
the Charter o f  the International M ilitary Tribunal, which consisted o f  seven parts and 
thirty articles. The Charter first stipulated the composition o f  the IMT as comprising 
the four Allies, France, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. The Core o f  the 
IM T’s jurisdiction was contained in Article 6:
[The IMT] shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the 
interests o f  the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members o f  
organizations, committed any o f  the following crimes for which there shall be in­
dividual responsibility;
(a) Crimes aeainst peace; namely, planning, preparation, initiation or wag­
ing a w ar o f  aggression, or a war in violation o f  international treaties, agreements 
or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy or the accom­
plishment o f any o f  the foregoing.
(b) W ar Crimes; namely, violations o f  the laws or customs o f war. Such 
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation 
to slave labor or for any other purpose o f  civilian population o f  or in occupied ter­
ritory, m urder or ill-treatment o f prisoners o f war or persons on the seas, killing o f 
hostages, plunder o f  public or private property, wanton destruction o f  cities, 
towns, o r villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
(c) Crimes against humanity, namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, 
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian populations, 
before or during the war; or persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds in 
execution o f  or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction o f  the tribu­
nal, whether or not in violation o f  tho domestic law o f  the country where perpe­
trated.^®
Article 7 rejected the defense o f  sovereign immunity, or “head o f  state” and article 8 
stated “the fact that a defendant acted pursuant to [an] order o f  his Government or o f  a
Ibid.
“The London Charter,” reprinted in Taylor, 645-653. 
Ibid., Article 6.
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superior shall not free him  from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation o f 
punishment i f  the Tribunal determines that justice so requires.”^’
The novel international concept o f  criminal conspiracy was included in article 9 
and 10: “A t the trial o f any individual m ember o f  any group or organization the Tribu­
nal may declare that the group or organization o f  which the individual was a m ember 
was a criminal organization.”^̂  The criminal conspiracy concept meant that once the 
IMT found a Nazi organization to be criminal, at the trial o f individual members o f  that 
organization, “the criminal nature o f  the group or organization is considered proved and 
shall not be questioned.”^̂
Each o f  the four Allied nations supplied their own chief prosecutors and staff that 
were responsible for the investigation, collection, and presentation o f all evidence, in­
cluding the examination o f witnesses, the preparation and filing o f  indictments o f  the 
defendants. Article 9 guaranteed to the defendants a fair trial, which consisted o f  the 
procedural due process right to counsel, or to defend themselves, to have available for 
their scrutiny all evidence presented against them, and to present evidence at the trial 
“in support o f  defense, and to cross-examine any witnesses called by the prosecution.”^̂  
Article 24 laid out the procedural process o f  how the trials would proceed. It set 
forth the following order o f  the trial:
(a) The Indictment shall be read in court.
Ô)) The Tribunal shall ask each Defendant whether he pleads “guilty” or “not 
guilty.”
Ibid., Articles 7 and 8. 
Ibid., Articles 9 and 10. 
Ibid.
Ibid., Article 9.
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(c) The prosecution shall make an opening statement.
(d) The Tribunal shall ask the prosecution and the defense what evidence (if 
any) they wish to submit to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall rule upon the 
admissibility o f any such evidence.
(e) The wimesses for the Prosecution shall be examined and after that the wit­
nesses o f  the Defense. Thereafter such rebutting evidence as may be held by 
the Tribunal to be admissible shall be called by either the Prosecution or the 
Defense.
(f) The Tribunal may put any question to any witness and to any Defendant, at 
any time.
(g) The Prosecution and the Defense shall interrogate and may cross-examine 
any witnesses and any Defendant who gives testimony.
(h) The Defense shall address the court.
(i) The Prosecution shall address the court.
Ô) Each Defendant may make a statement to the Tribunal.
(k) The Tribunal shall deliver judgm ent and pronounce sentence.^^
The most challenging task o f  the four Allied nations was defining the criminal subject 
m atter o f  the war crimes trials.^^ Article 6(b) on war crimes proved the easiest to define 
as they had the strongest legal standing in international law.^^ W ar crimes in Article
6(b) included customary law contained in the 1907 Hague Conferences and conven­
tional law as created by the 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment o f  Pris­
oners o f  War.^®
Ibid., Article 24.
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 25-26.
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 26.
“Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs o f War on Land, with 
Annex o f Regulations, 18 October 1907, reprinted in Bums H. Weston, Richard A. Falk, 
and Anthony D ’Amato, Basic Documents in International Law and W orld Order. 2d ed. 
(St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1990), 128 (hereafter cited as 1907 Hague Convention); 
League o f Nations, “The 1929 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment o f  Prisoners 
o f  War,” 27 July 1929, 118 League o f Nation Treaty Series 343,47, Stat. 2021.
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Defining “crimes against humanity” was more difficult legally as this categoiy 
was not a part o f  treaty law?^ Therefore, the Allies avoided adopting a rigid legal inter­
pretation o f  the principles o f  legality to avoid an ex post facto charge that could be chal­
lenged in c o u r t I n s t e a d  “crimes against humanity” under Article 6(c) existed through 
a combination o f  sources o f international law, specifically conventions, custom, and 
general principles o f  law. Therefore, the legal rationale for “crimes against humanity” 
was based on the theory o f  jurisdictional extension o f  war crimes. Jurisdictional exten­
sion o f war crimes legally reasoned that since w ar crimes applied to certain protected 
people, namely civilians, during time o f  war, “crimes against humanity” merely ex­
tended the same protections as “war crimes” to the same protected people within a par­
ticular state provided that state action was tied to the initiation, and waging o f  an ag­
gressive war or to war crimes.
The m ost controversial and most difficult to define was the category o f “crimes
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 26.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “ex post facto” as “A  law passed after the oc­
currence o f a fact or commission o f  an act, which retrospectively changes the legal conse­
quences or relations o f such fact or deed. See Black’s Law Dictionary. 4'^ ed. Rev. 
(1968), 662.
Ibid.
Due to the fact that crimes against humanity required linking evidence for these 
crimes with the initiation and/or conducting o f  aggressive war, and that evidence was 
lacking, allegations o f German crimes committed before 1939 were excluded. See Bas­
siouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 26.
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against peace.”^̂  Formerly referred to as the crime o f  aggression, or waging o f  an ag­
gressive war, “crimes against peace” was without precedence in international law, ex­
cepting the failed attempt to prosecute Kaiser W ilhelm H under Article 227 o f  the Ver­
sailles Treaty.'*^ Article 6(a) defined “crimes against peace” as the directing or partici­
pating in a war o f  aggression against other nations in violation o f  treaties and the prin­
ciples o f  international law. The definition represented the strongest legal rationale that 
could be m ade by the Allies. The Soviet Union wanted to add the wording, “by the 
European Axis” as to limit prosecution only to European nations and so prevent any 
possible prosecution o f  Soviet actions."*^ Justice Jackson, representing the United States 
at the London Conference refused. He argued that the crime o f  aggression was univer­
sal, and limiting it in the fashion proposed by the Soviets would amount to a “bill o f  at­
tainder,” and thus constitute a clear violation o f  the U.S. Constitution to which the U.S. 
could not allow.'*^
Ibid.
^  Ibid.
Ibid. Professor Bassiouni believes the rationale behind the Soviet Unions’ desire 
to limit crimes geographically to Europe was due in part to two things. One, the Soviets 
had no desire to codify a broad definition o f crimes against peace that might be used later 
in the future against them. Second, they wished to avoid being held criminally liable for 
their 1940 invasion and occupation o f Poland as a result o f  their secret Pact o f  Non- 
Aggression between the USSR and Germany. See also Taylor, 56-77.
U.S. Constitution, art.l, sec 10. A bill o f  attainder is “a legislative act, directed 
against a designated person, pronouncing him guilty o f an alleged crime, (usually treason) 
without trial or conviction according to the recognized rules o f procedure, and passing 
sentence o f  death and attainder upon him.” See Black’s Law Dictionarv. 4* ed. Rev. 
(1968), 162.
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The U.S. position to make waging an aggressive war a crime under international 
law had clearly changed since W orld W ar After W W I the U.S. held it was not a 
crime recognized by international law, but after WWn, they believed it was an interna­
tional crime. The U.S. would retreat fi'om their post-WWU position due to the political 
realities o f  the Cold W ar, once more holding the position that aggressive war was too 
difficult to define to be effectively outlawed.*** Instead the Cold W ar era international 
community prohibited the use o f force as set forth in the United Nations Charter except 
in cases o f  self-defense, in which case the use o f  force was permissible. The lack o f  a 
definition for aggression allowed nations to claim self-defense as a justification for use 
o f  force without any definition to constrain them.
Regarding the developing laws o f  war, the IMT Charter in Article 7 and 8 ex­
panded and codified international law by removing the defense o f  “obedience to supe­
rior orders.”^̂  The defense o f  “superior orders” had previously allowed individuals to 
plead that their actions were justified as they were obligated to follow the orders o f  a
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 27.
*** Ibid. In fact, an international convention explicitly making aggression an inter­
national crime has never existed. The General Assembly’s resolution in 1974 defining 
aggression, and adopted through consensus, is the only definition o f its kind that exists. 
However, General Assembly resolutions are non-binding upon nation-states. See United 
Nations, General Assembly Res. 3314. U.N. GAOR, 29' Sess., Supp. No. 31, 1974, U.N. 
Doc. A/9631: 143. Consequently, its definition has posed problems for the 1996 Prepara­
tory Conunittee on the Establishment o f  an International Criminal Court. See United Na­
tions, “Second Session o f  the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment o f an Interna­
tional Criminal Court,” Report o f the Prenatorv Committee on the Establishment o f  an 
International Criminal Court. Vol. I, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, paragraphs 
212-93,1996, U.N. Doc. A/51/22 (hereafter cited as Preparatory Committee Report).
“The London Charter,” Articles 7 and 8, reprinted in Taylor, 645-653.
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superior.^® However, the judgments o f  the IM T did not adhere strictly to Article 8, and 
allowed the defense o f  superior orders when the subordinate had no moral choice in re­
fusing to carry out the order.
As the trial opened, twenty-four persons were initially indicted.^’ O f those, 
twenty-two were prosecuted. Three defendants were acquitted, the rest were found 
guilty. Twelve defendants were sentenced to death by hanging; three were sentenced to 
life imprisonment, and the remaining defendants found guilty were sentenced to prison 
terms ranging from ten to twenty five years. Hermann Goering committed suicide 
hours before his sentence o f  death by hanging could be carried out. All twenty-four de­
fendants were German, and no other defendants from the European Axis powers were 
tried before the IMT. The proceedings, while generally considered to be just to the ac­
cused, were one-sided in that no Allied individuals were indicted or tried for alleged 
war crimes committed against Germany.^^
“Superior orders,” was the defense used in the trial o f  Peter von Hagenbach in 
1474 for various crimes committed under his command, and was the defense most com­
monly used in war crimes trials following W orld W ar H. Von Hagenbach’s plea that he 
was merely following the commands o f  his master the Duke o f  Burgundy was rejected. 
Instead, he was found guilty and sentenced to death. See Howard S. Levie, “Criminality 
in the Law o f War,” in M. Cherif Bassiouni, ed. International Criminal Law. 2d ed., 3 
vols. (New York: Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1999), 1: 381; See also Louis Henkin, 
Richard Crawford Pugh, Oscar Schachter, and Hans Smit, ed.. International Law Cases 
and Materials 3"̂  ed. (St. Paul: W est Publishing Co., 1993), 383-384.
Taylor, 571-611; Victor Bernstein, The Holocaust -  Final Judgment. (New 
York: Bobbs-Merril Co., Inc., 1980); Richard Gallagher, Third Reich on Trial, (New 
York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1961); W hitney R. Harris, Tvrannv on Trial: The Evidence at 
Nuremberg. (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1954).
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 29.
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Control Council No. 10 W ar Crimes Trials
In addition to the prosecutions o f  German nationals under the IMT Charter, Ger­
mans were also brought to stand trial by separate proceedings authorized by Allied Con­
trol Council Law No. 10.^^ CCL 10 permitted the Allies to prosecute Germans in the 
territories within Germany that each nation occupied and controlled. Thus, each o f  the 
four Allied m ajor powers conducted trials under the authority derived from CCL 10.
The proceedings o f  CCL 10 were different than the IMT proceedings, although they 
were patterned after the IM T’s Charter.^"* The U.S. trials were conducted before a civil­
ian judge, while France, Great Britain, and Russian held military trials.
From a legal perspective, prosecutions conducted under CCL 10 were domestic 
rather than international prosecutions. Due to Germany’s unconditional surrender, the 
Allies had complete control over German-occupied lands and resources. Therefore, in 
theory CCL 10 trials in American occupied zones were exercising U.S. sovereign au­
thority.^^ The same legal condition applied with respect to France, Great Britain and 
Russia.
“Allied Control Council Law No. 10 Punishment o f  Persons Guilty o f  W ar 
Crimes, Crimes against Peace and against Humanity,” 20 December 1945, Official Ga­
zette o f  the Control Council for Germany. No. 3, Berlin, January 31, 1946, reprinted in 
Benjamin Ferencz, An International Criminal Court: A Step Toward World Peace — A 
Documentary History and Analysis. 2 vols. (New York: Oceana Publications, 1980), 488 
(hereaflff tcited as CCL 10).
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 29.
Ibid., 30.
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The Far Eastern Commission and the 
International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East
The Far Eastern Commission (EEC) was established in M oscow in December 
1945 for the purposes o f  formulating a policy for the Allied occupation o f  Japan and to 
oversee Allied policies in the Far East. The Commission, whose seat was in W ashing­
ton, was composed o f  eleven states, with veto power granted to the four major Allies. 
The Commission created an advisory group known as the Allied Council for Japan, 
which consisted o f  the United States, Great Britain, China and the U.S.S.R., to whom 
the Commission reported its directives.
The EEC was essentially a political body, not an investigative body.^^ However, 
the Commission did serve an important function in granting political credibility for d i­
recting policies for the purposes o f prosecution o f  suspected Japanese war criminals, 
their trials, the sentencing o f  those found guilty, and their release. In the final analysis 
however, “the far Eastern Commission became little more than a debating society, and 
when a peace treaty was finally signed with Japan, it died a quiet death."^^
General Douglas M acArthur in his official capacity as the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in the Pacific Theater, had control over Japanese occupa- 
tional matters. M acA rthur's political views dominated virtually every aspect o f  justice 
in the Far East.^*
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 31-35. 
Ibid., 31.
Ibid.
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General M acAithur opposed the FEC ’s establishment as it allowed the U.S.S.R to exer­
cise too great o f  a role and influence primarily through its power to veto any EEC action 
it deemed objectionable. As he stated, “The very nature o f  its composition and proce­
dures eventually made the Far Eastern Commission ineffective.”^̂
General MacArthur, by virtue o f  his authority as the SCAP in the Pacific Theater, 
established the International Military Tribunal for the Far East on January 19, 1946, on 
behalf o f  the FEC.^® As a result the IMTFE, unlike the IM T was not a treaty-based tri­
bunal. Pursuant to his authority. General M acArthur also established the United States 
Military Commissions to try Japanese M ilitary personnel in the Philippines and other 
areas o f  the Far East M ilitary Theater o f  Operation. MacArthur, despite his almost dic­
tatorial power in establishing the Far East war crimes tribunals, attempted to remain de­
tached from the various legal proceedings, although his success in this matter remains 
suspect.®* The IMTFE granted General M acArthur the ability to grant clemency, reduce 
sentences and release prisoners on parole, a power that was completely absent from the 
IMT and CCL 10 Charters.®^
The IMTFE formally arraigned 28 defendants on 55 counts on May 3, 1946. On 
November 11, 1948, two years after the IMT's decisions, the IM TFE’s judgm ent was 
rendered.®^ The defendants were charged with "crimes against peace,” "war crimes,"
Ibid., 32.
®® “The IMTFE Charter,” reprinted in Minear, 185-192.
®‘ Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 32.
®̂ Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 34.
®̂ Phillip R. Piccagallo, The Japanese on Trial (Austin, TX: University o f Texas 
Press, 1979), 14; Minear, 23-26.
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and "crimes against humanity” just like the defendants in the Nuremberg tria ls.^  How­
ever, unlike the Nuremberg trials, which arraigned organizations like the Nazi SS, no 
organizations were similarly charged in the Tokyo trials.*^  ̂ Accused war criminals were 
divided into Class A, B, and C. The first IMTFE proceedings were against 28 senior 
Japanese officials considered Class A suspected war criminals.
The proceedings o f  the IMTFE, and the work o f  the FEC, were quite dissimilar to 
the IMT, and the other war crimes trials conducted in Germany, which gave rise to a 
considerably greater amount o f  criticism toward the IMTFE.^^ Among the first major 
differences is that, unlike the IMT, members o f  the FEC were not acting in their indi­
vidual capacity, but rather as representatives o f  their country’s government. This led to 
a degree o f politicization not felt in the IMT, which affected the internal functioning o f 
the FEC and IMTFE, and the quality o f  legal justice produced by the IMTFE.^^
In 1949, the FEC issued a formal request to all nineteen Allied powers in the Far 
East that the war crimes trials for the Japanese should begin not later than September 
30, 1949. Subsequently, forty-eight states signed the Treaty o f Japan in San Francisco
^  “The IMTFE Charter,”  reprinted in Minear, 185-192.
The lone exception in the Far East trials was the Netherlands’ military courts 
which prosecuted Japanese criminal groups for the commission o f specific war crimes. 
See Piccagallo 177.
R.B. Pal, International Military Tribunal for the Far East: Dissentient Judgment 
o f  Justice R.B. Pal. M.A., LL.D (Calcutta, India: P C . Ray, 1953): Minear, 1-229, Bas­
siouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 33.
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 33-36.
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on September 8, 1951.^® The treaty provided in Article 2 for the transfer o f  all con­
victed war criminals to Japan to finish serving the rem ainder o f  their sentences under 
SC A P’s control.^^ As a result, in the Far East between 1951 and 1957, all convicted 
war criminals were released from prison before serving their full sentences as a condi­
tion o f  being paroled or by commutation o f  their sentences.’®
The constitution o f  the FEC and the IM TFE led to proceedings fraught with pro­
cedural irregularities and judicial indiscretions. Consequently, the Japanese did not 
view individuals convicted o f war crimes as outcasts, as happened in Germany, but 
rather as victims o f  unjust criminal proceedings.’ * For the Japanese, the IMTFE, and
Ibid., 34.
Ibid.
’® Ibid.
”  In fact, several Class A war criminals found guilty by the IMTFE were chosen as 
members o f  Cabinet and one even became Prime Minister:
“Shigemitsu Mamoru, a career diplomat, who was Foreign Minister in Tojo 
Midelki's Wartime Cabinet and who signed on behalf o f Japan the Instrument o f Surren­
der on September 2, 1945, on board the [U.§. battleship] USS Missouri, was sentenced by 
the IMTFE to seven years imprisonment. He was released on parole 21 November 1950, 
and in November 1951 he was given clemency. Shigemitsu became Foreign Minister in 
December 1954. During his two years as Minister, he was instrumental in obtaining the 
Allies' clemency and ultimately, in 1957, the release o f all Japanese held in captivity. On 
7 April 1957, the Japanese Government announced that with the concuirence o f a major­
ity o f the Allied Powers represented on the IMTFE, all major Japanese war criminals 
were granted clemency and unconditionally released forthwith. Kishi Nobusake, another 
Class A  criminal suspect, was tried and convicted in further proceedings after the first 
Tokyo Trial, but later became Prime M inister in January 1956 and served until July 1960. 
He also held the portfolio o f the Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs for some time in 1956.”
Letter from Dr. R. John Pritchard to M. Cherif Bassiouni, Jan. 30,1996 (on file 
with the author); reprinted in Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 34.
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the other war crimes trials were not victors’ justice, but v ictors’ vengeance disguised as 
victors’ justice.’^
Comparison o f the Legal Bases for Setting up the IM T, CCL 10 and IMTFE
A comparison o f  the different legal mechanisms used by the various ad hoc tribu­
nals created after the Second W orld is useful for summarizing the most important his­
torical developments o f  international criminal law produced by these tribunals. Conse­
quently it becomes apparent that the divergent legal m echanisms used in the three dif­
ferent judicial proceedings produced divergent results in regard to substance and proce­
dure.
The IM T and IMFTE Charters were essentially the same with a few exceptions. 
Both Charters prosecuted and punished accused war criminals for “crimes against 
peace,” “war crimes,” and “crimes against humanity.”’  ̂ However, one exception is 
found in Article 5(c) o f  the IMTFE Charter. Article 5(c) allowed the prosecution for 
those “crimes against humanity” committed on the basis o f  persecution on political and 
racial grounds, whereas Article 6(c) o f  the IMT Charter included religious grounds as 
well.^'* The principle reason for including religious grounds in the IM T Charter was the 
Holocaust -  the Nazi pogrom against those o f  primarily Jewish descent -  and therefore 
the IM T contained a uniquely religious element.^^
Ibid., 35.
Ibid., 37.
“The IMTFE Charter,” Article 5(c), reprinted in Minear, “Victor’s Justice,” 186- 
187; “CCL 10,” Article 6(c), reprinted in Ferencz, An International Criminal Court, 488.
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 37.
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In addition, with respect to “crimes against humanity,” the IMT Charter provided 
that inhumane acts committed against any civilian population” could be prosecuted.
The IMTFE expanded the class o f  protected persons beyond civilians by eliminating the 
wording “against any civilian population.”’  ̂ The broadening o f  the definition was re­
portedly designed “to m ake punishm ent possible for large-scale killings o f  military per­
sonnel in an unlawful war.””
Identical to the IM T and IM TFE Charters, CCL 10 also relied on the prosecution 
and punishment o f  crimes against peace," "war crimes," and "crimes against human­
ity."’* However, whereas the IMT was established by treaty and the IMTFE by a m ili­
tary order, the CCL 10 conducted its proceedings pursuant to consensus decision by the 
four major Allies -  France, Great Britain, the USSR and the United States -  who occu­
pied German territory at the conclusion o f  the war. The legal justification for CCL 10 
was that the Allies were performing analogous governmental functions o f  the German 
government.’  ̂ In effect the Allies were acting as the de facto German government in 
the absence o f  the recently defunct Nazi Reich. Therefore, this m eant that the law the 
Allies were enforcing in the CCL 10 proceedings was German domestic law. But as 
each nation was in fact using their own judicial systems to orchestrate proceedings, the
“The IMTFE Charter,” Article 5(c), reprinted in Minear, 186-187. 
”  Ibid.
’* Ibid.
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 37.
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national law was not German, but rather the national law o f  each o f  the respective A l­
lied powers.^®
CCL 10 was nearly identical to the IM T Charter. Additionally, the three crimes 
identified in Article 2 o f  the International M ilitary Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) 
were the same for CCL 10 and Article 6 o f  the IM T’s Charter.** The major difference 
between the definition o f  crimes in the Far East trials and the IMT proceedings is found 
in Article 2(c), concerning “ crimes against humanity.” In the IMTFE trials “crimes 
against humanity” did not require the nexus o f  initiating an aggressive war or war 
crimes in order to charge individuals for crimes committed against protected persons.*^
The CCL lO’s definition o f “crimes against humanity” differed fi-om the IMT and 
IMTFE Charters in two ways. Article 2(c) o f  the CCL 10 expanded the list o f  crimes to 
include rape, imprisonment, and torture.*^ Second, it removed the requirement that 
“crimes against humanity” be linked to the w ar by eliminating the words, “before or 
during the war,” contained in Article 6(c) o f  the IM T’s Charter.*"* Moreover, the CCL 
10 broadened the principles o f  legality with respect to “persecution.” The CCL 10 
Charter expanded the category o f “crimes against humanity” by omitting the require-
Ibid., 38.
** Ibid.
“Special Proclamation: Establishment o f  an International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East,” 9 January 1946, Treaties and Other International Act Series. No. 1589,3, 
reprinted in Richard H. Minear, Victors’ Justice: The Tokvo W ar Crimes T ria l. (Prince­
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971), 183-184 (hereafter cited as IMTFE Proclama­
tion).
“CCL 10,” Article 2(c), reprinted in Ferencz, An International Criminal Court.
488.
*"* Ibid.
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ment that “crimes against humanity” be in the “execution o f  or in connection with any 
crime within the jurisdiction o f  the Tribunal.”®̂ Therefore, persecution as defined by 
CCL 10 could take place without requiring a connection to another crime.
As for the ability to commute sentences, the IMTFE granted that authority to General 
MacArthur, a power that was completely absent from the IMT and CCL 10 Charters. 
However, General M acArthur did not use that authority.^^
The separate military tribunals in the Far East proceedings were created by the 
FEC, and were in that regard similar to the CCL 10.®̂  The respective Allied powers 
were responsible for prosecuting Japanese and persons o f  other nationalities w ho were 
their prisoners o f  war. However, each Allied power created its own procedures and ap­
plied its own laws in the operation o f  their military tribunals. Unlike the CCL 10, there 
existed no treaty or uniformly agreed upon law defining crimes. The largest point o f  
difference was the legal authority wielded by General M acArthur far surpassed any 
similar authority wielded by one individual in the European Theatre. As Supreme A l­
lied Commander o f  the Pacific, General M acArthur was the sole executor o f  the policy
Article 6 o f the IMT Chart defines “crimes against humanity” as those prohibited 
acts, “and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or dur­
ing the war " (emphasis added). See “The London Charter,” Article 6 (c), reprinted in 
Taylor, 645-653. Whereas, CCL 10, Article 2(c) eliminates the nexus between interna­
tional conflict and the commission o f war crimes. However, the preamble o f  CCL 10 did 
contain a jurisdictional link to the IM T Charter, which contained the war nexus. There­
fore, the CCL 10 tribunals were divided over whether individuals could be prosecuted for 
the commission o f  crimes against humanity against their own citizens in the absence o f  an 
international armed conflict. See Margaret McAuliffe deGuzman, “The Road from 
Rome: The Developing Law o f  Crimes against Humanity,” Human Rights Quarterlv 22 
(2000): 355-356.
Ibid.
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 32.
75
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
set forth by the FEC. As sole executor o f  policy regarding Japan, General M acArthur 
was able to achieve political goals sought by the U nited States in the Pacific Theater 
following the Japanese surrender.*® Proof o f  General M acArthur’s authority as sole ex­
ecutor o f  policy was evident in the FEC's decision to end prosecutions by 1950 and to 
repatriate to Japan by 1953 all those who were convicted.
One o f  the m ost revolutionary legal concepts produced by the German and Japa­
nese war crimes trials was the charge o f  initiation o f  aggressive war. Supreme Court 
Justice Robert H. Jackson m ade the case for provisions to charge German and Japanese 
leaders with aggression, explaining that “sentiment in the United States and the better 
world opinion have greatly changed since Mr. James Scott and Secretary Lansing an­
nounced their views on matters o f  war and peace,” with obvious reference to the First 
W orld War.*’
The post-W orld W ar II war crimes trials reflected the American view that initiat­
ing a war o f  aggression had risen to become part o f customary international law which 
states were bound to follow. The progression o f  the outlawing o f aggressive warfare as 
an uncodified war crime had occurred by virtue o f  a series o f  events that began with the 
Versailles Treaty’s attempt in Article 227 to try the Kaiser, the passing o f  resolutions 
condemning aggression by the League and other international organizations, and the 
adoption o f the Kellogg-Briand treaty outlawing war.’®
**Ibid„ 33.
*’ Willis, 174.
’® Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 26-28.
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The Nuremberg tribunal members o f  the Nazi command structure were held to be 
individually accoimtable and were charged with the following substantive crimes: (a) 
crimes against peace; (b) war crimes; (c) crimes against humanity, and waging an ag­
gressive war.
In addition to the favorable public and political climate for setting international 
legal precedents at Nuremberg, Allied legal responses to defenses put forth by Nazi 
war crim inals’ also provided an impetus for creating international law at Nuremberg.
As a response to Nazi defendants’ challenges to Allied jurisdiction, fundamental inter­
national legal principles were formulated to address these challenges:
1. The maxim nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine leee states that there is 
“no crime without punishment,’’ and “no punishment without law.” These m axims form 
the principle o f law that holds that where no doubt exists that the defendants knew that 
they were committing a wrong condemned by the international community, then it is 
not a violation o f  the principles o f  justice to punish them despite the absence o f  a highly 
specific international law.
2. Individuals are held responsible for their own actions even when their actions 
are justified as acts committed on the authority o f  the state.^'
3. The fact that domestic law perm its a person’s actions is no defense for viola­
tions o f  international law; the international law trumps domestic law.
These principles form the foundation o f  individual criminal responsibility for violations 
o f  international law and therefore form the core o f  the Statute creating the ICC.
91 Marquardt, 81-82.
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Nuremberg was also responsible for developing other substantive norms and prin­
ciples o f  international criminal law.®  ̂ First, German officials were held criminally li­
able for acts committed against their own nationals, as well as nationals o f  other nation 
states. Thus, with the Nuremberg trials the precedent was set that individuals and states 
are responsible under international law for acts committed entirely within a states na­
tional boundaries. N o longer did the principle o f  domestic sovereignty permit nations to 
do absolutely whatever it wished to its citizens without a guarantee o f  non-interference 
fi*om the international community.^^
Second, the charge o f  waging aggressive war brought to an end the centuries old 
unqualified right o f  a nation to go to war. However, the charge o f  aggressive war also 
produced the greatest concerns for A llied nations who questioned its legality and le­
gitimacy. In the end, despite their misgivings, the Allies went ahead with the decision 
to prosecute Nazi Germany for the crime o f  aggression. Bernard V.A. Roling, the 
Netherlands judge assigned to the Tokyo trials, stated that once the Allies had charged 
Germany with initiating an aggressive war, they felt compelled to make the same charge 
against Japan in the Tokyo tria ls.^
As a result o f  using the charge o f  aggression against Japan, the Tokyo trials gener­
ated the most dissent out o f  all the W orld W ar H war crimes trials.
Ibid., 82-83.
Ibid; Taylor, 612-641. 
Marquardt, 82-83.
Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 31- 37; Minear, 3-182; Pal, 1-701.
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First, Judge Roling partially dissented from the charge o f  the convictions against Japa­
nese political leaders for their failure to prevent the war. Roling argued that omissions 
on the part o f  Japanese leadership for failing to stop the war did not establish their 
guilt.^^ Second, Indian Judge R. B. Pal dissented from all the convictions at Tokyo on 
the grounds that it was impossible to assess the “guilt” o f  states from a historical con­
text. In addition, Pal argued it was even more difïïcult to assess blame for initiating 
wars against individual political leaders operating in an international and national sys­
tem that lacked universally accepted international laws and judicial mechanisms for de­
termining breaches o f  the peace.^’
Still, the criticisms o f  Pal, Roling and other scholars o f  the Tokyo trials, however 
valid, have done little to detract from the core principles o f  international law developed 
at Nuremberg or the precedent o f  criminalizing state authorized aggressive war.^® 
Moreover, scholars have been quick to isolate the flaws in the Tokyo trials from the 
more respected judgm ents made at Nuremberg.^^
In general, the post-W orld W ar II trials brought to fruition many o f  ideas and pro­
posals that had first appeared after W orld W ar I, Additionally, while few fundamen­
tally new concepts came out o f  the W orld W ar II w ar crimes trials, the remarkable feat 
is that the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials happened at all. Unlike W orld W ar I, the vic­
tory o f  W orld W ar II resulted in the total defeat and occupation o f  Germany and Japan.
Ibid.
Pal, 177-701; Minear, 34-80; Piccagallo, 9-95,209-215.
Piccagallo, 209-215.
Taylor, 612-641; Henry T. King, Jr., “Conference Paper; The Nuremberg Con­
text from the Eyes o f a Participant,” Military Law Review 149 (Summer, 1995); 40-41.
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Germany and Japan’s total defeat enabled the Allies to take complete control o f  both 
countries and carry out all aspects o f  the war crimes trials process virtually unop­
posed.'®®
The Allies occupied Germany with over one million troops, and therefore had 
complete access and control o f  prisoners o f  war, witnesses, and government documents. 
The process o f  collecting evidence was greatly enhanced by the “Teutonic penchant for 
meticulous record keeping,” as so aptly described by Telford Taylor.'®' In so doing, the 
Allies achieved a result that was not possible after W orld W ar I. To a large degree the 
success o f  the war crimes trials after W orld W ar II was completely dependent on the 
total victory and control over the territory o f  the vanquished foes. As a result, fully im­
plementing war crimes following W orld W ar I was in part prevented by the lack o f  a 
total victory over the Central Powers and the need to maintain political stability in those 
countries, particularly Germany and Turkey. However, the significance o f  the First 
W orld W ar lies in the germination o f  the ideas o f  war crimes which were then allowed 
to bear fruit and be given firm legal precedents as international law by the decisions o f 
the war crimes tribunals at the end o f  W orld W ar H.
The first and m ost important judgm ent at Nuremberg crystallized the fact that in­
ternational law applied to all individuals waging war, regardless i f  those individuals 
were the highest governmental leaders. The defense that as heads-of-state leaders were 
immune fi'om prosecution based on the principle o f sovereign immunity was forever
'®® Ibid.
'®' Taylor, 57.
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repudiated.’®̂ Violations o f  international law were applicable to everyone following the 
judgm ent o f  Nuremberg, including heads-of-state.
The Nuremberg trials restricted the use o f  defenses against war crimes prosecu­
tion, including the defense o f  superior orders, act o f state, and military necessity.’®̂ It 
created an entirely new categoiy o f  international crimes -  crimes against humanity -  
that was used to condemn H itler’s brutal policy o f  exterminating six million people o f  
Jewish ancestry and other people designated as racially inferior.'®^ Most significantly, 
it confirmed that waging a war o f aggression (the Nuremberg Tribunal used the term 
“crimes against peace”) violated international law for which individual leaders could be 
held criminally responsible.
These precedents laid the foundation for a new international legal order in interna­
tional affairs. The Nuremberg principles “repudiated decisively the international anar­
chy o f  absolute sovereign states in which leaders and their followers could use force 
according to the Taw o f  the jungle’” .’®̂ Hereafter, individuals engaged in the service o f  
their countries during w ar would be subject to the dictates o f international law .’®®
However, despite the precedent setting nature o f  post-WWU war crimes trials Al-
’®̂ Taylor, 612-641; Henry T. King, Jr., “Conference Paper; The Nuremberg Con­
text from the Eyes o f  a Participant,” Militarv Law Review 149 (Summer 1995): 40-41.
’®̂ Willis, 175.
’®̂ Ibid.
’®® Willis, 175.
’®® Ibid.
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lied optimism that the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials would act as a deterrent to future 
wars never reached fruition. In fact, as Eugene Davidson, the noted Nuremberg histo­
rian has suggested, “it may be argued that the uneasy peace that has endured between 
the major powers since W orld W ar II has been kept not because of, but despite, Nurem ­
berg.*®^ Certainly, it can be argued that in the Cold W ar years, any serious attempt to 
enforce and apply the Nuremberg principles to certain conflicts around the world might 
have caused a world war.'®®
Additionally, controversy and historical/legal debate still surrounds the Nurem ­
berg and Tokyo tribunals as flawed judicial examples o f  “victors’ justice.” '®̂  The N ur­
emberg trials proceeded from the w ills o f the victorious Allied superpowers."® Judicial 
prosecutions following W orld W ar II ran only one way; the Allies never subjected their 
conduct during the war to the same legal scrutiny applied to Germany and Tokyo.
Thus, despite the fact that the fire bom bing o f  Dresden, the bombing o f Tokyo, and the 
dropping o f  atomic bombs on civilian populations in Hiroshima and Nagasaki arguably 
fit the definition o f  Allied war crim es -  the “wanton destruction o f  cities, towns, or vil-
'®̂  Eugene Davidson, The Nuremberg Fallacy: W ars and War Crimes since W orld 
W ar n , (New York: Macmillan, 1973): 291.
'®® Ibid.
*®̂ Philip R. Piccagallo, The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes Operations in 
the East, 1945-1951, (Austin: University o f  Texas, 1979): 211.
' '® David Marcella, “Grotius Repudiated: The American Objections to the Interna­
tional Criminal Court and the Commitment to International Law,” Michigan Journal o f  
International Law 20 (1999): 346.
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lages, or devastation not justified by military necessity,” -  the Allies excluded their own 
conduct in the war from the purview o f  the post-W orld W ar II war crimes trials.’
The complaint o f  “victors justice” and selectivity in dispensing justice belie the 
persistent criticism that international justice is not blind; international criminal trials 
produce “uneven justice, unequal justice, and politicized justice.””  ̂ Furthermore, the 
deterrent value o f  the Nuremberg trials has been marginal i f  not altogether non-existent. 
Since the Nuremberg principles were set forth and later affirmed by the U.N. General 
Assembly, 250 armed conflicts are estimated to have broken out, including genocidal 
campaigns o f  violence in Tibet, Cambodia, Guatemala, Burundi, Indonesia, Paraguay, 
and within the Soviet Union.
W hile many international scholars have denounced the lack o f political will in 
allowing these atrocities to go unpunished, other equally persuasive scholars point out -  
such as the aforementioned Eugene Davidson -  that sacrificing justice to preserve the 
world from a potentially catastrophic nuclear war world war is a virtue not a v ice.” ''
Yet, for all the debate and scholarly examinations regarding the trials perceived moral 
and legal flaws, Nuremberg and Tokyo also marked a large step forward in developing 
the new international order envisioned by W ilson and others following W orld W ar 1.”  ̂
M any contemporary scholars and social commentators lauded the trials as a tum -
Ibid., 349. 
” ^Ibid. 
' ” lbid.
114 Piccagallo, 213. 
"^W illis, 175.
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ing point in history. W alter Lippman, the famous American journalist, announced that 
the judgm ent at Nuremberg would be accorded by future generations as having the 
same historical status as the M agna Charta, the right o f habeas corpus, and the Bill o f  
R ights.” ® International law expert Richard Falk stated that while “deeply flawed as 
moral education, however there is more to Nuremberg than its Judgment. Certainly the 
Nuremberg trial contributed to an international learning experience on world order...” ' ”  
Arthur Schlesinger Jr. stated the Nuremberg principles constituted, “along with other 
treaties, rudiments o f  an international consensus,” that merited international enforce­
ment. He added, “such documents, outlaw actions that the world has placed beyond the 
limits o f  permissible behavior.”"*
In sum, the Nuremberg trials created precedent-setting principles o f international 
criminal law that are crucial to the foundation o f a fully functioning ICC. Individuals 
are criminally liable for their conduct even if  that conduct is committed under the pro­
tection o f  state granted authority under national law, and even if  that conduct is ordered 
as a result o f  military or sovereign political commands: the defense o f  superior orders 
was no longer a justifiable defense in the eyes o f the international community. M ore­
over, the norms by which an individual is judged do not necessarily require the same
"® Ibid.
' Richard A. Falk, A  Global Approach to National Policy (Cambridge, Mass. 
Harvard University Press, 1975), 153.
' '* Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “The Necessary Amorality o f Foreign Affairs,” 
Harper’s Magazine. August, 1971, 73; quoted in Piccagallo, 211.
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specificity o f  a national penal statute so long as fundamental principles of justice are 
respected."^
Post-W orld W ar II to the Present:
Developments Toward the Creation o f the ICC
Following the epochal Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, supporters anticipated that 
further developments in international law w ould include the establishment o f  an interna­
tional criminal court and an international code o f  criminal offenses.’ ®̂ Indeed, some 
progress in both these areas has been made. One o f  the first major acts of the United 
Nations General Assembly expressed approval for Nuremberg’s legal principles and 
sponsored a Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the Crime o f Genocide.'^' 
The Genocide Convention adopted by the United Nations in 1948 made genocide a pun­
ishable international o f f e n s e . ' I n  1949, the Geneva Conventions were revised, and 
subsequently additional changes were made in other international conventions regarding
' However, there is considerable debate among legal scholars as to the limits o f  
specificity that is required in international penal codes, the precise manner in which rule 
o f law principles are protected, and the minimum guarantee o f procedural and substantive 
principals o f  law. See Bassiouni, International Criminal Law. 1:283-312.
Marquardt, 83-84.
By General Assembly Resolution 95/1 o f December 11,1946, the U.N. General 
Assembly overwhelmingly affirmed “ [T]he principles o f  international law recognized by 
the Charter o f  the Nuremberg Tribunal and die judgment o f the Tribunal.” See Bierzanek, 
101-102, in Bassiouni, International Criminal Law. 3: 101-102.
MacPherson, 11.
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the laws o f  w a r . ' S p e c i f i e d  “grave breaches” o f  the Geneva Conventions are consid­
ered crimes for which individuals are deemed personally responsible.
In the area o f  international crimes, international law expert M. Cherif Bassiouni 
has identified twenty-two categories o f international offenses that rise to the status o f 
international criminal law.*^^ These offenses include terrorism, narcotics trafficking, 
environmental damage, stealing national treasures, and hum an rights violations.
Yet, these offenses remained uncodified within a central code o f  offenses. Instead, the 
offenses o f  international law  are contained in separate multilateral treaties with separate 
provisions and procedures for breaches and penalties. Toward the solution o f  that prob­
lem the United Nations General Assembly commissioned the U .N .’s International Law 
Commission (ILC) to formulate a Draft Code o f  Offenses Against the Peace and Secu­
rity o f  M ankind and a Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court.
Two sides crystallized in the debate over the creation o f a permanent international 
criminal court. Ricaldo Alfaro o f  Panama strongly advocated its creation. He felt an 
international criminal court was the logical extension o f  thirty years o f effort and devel­
opment o f  the rule o f  law. Emil Sandstrum o f  Sweden objected to its creation just as 
strongly. Sandstrum concluded that the problems o f  jurisdiction, state cooperation, and 
enforcement would render successful establishment o f a court so remote that its “imme­
diate creation would do more harm than good to the development o f  international
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
126 Marquardt, 85.
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law .'^’ After m uch spirited debate, the General Assembly authorized creating a com­
mittee to draft the statute for an international criminal court. The committee developed 
an initial Draft Statute in 1951, later revised in 1953.*^*
The complete draft statute did little to ease the differing opinions over the pro­
posed court. Moreover, in addition to the practical difficulties o f  jurisdiction, crimes, 
and enforcement, the Cold W ar complicated matters considerably. The opposition o f  
the Soviet bloc countries proved to be a m ajor obstacle to a court’s c r e a t i o n . W h e n  
the Korean W ar broke out, Soviet opposition grew as concerns mounted that such a 
court would be used against them.
Among the plethora o f  criticisms raised by these countries to the proposed court 
were that any such court would violate national sovereignty, and interfere with the do­
mestic affairs o f  United Nations m em ber states in violation o f  Article 2(7) o f  the U.N, 
Charter.*^® Such a court would also infringe upon the sphere o f  jurisdiction o f  the In­
ternational Court o f  Justice, and the Security Council’s responsibility under Chapter VII 
o f the U.N. Charter regarding matters related to the maintenance o f  international peace 
and security.'^* N or were the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc countries alone in their
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
U.N. Charter, Article 2(7) states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to in­
tervene in matters which are the essentially within the domestic jurisdiction o f  any state or 
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; 
but this principle shall not prejudice the application o f enforcement measures under Chap­
ter vn.
U.N. Charter, Chapter VH, Article 39 states:
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concerns. The United States was equally opposed to the creation o f  the court for similar 
reasons, although they framed their opposition in terms o f  procedural objections not on 
p r i n c i p l e . I t  was apparent that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R did not wish to be sub­
ject to any judicial review for which they lacked veto power or an option not to accept 
jurisdiction.’^̂
As it became apparent that the political deadlock was insurmountable at this junc­
ture in the Cold W ar era, more states became convinced that the creation o f  an interna­
tional criminal court was premature, even i f  state support existed in principle.’ '̂* If the 
political reality precluded the establishment o f  an international criminal court, then pro­
gress in drafting a court statute were essentially futile. The project o f codifying the 
laws o f  war and humanitarian law protecting civilians suffered a similar fate, although 
the difficulty o f  defining aggression was the main obstacle in this area.’^̂  Conse­
quently, until progress could be made in codifying international crimes, the ILC decided 
to defer the matter o f  the creation o f  an international criminal court. The final blow 
came in 1957 when the Sixth (Legal) Committee, on the recommendation o f  the ILC,
The Security Council shall determine the existence o f any threat to the peace, 
breach o f the peace, or act o f  aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore in­
ternational peace and security.
Marquardt, 86.
Ibid.; Bassiouni, “From Versailles to Rwanda,” 52.
Ibid..
Ibid.
88
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
indefinitely postponed consideration o f  both the court and the code o f  c r i m e s / I t  was 
widely regarded that the DLC’s recommendation was meant to lay to rest the issue.
Even though the United N ation’s efforts at establishing a permanent international 
criminal court derailed in 1957, the issue did not go away. As in the interwar period 
between the two world wars, academic interest kept the issue a l i v e , I n  the 1970s, 
scholarly interest waxed, and while it generated no practical governmental progress, the 
propagation o f  proposals prevented the issue from disappearing altogether. Among the 
reasons for scholarly involvement in the early 1970’s were the suspected w ar crimes 
violations in the Vietnam war and the Bengali war o f  secession. Two conferences, 
one sponsored by the W orld Peace Through Law Center in 1971, and the other by the 
Foundation for the Establishment o f  an International Criminal Court in 1972, produced 
two draft statute proposals. Although a larger audience was lacking, expertise in the 
field was not, and this m eant the issue could survive at least intellectually until the in­
ternational community o f  nations was once more ready to take up the issue.
A t the same time, evidence suggested international interest in an international 
criminal code was on the rise. That interest resulted in a series o f  conferences held be­
tween 1975-1979 sponsored by the International Association o f  Penal Law that pro­
duced a draft code o f  international offenses. Remarkably, in 1974, the General Assem-
Ibid.
Ibid.
Marquardt, 87. 
’ ’̂ ibid.
Ibid.
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bly finally managed to adopt a definition o f  aggression.’'̂ ’ The problem was what to do 
with it. The General Assem bly’s resolutions were non-binding, so the definition existed 
without legal m ooring.’'’̂  Furthermore, when the Secretariat attempted to persuade the 
General Assembly to move to the next step o f  working on the code o f  international of­
fenses, and a court to enforce them, the m em ber states b a l k e d . I t  was not until 1981 
when the General Assembly would again consider the issue o f  the code."'’̂
W hile it was impossible to produce a comprehensive draft code o f  international 
crimes, and an international criminal court bogged down in political rancor and opposi­
tion, the post-W orld W ar H decades witnessed significant changes in substantive inter­
national criminal law. The multilateral approach to creating treaty law, which had de­
veloped slowly in the late 19* and early 20* centuries, mushroomed rapidly in the post­
war period.’'*̂  The rapid growth o f international law is brought about primarily through 
international crisis periods. Thus, after W orld W ar n, maximum effort was turned to­
ward internationalizing the m ost significant legal principles developed in the aftermath 
o f  that war in the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention.’'*̂
However, circumstances and the passage o f time dictated concerns for smaller- 
scale crimes. As international drug trafficking grew and became a more serious prob­
lem for countries, interest in crim inalizing this activity created a series o f international
Ibid.
UN Charter, Chapter TV, Articles 10, 11,12, 13 and 14. 
Marquardt, 87.
Ibid.
Ibid., 88.
Ibid.
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conventions to deal with the problem.''*^ From these conventions international criminal 
laws targeting drug trafficking emerged.
An even greater concern was generated by the rise in terrorism in the 1960’s and 
1970’s, as the international community focused its efforts on containing the violence. 
Although reaching agreement upon which groups were fi-eedom fighters, as opposed to 
terrorists, proved impossible, certain proscribed acts were criminalized through m ulti­
lateral treaty law. Thus, while international conventions and multilateral treaties con­
tinued to produce proscribed offenses, the effort was piecemeal and lacked the compre­
hensiveness o f  a code o f  crimes necessary for the creation o f  a permanent international 
criminal court. The development o f international crimes arose out o f  crisis management 
rather than any deliberate United Nations forethought and planning.
These developments in international criminal law in the 1960’s and 1970’s devel­
oped wholly independent o f  any consideration o f  a centralized enforcement mechanism, 
international legislative or adjudicatory institutions o f  international criminal law.'"*^
The multilateral instruments and institutions resulted fi-om political necessity o f  control­
ling international violence and crime, and were wholly dependent on national processes 
o f  investigation, jurisdiction, and enforcement for implementation and prosecution.
However, the independent development o f  law in these areas stimulated general 
international criminal law  in two very important ways. First the increase in multilateral 
conventions broadened the content o f  international criminal law beyond the narrow con-
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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fines o f  the m ost egregious violations o f  crimes against humanity. Second, the new 
conventions created new areas o f international crimes that had significant ramifications 
for “high international politics.’’*̂® States now regarded terrorism and narcotrafficking 
to be matters o f  grave importance involving issues o f  national security.’̂ ' Ultimately 
these threats to national security renewed calls for a permanent criminal court to enforce 
these international crimes.
In 1989, the International Law Commission began anew to draft a statute for a 
permanent international criminal c o u r t . T h e  ILC’s renewed interest came about as a 
result o f  the international drug trade, A.N.R. Robinson, the Prime M inister o f  Trinidad 
and Tobago, proposed the idea o f  a permanent international criminal court as a way to 
deal with the problem o f  drug traffickers who were wreaking havoc upon smaller coun­
try’s judicial and law enforcement systems with intimidation, violence, and the threat o f
153assassination.
In 1989 with the support o f  a coalition o f  Latin American and Caribbean states, 
the Trinidadian government requested a General Assembly agenda item to consider the 
creation o f an international criminal court with jurisdiction over international drug of-
150 Ibid., 89.
Ibid.
Marcella, 13.
Ibid.; Marquardt, 90; United Nations, Letter dated 21 August 1989 fi~om the 
Permanent Representative o f  Trinidad and Tobago to the Secretarv-General. UN General 
Assembly Official Records, 44* Sess., Annex 44, Agenda Item 152,1989, UN Doc. 
A/44/195, as cited in Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, “Developments in International Criminal 
Law: The Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court,” The American Journal o f 
International Law 93 (January 1999) 22.
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fenses.'^"* The request included reference to the 1988 U.N. Narcotics Convention that 
had made drug trafficking an international crime, which “threatens to engulf small 
States and afflicts even the super Powers,” and that an international criminal jurisdiction 
was needed “for prosecuting and punishing offenders who command the means to evade 
the jurisdiction o f  domestic courts.” ’
The General Assembly responded by requesting that the ILC resume its efforts on 
the creation o f an international criminal court .’ The request, which emphasized drug 
crimes, was treated favorably by the ILC. The United States delegate to the ILC re­
ported “broad agreement, in principle, on the desirability o f  establishing a permanent 
international criminal court” and general agreement that it was a “particularly favorable 
time” to create such a court.
A t the same time, turmoil engulfed the former Yugoslavian Republic as it disinte­
grated following the breakup o f  the former Soviet Union and the easing o f  the Cold 
War. In the former Yugoslavia a wave o f  violence and terror swept over that part o f  
Europe triggering reports o f atrocities that the continent had not witnessed since W orld 
W ar n. These reports o f  war crimes created renewed interest and calls for the creation 
o f a criminal court.
Ibid.
Marquardt, 91.
United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 44/39. UN GAOR, 44* Sess., 
Supp. No. 48,1989, UN Doc.A/44/195, 311.
Marquardt, 91.
Ibid., 93-94; Marcella, 351-353; MacPherson, 14; Ball, 121-154.
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Thus, the political climate and the obviating circumstances o f  Yugoslavia -  later 
in Rwanda -  factored heavily in the Security Council’s decisions to create ad hoc tribu­
nals for the prosecution o f  war crimes in these two areas o f  conflict. Reports o f  war 
crimes committed in Rwanda and the Balkans spurred renewed calls for the creation o f  
a permanent international criminal court. The U N ’s International Law Commission 
produced a draft statute in 1993, which led to the eventual creation by the General As­
sembly in 1995 o f  the Prepatory Committee on the Establishment o f  an International 
Criminal Court (“Prepatory Committee”).
The purpose o f  the Prepatory Committee was to produce a draft statute that would 
serve as the basis for a convention to be adopted at an international diplomatic confer­
ence. Approval for an international conference was secured, and following the comple­
tion o f  the eighth session o f  the Prepatory Committee in April 1998, the date was set for 
a five-week conference to consider the draft statute. The five-week diplomatic confer­
ence was held in Rome in June and July o f 1998, and ultimately produced a Rome Stat­
ute o f  the International Criminal Court to create the world’s first international criminal 
court. Many nations have since ratified the treaty. Yet, the U.S. has stated it will not be 
one o f  them.'®® As the ICC edges closer to 'the sixty ratifications it needs to become 
international law, the U.S. remains convinced o f  the Statute’s defects, and thus remains
United Nations, Revised Report o f the W orking Group on the Draft Statute for 
an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 1993, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/L.490; 
United Nations, Revised Report o f the W orking Group on the Draft Statute for an Interna­
tional Criminal Court: Addendum, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., 1993, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/L. 
490/Add. 1.
'®® Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relation, Is A UN International 
Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?. 105^ Cong, sess., 23 July 1998.
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opposed to the creation o f  the ICC. W hat are the U.S. objections to the ICC, and do 
they have any merit? A description o f  the U.S. objections to the ICC and an assessment 
o f  those objections is the topic o f  the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4
ASSESSING AM ERICAN OBJECTIONS TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The following chapter assesses specific United States objections to the ICC Stat­
ute (see copy o f ICC Statute in appendix). The chapter begins with an overview and 
background o f  the official U.S. position prior to the Rome Conference in 1998 regarding 
the type o f  court sought by the U.S. In this first section the key U.S. positions are listed. 
The chapter then describes the general institutional features o f the ICC Statute as final­
ized at the Rome Conference. In this section the specific ICC mechanisms and articles 
are identified that the U.S. has criticized and predicted w ill lead to a flawed Court. Fi­
nally, the chapter assesses those particular ICC mechanisms and supporting articles.
The assessment is done by carefully analyzing the language o f  those articles to ascertain 
whether or not they will lead to the IC C ’s flawed results that the U.S. has predicted.
United States Positions Prior to the 1998 Rome Conference
The United Nations General Assem bly voted to hold Prepatory Committee meet­
ings (PrepCom) beginning in 1996 for the purposes o f  preliminary drafting and negotiat­
ing o f  the substantive and procedural issues underlying the establishment o f the ICC.’
’ Howard Ball, Prosecuting W ar Crimes and Genocide (Kansas: University Press o f 
Kansas, 1999), 195.
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The U.S. State Department under President C linton’s direction emphatically argued 
from the beginning o f PrepCom meetings in 1996 the key positions that the U.S. stated 
were non-negotiable. The largest concern for the U.S. were the issues involving how 
the jurisdiction o f  the ICC could be triggered, whether the authority to refer cases to the 
Court would be vested in states parties, the degree o f  independence and authority exer­
cised by the ICC Prosecutor, and whether the Security Council could control what cases 
came before the ICC.^ These issues can be simplified as pertaining to three interrelated 
areas:
1 ) The ICC ’ s jurisdiction;
2) The role and function o f  the Office o f  the Prosecutor;
3) The relationship between the ICC and the United Nations Security Council.
In terms o f  the overall goal sought by U.S. negotiators o f  the ICC treaty, David Scheffer, 
Ambassador-at-large for W ar Crime Issues, stated the U.S. position that actions o f U.S. 
citizens, particularly the military, “will always remain beyond the conceivable reach o f 
such an [international criminal] court.”^
U.S. ambassador to the U.N. Bill Richardson also reaffirmed the overall U.S. po­
sition in a speech before the General Assembly on October 31 ,1996. In that speech, 
Richardson, while emphasizing the long-standing U.S. commitment to the establishment
 ̂Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relation, Subcommittee on International 
Operations. Is A  UN  International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?. lOS*** 
Cong, 2"*̂  sess., 23 July 1998 (hereafter cited as ICC Senate Hearing ).
 ̂Joe Stork, “The ICC in Focus.” International Criminal Court 3. no. 4 (1998): 1.
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o f  the ICC in principle cautioned other nations that his country had serious concerns 
with the proposed ICC:
There are some who argue that the Security Council will politicize the work 
o f  the Court, that it will undermine the Court’s independence. [Regarding the per­
ception] that the Security Council is a political body, and its actions are therefore 
wholly suspect... while individual governments and individual Tribunal staff are 
objective, non political, and reliable,...The Security Council transcends the indi­
vidual political views and agendas o f  each specific member. It is an institution 
with checks and balances and an essential objective mission to fulfill.. There is 
also a need for checks and balances with respect to the decisions o f a single Prose­
cutor, who in theory could be influenced by personal and political considerations. 
I f  the Prosecutor had sole discretion to initiate investigations and file complaints—  
as some delegations have sought under the rubric o f “inherent jurisdiction”— the 
results could be more idiosyncratic, possiblv even m ore political, than the deci­
sions o f  the Security Council [emphasis added] ."*
Two years later, on the eve o f  the commencement o f  the Rome Conference on June 
17, 1998, Ambassador Bill Richardson repeated U.S. policy toward the ICC. Richard­
son’s statement contained basic principles o f  American policy, in addition to emphasizing 
the categorically firm stance o f  the U.S. by use o f the word “must” sixteen times in the 
following excerpt o f  that speech:
The world must not underestimate the importance o f our collective efforts here to­
day. The creation o f a permanent International Criminal Court must represent a sin­
gular statement o f consensus; genocide, crimes against humanity, and the most seri­
ous war crimes are never acceptable.. ;But it must be the world community that cre­
ates the C ourt... .The Court must be built on the firm ground on international con­
sensus, and enjoy international support.... [W]e must also recognize the reality o f the 
international system today.. .As we craft a Court that reflects our ideals, we must 
remember that it will not operate in a political vacuum. Experience teaches us that 
we must carefully distinguish between what looks good on paper and what works in 
the real w orld .... It [the ICC] must be a part o f  the international order, and supported 
by the international community. .. .[T]he U.S. believes that the Security Council 
must play an important role in the work o f a permanent court, including the Court’s
Bill Richardson, Speech on 31 October 1996 before the United Nations General 
Assembly, as quoted in Ball, 203.
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trigger mechanism. The [Security] Council must be able to pursue the aims o f 
peace. The Council must be able to refer critical situations to the Court for investi­
gation and must be able to instruct countries to cooperate with the Court if  necessary 
and appropriate within its powers... .[Tjhe Court must operate in coordination— not 
in conflict— with the Security Council... [T]he ICC must work in coordination, not 
in conflict, with states. The Court must complement national jurisdiction and en­
courage national state action wherever possible.. .[W ]e must not turn an Interna­
tional Criminal Court— or its Prosecutor—into a human rights ombudsman, open to, 
and responsible for responding to, any and all complaints from any source.. ..An In­
ternational Criminal Court will succeed only if  governments draft a  treaty that melds 
effectively the proper role o f individual states, their national judicial systems, the 
Security Council, and the UN itself. The U.S., which has been so instrumental in es­
tablishing international tribunals from Nuremberg to Arusha [Rwanda], will con­
tinue to seek actively the achievement o f  this important objective.^
Scheffer reiterated the U.S. position regarding a Security Council controlled ICC when 
he announced that the “Security Council needs to be a very significant player in the op­
eration o f  this court.
Detailing specifics o f  the U.S. policy on the jurisdiction o f the ICC, David Schef­
fer officially stated “Official actions o f  a non-party state should not be subject to the 
Court’s jurisdiction if  that country does not jo in  the treaty, except by means o f  a Secu­
rity Council action under the U.N. Charter.”  ̂ The U.S. sought a jurisdictional scheme 
that would only allow cases to come before the ICC if  the state o f  the nationality o f  the 
prospective defendant consented to the ICC’s participation.®
^Ibid.
® T.R. Goldman, “A World Apart? U.S. Stance on a New ICC Concerns Rights 
Groups.” Legal Times. June 18,1998,16.
 ̂ICC Senate Hearing, 14.
® M. Cherif Bassioni, “Negotiating the Treaty o f  Rome on the Establishment o f an 
International Criminal Court.” The Cornell International Law Journal. 32 (1999): 458.
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On the subject o f the ICC Prosecutor, the U.S. officially announced their position 
in the U.S. State Department release entitled, “Statement o f  the United States Delega­
tion Expressing Concerns Regarding the Proposal for a Proprio M otu Prosecutor,”’ 
submitted to the Rome Conference on June 22, 1998. In that statement the U.S. stipu­
lated:
The United States is strongly o f  the view that the principles o f prosecutorial 
independence and effectiveness...w ill be best served by, the structure proposed by 
the ICC under which the Prosecutor’s authority to embark on an investigation is 
triggered by a referral by a State or the Securitv Council (emphasis added).
Yet, the proposal favored by a majority o f  other countries in Rome was an ICC 
Statute whereby cases could be initiated by referrals from one o f  four sources; either a 
State, the Security Council, the Prosecutor, or any other interested party, including vic­
tims, non-govemmental organizations or any other reliable source, all o f whom could 
refer cases to the ICC Prosecutor.' ' A referral is a request to the prosecutor to investi­
gate the situation to determine if  one or more persons should be charged for a crime. 
Human rights groups were particularly strong advocates o f  an independent prosecutor, 
believing that the U.N. Security Council would be averse to referring situations to the
’ Proprio M otu literally means on his or her own motion.
“The Concerns o f  the United States Regarding the Proposal for a Proprio Motu 
Prosecutor,” in ICC Senate Hearing. 147-150 (hereafter cited as U.S. Concerns o f Proprio 
Motu Prosecutor).
' ' Peggy E. Rancillio, “From Nuremberg to Rome: Establishing An International 
Criminal Court and the Need for U.S. Participation,” University o f Detroit Mercv Law 
Review 77 (Fall 1999): 183.
Ibid.
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Court. It was also felt that an independent prosecutor would allow victims o f  crimes to 
come forth and initiate investigations against the perpetrators.'^
However, the United States rejected the proposals for an independent Prosecutor. 
The U.S. also rejected the idea that other entities and individuals should be allowed to 
initiate an investigation by the P ro s e c u to r .S e n a to r  Rod Grams articulated U.S. con­
cerns in a hearing before the U.S. Senate: "The [ICC] prosecutor will have the power to 
initiate prosecutions without a referral from the Security Council or state parties. There 
will be no effective screen against politically motivated prosecutions from being 
brought forward."'^ Am bassador Scheffer suggested that there existed a legitimate rea­
son for referrals to come from m ember states or the Security Council. He said:
The value o f  having a government refer it or the Security Council refer it is they 
are accountable to somebody. They are accountable either to their people, their 
populace, for doing so, or the Security Council is accountable to the United Na­
tions system. W e believe that that fundamental principle o f  accountability should 
be at the core o f  referrals to this court.
The U.S. outlined five main reasons for rejecting the creation o f  a “proprio motu. " 
in an official statement on the proposal o f  a proprio motu prosecutor.'^ First, the U.S. 
rejected as “entirely cynical the notion that the community o f States is so lacking in 
moral and political courage that when faced with an atrocity meriting the attention o f the
Ball, 192.
‘TJ.S. Concerns o f Proprio Motu Prosecutor,” in ICC Senate Hearing. 147. 
“Opening Statement o f Senator Rod Grams,” ICC Senate Hearing. 3.
ICC Senate Hearing, 23.
“U.S. Concerns o f Proprio Motu Prosecutor,” in ICC Senate Hearing. 147.
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Court, not one State will respond.” '* Instead, the U.S. cited the ad hoc tribunals created 
to investigate atrocities in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia republic as evidence o f  
the willingness o f the United States and other States to address serious crimes o f  inter­
national concern.
Second, the U.S. rejected as simplistic the attitude that a system o f  State and Se­
curity Council referrals can only politicize the office o f the Prosecutor, while the proprio 
m otu will be inherently apolitical and impartial.^® The U.S. stated that the debate sur­
rounding the subject cast the United States and other States as acting on purely “politi­
cal” grounds. Advocates for an independent prosecutor defined “political” in a pejora­
tive sense denoting partisanship and self-interest, while maintaining that individuals and 
non-govemmental organizations are beyond motivations o f  self-interest and partiality.^'
Third, the U.S. argued that state involvement is critical to the functioning o f  the 
ICC.^^ In supporting their contention for an active state role, the U.S. argued that pro­
ponents for an independent prosecutor neglect the fact that State and Security Council 
referrals will have a positive “political” impact.^^ State and Security Council referrals 
demonstrate political will and political support that are vital to the prosecutor’s work. 
The U.S. summarized its position on the efficacy o f  active state involvement as follows;
'* Ibid., 148.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
ICC Senate Hearing, 14.
“U.S. Concerns o f  Proprio Motu Prosecutor,” in ICC Senate Hearing. 149.
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Under the proprio m otu model, we fear it will become too easy for the States Par­
ties to abdicate their responsibilities and simply leave it to individuals, organiza­
tions and the Prosecutor him self to initiate cases without the starting foundation o f 
political will and commitment that only States can provide.^"*
Fourth, the U.S. found unpersuasive the arguments that an independent prosecutor 
w ill make decisions to pursue investigations solely on legal criteria, and thus avoid any 
questioning o f  the Prosecutor’s motives, impartiality, or independence,^^ The U.S. ra­
tionalized that granting the Prosecutor the authority— and responsibility— to investigate 
all credible allegations would overwhelm the resources o f  the Prosecutor. Inevitably 
with such an overwhelming volume o f  allegations to review, the Prosecutor would be 
forced to reject m any o f  those complaints, including those that are unsuitable for prose­
cution. Among the complaints found unsuitable will be referrals that are directed to­
ward an individual, have their basis in political motivations, and those being dealt with 
by national judicial systems, which will invariably disappoint the organizations and in­
dividuals who are the source o f the allegation?^
However, some o f  these complaints will m eet the requirement o f  legal merit 
contained in the draft Statute as possessing a “reasonable basis” on which to pursue an 
investigation. Thus, the U.S. reasons, a simple legal checklist will be inadequate to de­
cide between the large volume o f  legally meritorious allegations, and consequently “the 
Prosecutor will be required to m ake decisions o f  policy in addition to those o f law.”^̂
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
27 Ibid.
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The effect o f  increasing the amount o f  sources from which the Prosecutor receives alle­
gations will substantially increase the instances where the Prosecutor must reject appar­
ently suitable referrals, resulting in charges o f  impartiality and criticism from groups 
unhappy with the Prosecutor’s choices. The U.S. position concludes, “In sum, the pro­
prio motu proposal risks routinely drawing the Prosecutor into making difficult public 
policy decisions which the Prosecutor is neither well-equipped nor inclined to make.”^̂  
Fifth, the U.S. also opposed the role o f  judges in reviewing decisions o f  the prose­
cutor, adding that granting review authority to judges allows them to substitute their 
policy preferences for those o f  the prosecutors. Finally the U .S. opined that allowing 
the prosecutor’s office to use information from non-govemmental and individual 
sources would overwhelm the office. The U.S. cited as evidence the nearly 30,000 
complaints received by the U.N. Human Rights Commission in \ 991?̂
To summarize, the U.S. pursued several non-negotiable points regarding the 
establishment o f the ICC. The main U.S. objections as the Rome Conference got under 
way in June 1998 were:
(1) The Prosecutor must not have the authority to independently initiate an in­
vestigation absent a referral to investigate from either a government that is a state 
party to the treaty or the Security Council. The Prosecutor would only be permit­
ted to initiate an investigation upon either a referral from a government that is a 
state party to the ICC treaty or the Security Council.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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(2) As a precondition to the exercise o f jurisdiction o f  the Court over a crime, 
both governments m ust be parties to the treaty.
(3) Under its Chapter VII responsibilities o f  the UN Charter the Security Coun­
cil m ust be able to review m atters that come before the Court.
T he  Rom e S ta tu te  Em erges 
As the representatives arrived in Rome for the start o f  the Rome Conference the 
United States had three m ajor unresolved issues from the PrepCom meetings: (1) W hat 
type o f relationship would be reserved for the U.N. Security Council and the ICC? (2) 
W hat would be the functions, duties and scope o f  authority o f  the Prosecutor’s Office? 
(3) W hat core crimes would comprise the jurisdictional subject m atter o f  the Court?
The central debate before and during the Rome Conference was the “scope o f  the U .N .’s 
Security Council involvement in deciding whether or not the ICC takes up a particular 
case.” W ould the perm anent members o f  the Security Council be permitted to veto the 
ICC’s ability to investigate and to prosecute war criminals?^®
The United States arrived in Rome with a PrepCom ICC draft that reflected the 
U.S. position regarding the Security Council’s role.^' Article 23(1) o f  the PrepCom 
draft stated reflected the U.S. position that only states that ratified the treaty and the Se-
Goldman, 1.
David J. Scheffer, “Developments in International Criminal Law: The United 
States and the International Criminal Court,” The American Journal o f  International Law 
93 (January 1999): 13.
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curity Council could refer “situations” to the Prosecutors Office for initiation o f  an in­
vestigation.^^
However, a competing option permitted the Prosecutor’s Office independently to 
initiate investigation proceedings on its own authority absent a state or Security Council 
referral.^^ The U.S. delegation sought to prevent the inclusion o f a Prosecutor’s Office 
with the authority to initiate ICC proceedings on its own. The U.S. by requiring a Secu­
rity Council referral would have preserved the veto o f  the United States over possible 
investigations. In the U .S .’s official view, “I f  neither the Security Council nor any state 
endorses action by the Court, the prosecutor would act without a critical and essential 
base o f  international consensus.”^̂
The majority o f the other delegates at the Rome Conference disagreed with the 
U.S. position. They supported an independent Prosecutor based on the rationale that 
only a truly independent prosecutor would be able to investigate situations states would 
rather avoid.^^ Approaching midnight on the final day o f the Conference, the U.S.
Ball, 198.
Mahnoush H, Arsanjani, “Developments in International Criminal Law: The 
United States and the International Criminal Court,” The American Journal o f Interna­
tional Law 93 (January 1999): 27.
“U.S. Concerns o f  Proprio Motu Prosecutor,” in ICC Senate Hearing. 148-150.
The group o f  nations opposing the U.S. position, called the Like-Minded Group, 
was led by Great Britain, Canada, and Argentina and ultimately included over eighty na­
tions. The Like-Minded Group, working with the 264 Non-Govemmental Organizations 
(NGO’s) and human rights groups in Rome to participate in the proceedings, advocated 
for a strong and independent ICC that would create a tmly independent Prosecutor, “fi*ee 
o f  Security Council (read U.S.) control.” See Ball, 199.
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sought to introduce a last minute amendment regarding jurisdiction/^ The U.S. 
amendment requested that ICC jurisdiction m ust be subject to the consent o f  the state o f  
the nationality o f  the defendant, and that a non-state party’s nationals could only be in­
vestigated upon a Security Council resolution to that affect.^^
Norway blocked a vote on the U .S. amendment with a no action motion.^® The 
U.S. motion for an amendment would only come to a vote i f  the no action motion were 
defeated. However, Norw ay’s no action motion passed overwhelmingly, and the U.S. 
amendment was tabled permanently.^^
W hen the final vote was taken, the U.S. had failed in its attempt to limit ICC ju ­
risdiction to the consent o f  states. Absent a Security Council referral, the ICC can pro­
ceed with a case if  a state party has submitted a complaint or the Prosecutor initiates a 
case involving a state-Party to the treaty where either the crime was committed or the 
accused is a national. A  state that is not a party to the treaty can also accept ICC juris­
diction on an ad hoc voluntary basis. The U.S., unhappy w ith the final ICC Statute, 
joined six other nations -  Iraq, Libya, Qatar, Yemen, China and Israel -  in voting 
against the treaty on July 17, 1998."̂ ®
36 Bassioni, “Negotiating the Treaty o f  Rome,” 458.
Ibid.
The no action motion, according to parliamentary rules, is a motion to take “no 
action” on a motion on the table, which effectively removes the issue from further consid­
eration at that time. Ibid., 459.
Ibid.
Thomas W. Lippman, “Worldwide W ar Crimes High Court Is Approved Dele­
gates Overrule U.S. Objections.” Washington Post. 18 July 1998, sec. A, p. 1.
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Overview o f  the ICC Statute: Structure and Functioning 
o f the International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court is an institution created by an international treaty 
whose authority and powers are derived from the will o f  the State-Parties to the trea ty /' 
The treaty contains the Statute o f  the Court, which outlines the Court’s major functions, 
duties, rules, and procedures o f  operation/^ The Statute will be binding only on State- 
Parties and enters into force once sixty nations have ratified the treaty/^ The ICC ju ris­
diction is intended to complement that o f  national criminal justice systems, and can 
prosecute only when national courts are unwilling or unable to prosecute for the crimes 
contained within the Court’s criminal subject matter/'* In addition, the Court can only 
prosecute for crimes committed after the treaty enters into force/^ The ICC is depend­
ent upon the cooperation o f  nation-states for conducting its operations, including the 
work o f  investigations, prosecutions, extradition, and enforcement/*^
The Statute is composed o f  128 Articles organized into thirteen parts. An opening 
preamble sets forth the purpose and historical context for the need o f a permanent inter-
M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Policy Perspectives Favoring the Establishment o f  the In­
ternational Criminal Court,” Journal o f  International Affairs 52, no. 2 (Spring 1999): 797.
United Nations, “Rome Statute o f  the International Criminal Court,” 17 July 
1998, United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f 
an International Criminal Court. U.N. GAOR, 53*  ̂sess., 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 
(hereafter cited as ICC Statute).
Ibid.
Ibid., Preamble.
Ibid.. Article 24.
Ibid., Part 9, Articles 85-102.
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national criminal court.'^^ Part 1 contains four articles that establish the Court as a 
“perm anent institution” headquartered at The H ague/^ In addition, the Statute creates a 
Court having “international legal personality,” and provides that the “Court may exer­
cise its functions and power...on the territory o f  any State Party and, by special agree­
ment, on the territory o f  any other State.”^̂  The Court will have jurisdiction “over per­
sons for the most serious crimes o f  international concern,” and operate as “complemen­
tary to national criminal jurisdictions.” ®̂
The crimes contained within the Court’s jurisdiction are broadly determined to be 
the “m ost serious crimes o f international concern.” The Statute’s four categories o f 
crime are genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime o f  aggression.^* 
The Statute provides definitions for ge n o c i d e , c r i me s  against humanity,^^ and war 
crimes.^^ The crime o f  aggression, however, is within the Court’s jurisdiction once the 
crime is defined.^^
Part 2, Jurisdiction, Adm issibility and Applicable Law, composed o f  seventeen 
articles (Articles 5-21), form the core o f  the statute. This part categorizes and defines
Ibid., Preamble.
Ibid., Articles 1 and 3.
Ibid., Article 4.
Ibid., Preamble.
Ibid., Article 5.
Ibid., Article 6.
Ibid., Article 7.
Ibid., Article 8.
Ibid., Article 5(2). The crime o f aggression enters into effect seven years after the 
treaty enters into force, if  a definition can be agreed upon by the State-Parties.
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the crimes, establishes the process o f  referring cases to the Court (the trigger mecha­
nism), defines criteria for admissibility, and lists the applicable law /^
Part 3, General Principles o f  Criminal Law, composed o f  twelve articles, sets forth 
the statute’s substantive criminal law, which forms the foundation o f  the basis for individ­
ual criminal responsibility and grounds for excluding criminal responsibility/^ This part 
states clearly that the court has jurisdiction over "natural persons.” However, the Court 
will not have jurisdiction over any over any person under the age o f  eighteen at the time 
the crime was committed.^^ Articles 22 and 23 contain the principles o f  nullum crimen 
sine lege and nulla ooena sine leee.^^
Part 4, Composition and Administration o f  the Court, comprises nineteen arti­
cles.^’ The Court establishes four elements o f the ICC: a Presidency with three 
judges/^  a section creating an Appeals d iv is io n ,a  Pre-Trial and a Trial D iv ision /'’ a 
Prosecutor’s O ffice/^ and the Registry to perform administrative duties.^^ The court is
Ibid., Part 2, Articles 5-21. 
Ibid., Part 3, Articles 22-33. 
Ibid., Article 25(1).
Ibid., Article 26.
Ibid., Articles 22-23.
Ibid., Part 4, Articles 34-52. 
Ibid., Article 38.
Ibid., Article 39.
^ Ib id .
Ibid., Articles 15,42.
Ibid., Article 34.
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to have eighteen judges, nominated and elected by states parties.^^ The judges are 
elected as full-time personnel and shall perform their functions on that basis.®* How­
ever, the Statute anticipates and supports the likelihood that some judges m ay serve on a 
part-time basis depending on the Court’s caseload.®^
The specific U.S. objections are contained in Part 2 on Jurisdiction, Admissibility 
and Applicable Law. Examining article 124, the opt-out clause, and what exactly that 
means, along with Articles 12 and 13 regarding jurisdiction, are necessary to assess the 
question o f  whether U.S. claims about the nature o f the ICC’s exceptional authority are 
accurate. In assessing objections to the Office o f  the Prosecutor, Articles 14 and 15 are 
analyzed. Finally, Article 16, which defines the role o f the Security Council, is analyzed 
at the conclusion o f  the chapter.
Assessing The U.S. Objections to the ICC Statute 
Jurisdictional Objections
Article 12 and 13 contain the relevant provisions that determine the necessary
requirements that the Court m ust have in order to initiate an investigation. In
conjunction, these articles perm it the Court to exercise a form o f limited jurisdiction
over the nationals o f  non-state parties with regard to the core crimes as set forth in
Article 5. The jurisdictional regime created a two-track system. The first track permits
the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over all states involved in the conflict regardless o f
whether any o f the states involved are parties to the treaty. Article 13(b) states;
®̂ Ibid., Article 36.
®* Ibid., Article 35.
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The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in 
article 5 in accordance with the provisions o f  this Statute if:
(b) A situation in which one or more o f  such crimes appears to have been com­
mitted is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter 
V n  o f  the Charter o f  the United Nations;^®
The second track permits the Court to exercise jurisdiction over states, even i f  they are 
non-state parties to the treaty, providing that one o f  two requirements is met. The first 
requirement necessitates either the state where the alleged crime occurred is a party to 
the ICC treaty, or the accused is a national o f  a state that is a party to the Statute. The 
second requirement is the acceptance o f  ICC jurisdiction for non-state parties providing 
either the accused is a national or the alleged crime was committed on their soil.
Appearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in W ashington, DC, 
July 23, 1998, Ambassador-at-Large for W ar Crimes Issues and head o f  the U.S. Dele­
gation in Rome, David Scheffer, while acknowledging that certain U.S. objectives were 
achieved, stated that, “serious risks remain because o f  the document's provisions on ju ­
risdiction.” *̂ The U.S. wanted a court that would have required both countries to be 
parties to the ICC treaty, “or at a minimum, would have required that only the consent 
o f  the state o f  nationality o f  the perpetrator be obtained before the court could exercise 
jurisdiction.”^̂  Scheffer stated that, because the ICC created a jurisdictional regime in 
the manner it did, the ICC as currently structured does not “serve the cause o f  intema-
Ibid.
Ibid.
ICC Senate Hearing, 14.
Ibid.
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tional justice.”’  ̂ Specifically, the U.S. objection to the jurisdictional structure o f  the 
court is stated as such:
Since most atrocities are committed internally and most internal conflicts are 
between warring parties o f the same nationality, the worst offenders o f  interna­
tional humanitarian law can choose never to join the treaty and be fully insulated 
firom its reach absent a Security Council referral. Yet multinational peacekeeping 
forces operating in a country that has joined the treaty can be exposed to the 
court's jurisdiction even if  the country o f  the individual peacekeeper has not joined 
the treaty. Thus, the treaty purports to establish an arrangement whereby U.S. 
armed forces operating overseas could be conceivably prosecuted by the interna­
tional court even i f  the United States has not agreed to be bound by the treaty.
There are two parts to the U.S. objection surrounding the jurisdictional regime o f 
the ICC. The first part is a factual claim. The factual claim states that internal atrocities 
committed by states against their own nationals are exempted from ICC jurisdiction ab­
sent a Security Council resolution. As a result, the U.S. asserts that the worst forms o f 
international crimes -  those committed by dictators such as Pol Pot, and Saddam Hus­
sein against their own nationals — will escape prosecution barring Security Council ac­
tions.
The second part o f  the U.S. objection concerns the ICC’s jurisdiction. The U.S. 
claims that the ICC’s jurisdiction permits states to join the treaty and by exercising the 
opt-out clause o f  Article 124 exem pt their forces from ICC prosecution while subjecting 
the nationals o f  states that do not jo in  the treaty to the Court’s jurisdiction.^^ The pri­
mary objection o f the United States is that the ICC jurisdiction, in conjunction with Ar­
ticle 124 containing the opt-out clause, the Prosecutor’s power, and the Security Coun-
Ibid.
Ibid.
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c il’s role combine to create an ICC that will fail to “serve the cause o f international jus- 
tice.”’^
A fictitious scenario involving country X is used to analyze the first part o f the 
U.S. objection regarding jurisdiction. Country X, which is not a party to the ICC treaty, 
is alleged to have committed crimes as set forth in Article 5 o f the Statute against its 
own civilians on its territory. In such a circumstance, several factors must be present in 
order to initiate an ICC investigation. First, the crimes that country X is alleged to have 
committed must fall within the crimes set forth in Article 5 o f  the ICC Statute. Article 5 
defines the crimes falling under the IC C ’s jurisdiction as:
Article 5
Crimes within the jurisdiction o f  the Court
1. The jurisdiction o f  the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes o f
concern to die international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in
accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:
(a) The crime o f  genocide;
(b) Crimes against humanity;
(c) W ar crimes;
(d) The crime o f  aggression.’^
Assuming that evidence exists that the above crimes have been committed after 
the date the ICC enters into force, the next step is to determine whether or not the ICC 
can obtain jurisdiction over the crimes. The next factor to consider is country X ’s non- 
party status to the ICC treaty. Since country X is not a party to the ICC treaty. Article
Ibid.
Ibid., 12.
”  However, the crime o f  aggression remains outside the Court’s jurisdiction for a 
minimum o f  seven years after the treaty enters into force, and a satisfactory definition is 
agreed upon by two-thirds o f  the state parties to the treaty. See “ICC Statute,” Article 5.
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12(1) does not apply as it refers to state acceptance o f jurisdiction with respect to states
that become a party to the ICC Statute:
A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction o f 
the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 5. ®
An ICC investigation still could be triggered if  country X voluntary accepted the ICC’s
jurisdiction as stated in Article 12(2):
In the case o f  article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdic­
tion if  one or more o f  the following States are Parties to this Statute or have ac­
cepted the jurisdiction o f  the Court in accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory o f  which the conduct in question occurred or, i f  the 
crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State o f  registration o f  that 
vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State o f  which the person accused o f  the crime is a national/^
Country X ’s voluntary acceptance o f  ICC jurisdiction could happen i f  country X ’s gov­
ernment, the alleged perpetrator o f  the crimes, were ousted and replaced by a govern­
ment that accepted ICC jurisdiction to investigate the former regimes alleged atrocities.
However, Scheffer uses the scenario wherein the atrocity is committed by a state 
against its own nationals, and the state refuses to accept ICC jurisdiction. Thus, Article 
12(2)(a) and (b) does not apply since, as in the fictional scenario o f  country X, the ac­
cused state, and the “state on the territory o f  which the conduct in question occurred,” 
are one in the same.*® Country X ’s alleged atrocities are exactly the type o f  scenario 
that is criticized by Scheffer and the United States. In these types o f  situations Article
Ibid., Article 12(1). 
Ibid., Article 12(2).
80 Ibid., Article 12(2)(a)(b).
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12 does not apply since a state is committing atrocities against its own citizens, and is 
not a party to the treaty.
Moving from the fictitious to the concrete, the examples o f  Pol Pot’s extermina­
tion o f  Cambodian citizens in the late 1970’s and Saddam Hussein’s alleged gassing o f  
the Kurds in Iraq in 1988 are real world examples that would fall within the fictitious 
scenario o f  county X  ju st described.*’ In these two examples — Iraq and Cambodia -  
states have committed crimes against humanity, and, or, genocide, against their own na­
tionals on its own territory.
Thus, in the examples o f  Cambodia and Iraq the ICC could not exercise jurisdic­
tion over the alleged crimes committed by these governments. The only way a non- 
party state can be prosecuted for crimes committed against its own nationals within its 
territory is by a referral fi*om the Security Council as set forth in Article 13(b), which 
states:
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 
5 in accordance with the provisions o f  this Statute if:
(b) A situation in which one or more o f such crimes appears to have been com­
mitted is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter 
v n  o f  the Charter o f the United Nations;*^
Therefore, the criticism leveled at the ICC’s jurisdictional regime by the United States
*' Anthony Clark Arend and Robert J. Beck, International Law and the Use o f Force 
(New York: Routledge, 1993), 98, 112,121-123; Roy Gutman and David Rieff, ed.. 
Crimes o f  War: What the Public Should Know. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1999), 
155-156.
“ICC Statute,” Article 13(b).
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through its Ambassador-of-W ar Crimes, David Scheffer, is accurate. Under the Statute 
there is no authority for the ICC to prosecute a nation that is not a party to the Statute 
for violations o f international humanitarian laws against its own civilians on its terri­
tory, unless, and only if  the situation were referred to the ICC prosecutor by a Security 
Council referral.®^
However, there exists a second part o f  the United State’s critique o f  the Statute’s 
jurisdictional regime. Scheffer alleges that “because o f  the extraordinary way the 
Court’s jurisdiction was framed. . .a country willing to commit war crimes could jo in  the 
treaty and opt-out o f  war crimes jurisdiction for 7 years, while a non-party state could 
deploy its soldiers abroad and be vulnerable to assertions o f  [ICC] jurisdiction.”
Scheffer’s objection reflects U.S. policy which maintains that states should have 
the opportunity to assess the effectiveness and impartiality o f the Court before subject­
ing its nationals to its jurisdiction.®^ This position was balanced with the U.S. recogni­
tion o f  the advantages o f  a broad ICC jurisdiction to prosecute international war crimes.
As a result some scholars have suggested the ICC’s jurisdiction is both too broad 
and too narrow resulting in the worst o f  both worlds. The jurisdiction is broadly defined 
to allow the possibility o f  exposing peacekeepers participating in humanitarian missions in 
internal armed conflicts to ICC prosecution. At the same time the jurisdiction is too nar­
row as to allow non-states parties to the treaty to perpetrate the worst forms o f  crimes 
against its own citizens and yet be immune from prosecution absent a Security Council 
referral. See Ruti Teitel and others, “Panel: The International Criminal Court: Contempo­
rary Perspectives and Prospects for Ratification,” New York Law School Journal o f Hu­
man Rights 16, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 519.
ICC Senate Hearing, 14.
Ibid.
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To balance the tension between the principles o f  broad jurisdiction against the principle 
that a state must have an opportunity to assess the Court’s effectiveness, the U.S. ac­
cepted the idea o f  automatic jurisdiction o f  the Court over the crime o f genocide, but not 
for the category o f  crimes against humanity and war crimes.
For the category o f war crimes and crimes against humanity the U.S. favored a 
proposal that would allow a country to exempt its nationals firom ICC prosecution for a 
period o f  up to ten years during which time the Court’s effectiveness could be ascer­
tained.*^ At the end o f the ten-year period the state could choose one o f three options: 
(1) to accept the Court’s jurisdiction over all the Statute’s core crimes, (2) to extend the 
opt-out provision, or (3) to withdraw firom the treaty altogether. The U.S. proposal was 
defeated, and instead a proposal was accepted that allows countries to exempt its na­
tionals from being prosecuted for war crimes for a seven-year period. According to 
Scheffer, in the worst case scenario. Article 124’s seven-year opt-out clause allows state 
parties to charge other nations who have not joined the ICC with war crimes while ex­
empting its own nationals fi'om war crimes prosecution.
Is Scheffer’s assertion accurate? Can a country jo in  the treaty, exercise the opt-out 
clause and charge other nations for war crimes committed on their soil? Could Saddam 
Hussein charge U.S. soldiers for alleged crimes within Iraq, while choosing to exempt 
its own conduct from the ICC jurisdiction by joining the treaty and exercising the opt-
Ibid.
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out clause? In order to answer that question it is necessary to examine the language o f 
the opt-out clause in Article 124. Article 124 states:
Notwithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becoming a party 
to this Statute, may declare that, for a period o f  seven years after the entry into 
force o f  this Statute for the State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction o f  
the Court with respect to the category o f  crimes referred to in article 8 when a 
crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory. A dec­
laration under this article may be withdrawn at any time. The provisions o f  this 
article shall be reviewed at the Review Conference convened in accordance with 
article 123, paragraph 1.*^
Therefore, it is possible for a nation such as Iraq to jo in  the treaty and exercise the opt-
out clause.
Furthermore, since the opt-out clause is only available to countries that jo in  the 
treaty, the U.S. by failing to jo in  would not enjoy the right to exempt its nationals from 
war crimes prosecution in the ICC. Therefore, in theory a country such as Iraq, could 
violate war crimes and exempt its nationals from ICC prosecution under Article 124, 
while subjecting U.S. nationals to possible prosecution before the ICC for acts commit­
ted by U.S. troops in that nation’s territory. Thus, it is entirely possible for Iraq to join 
the ICC and charge the U.S. with war crimes violations for potential acts committed as 
part o f  the ongoing U.S. military operations in Iraq while exempting its own troops from 
war crimes violations for at least seven years.
In summary. Article 124, the opt-out clause, in concert with Article 12 authorizes 
state-parties to the ICC treaty to refer situations o f  the armed forces o f  a non-state party 
to the ICC for prosecution while exempting its own nationals from prosecution for war
“ICC Statute,” Article 124.
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crimes. Therefore, the U.S. objection that the ICC Statute permits states to jo in  the 
treaty and enjoy temporary prosecution from w ar crimes while subjecting states that fail 
to ratify the Statute to the ICC’s jurisdiction, is an accurate assessment.
The Role and Function o f the Office o f the Prosecutor
The United States consistently opposed the creation o f an independent prosecutor 
with authority to initiate investigations on his or her own.®* jSpeaking before the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, David Scheffer explained the U.S. position on 
the role o f the prosecutor: ,
The treaty also creates a proprio motu — or self-initiating prosecutor — who, 
on his or her own authority with the consent o f  two judges, can initiate investiga­
tions and prosecutions without referral to the court o f a situation either by a gov­
ernment that is party to the treaty or by the Security Council. We opposed this 
proposal, as we are concerned that it will encourage overwhelming the court with 
complaints and risk diversion o f its resources, as well as embroil the court in con­
troversy, political decision-making, and confusion.®^ {
The U.S. was opposed by other countries that believed an independent prosecutor was
necessary to act in cases where investigations o f  alleged crimes ran contrary to a state’s
interest.^® The theory behind the creation o f the independent Prosecutor was to "prevent
favoritism and ensure that suspected criminals from all sides o f  the conflict are treated
fairly."^* Advocates argued an independent Prosecutor would ensure impartiality by
®® “U.S. Concerns o f  Proprio Motu Prosecutor,” in ICC Senate Hearing. 147.
®̂ ICC Senate Hearing, 14.
Ball, 199.
Bryan F. MacPherson, “Building An International Criminal Court for the 21®‘ 
Century.” Connecticut Journal o f International Law 13 (Winter 1998): 57.
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possessing the authority to refer cases to the Court acting on their own initiative, absent 
any State or Security Council referral.
In the end, the U.S. opposition to the independent prosecutor met with defeat. 
Instead, the ICC created an independent prosecutor that the U.S. criticized as having far 
too much power and too little accountability. Articles 15 and 54 create the institution o f  
the independent Prosecutor. The Prosecutor’s duties and responsibilities include 
evaluation o f  evidence, initiation o f  investigations o f  alleged crimes, and the prosecu­
tion o f  defendants.^^ Thus, in addition to allowing referrals to the Court to come from 
states and Security Council referrals, the independent prosecutor can investigate allega­
tions o f  applicable crimes upon information from victims, non-govemmental agencies, 
or other reliable sources.^^
All referrals regardless if  originating from a State, the Security Council, or any 
other source, m ust be submitted to the Prosecutor, who has sole authority to reject or 
continue with an investigation. The authority for referring situations to the Court is con­
tained in Article 13. Article 13 creates a jurisdictional scheme that allows cases to come 
before the Court for investigation by three different routes, either by a State, the Security 
Council, or by the Prosecutor:
Article 13: Exercise o f  jurisdiction
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in 
article 5 in accordance with the provisions o f this Statute if:
“ICC Statute,” Articles 15 and 54. 
Ibid., Articles 13 and 15.
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(a) A  situation in which one or more o f  such crimes appears to have been com­
mitted is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 
14;
(b) A  situation in which one or more o f  such crimes appears to have been com­
mitted is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under 
Chapter VB o f  the Charter o f the United Nations; or
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect o f  such a crime in ac­
cordance with article 15.®'*
Article 13, regardless o f  the source o f  the referral, grants the Prosecutor the func­
tion o f  receiving applications for investigations.®^ Thus, the Prosecutor has the respon­
sibility for receiving all referrals made to the Court. The responsibility and power o f  the 
Prosecutor appears to be broad as he or she is the sole recipient o f  all referrals to the 
ICC.
Article 13 stipulates who can make referrals, while Article 14 goes further by de­
scribing the process o f  what happens after a referral is received. Article 14 affirms that 
States “may refer to the Prosecutor a situation.. .requesting the Prosecutor to investi­
gate.”®̂ By use o f  the word “requesting” the Prosecutor has the initial authority to de­
cide whether a request for an investigation is accepted or denied. Furthermore, Article 
14 grants the Prosecutor the authority o f  “investigating a situation for the purpose o f  de­
termining whether one or m ore specific persons should be charged with the commission 
o f such crimes.”®’ Article 14 states:
1. A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more
crimes within the jurisdiction o f the Court appear to have been committed request-
®̂* Ibid., Article 13. 
®̂ Ibid.
96 Ibid., Article 14.
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ing the Prosecutor to investigate the situation for the purpose o f  determining 
whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the commission o f 
such crimes.
2. As far as possible, a referral shall specify the relevant circumstances and be 
accompanied by such supporting documentation as is available to the State refer­
ring the situation.’*
The word “situation” as used in Article 14 o f  the ICC Statute refers to two things. 
First, it is designed to prevent referrals that target individuals alleged to have committed 
violations o f  the Statute’s crimes.”  Two, the word “situation” refers to the authority o f  
the Prosecutor to investigate a conflict in it entirety, and thereby prevents limiting the 
Prosecutor to investigating the alleged criminal activities o f  only one party, one individ­
ual, or one incident.’”
Thus, i f  country X refers a case to the Court involving country Y, the Prosecutor, 
acting under Article 14, is not limited to solely investigating country X ’s allegation, but 
can broaden the investigation to include any possible violations that may have been 
committed by both sides. The rationale behind giving the Prosecutor the power to in­
vestigate the entire situation rather than one incident, individual, or group, is that neither 
State in a conflict should be able to shield its nationals from investigations for alleged 
commission o f  crimes falling within the jurisdiction o f  the Court. In other words, the 
Prosecutor can, should, and, in theory, m ust have the authority to investigate all parties
”  Ibid.
”  Bassiouni, “Policy Perspectives Favoring the Establishment o f the International 
Criminal Court,” 759,
Ibid.
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involved in an armed conflict in order to avoid any hint o f bias toward any o f the par­
ties.’®’
The idea o f  authorizing the Prosecutor to investigate all parties to a conflict and
thus determine the direction o f the investigation has long been supported by the U.S.:
[W]e reiterate the longstanding position o f the United States that no one, not the 
Security Council, not States, nor any entity nor individual should be able to con­
trol the direction o f  the Prosecutor’s investigation by referring a particular case 
against a particular person.’®̂
However, .the Statute, while attempting to avoid charges o f  biased prosecutions, will 
nevertheless be unable to escape these charges for the following reasons.
Since, as noted earlier, many o f the referrals to the Court will originate from an 
internal armed conflict, there is a high probability that all the warring sides in the con­
flict will charge the other with the ICC Statute’s core crim es.’®̂ As referrals are submit­
ted to the Prosecutor’s office from the warring parties, the pressure w ill likely be tre­
mendous for the Prosecutor to investigate all parties’ allegations against each other in 
order to avoid criticisms o f  partiality or bias. Therefore, in an attempt to avoid criti­
cisms o f  bias, investigations will likely result for the entire situation, that is o f all parties 
to a conflict.
In addition, the Prosecutor has sole authority to perform investigations and decides 
what crimes, i f  any, have been committed and by whom. As the Prosecutor alone bears 
the burden o f  investigation, determination o f charges, and naming the defendants, there
’®’ Ibid
102 4‘U.S. Concerns over the Proprio Motu Prosecutor,” in ICC Senate Hearing, 148.
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is likely to be considerable pressure placed on the Prosecutor in the initial investigation 
stages. Indeed, a great deal o f  “lobbying” will be going on, not just toward the Prosecu­
tor, but toward the p u b lic .'^  Public opinion campaigns are likely to be directed by all 
parties in an attempt to portray themselves as blameless, while portraying the other side 
as blameworthy.'®^ Thus, i f  the United States were involved in a conflict that generated 
referrals to the Prosecutor, it is anticipated that considerable pressure will be brought to 
bear upon the Prosecutor to investigate claims against the U.S. as to avoid charges o f 
favoritism and bias on the part o f  the Prosecutor.'®^
W hile the U.S. supports the idea that no entity or individual should be able to steer 
the direction o f  a Prosecutor’s investigation, the U.S. adamantly opposes giving the 
power o f  the Prosecutor to initiate cases on his or her own. However, Article 15 o f  the 
ICC Statute gives to the Prosecutor, proprio motu status, that is, the power to initiate 
investigations acting on his or her own authority. Article 15(1) states:
The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis o f  informa­
tion on crimes within the jurisdiction o f  the Court.'®^
Article 15(1) raises the question o f  what does “on the basis o f  information on 
crimes within the jurisdiction o f  the Court’’ mean?'®® W ho or what is the source o f  that 
information? Article 15(2) answers this question. Article 15(2) gives the Prosecutor the 
authority to analyze the “seriousness o f  the information received,” from sources that in-
'®̂  Ibid, 8-16.
'®̂  Ibid.
'®®Teitel, 519.
'®’ Ibid., Article 15(1).
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elude states, the subsidiary organs o f  the U.N., intergovernmental, non-govemmental, 
and other reliable sources, in written or oral form. Article 15(2) says:
The Prosecutor shall analyze the seriousness o f  the information received.
For this purpose, he or she may seek additional information from States, organs o f  
the United Nations, intergovernmental or non-govemmental organizations, or 
other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate, and may receive written or 
oral testimony at the seat o f  the Court.
Article 15(2) also gives power to the Prosecutor to seek out “additional information” 
from entities and individuals, and “other reliable sources that he or she deems appropri­
ate.” ’’® The Statute does not define “reliable” nor “appropriate,” instead leaving their 
interpretations to the Prosecutor’s discretion.”  ’ Thus, authority rests with the Prosecu­
tor to determine what “other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate.””  ̂ The 
words “reliable” and “appropriate” w ithout definition are vague, and thus open to sub­
jective determinations o f  the Prosecutor. The accountability rests with the Prosecutor’s 
discretion.
Article 15(3) authorizes the Prosecutor to determine whether or not a referral for
investigation merits a, “reasonable basis to proceed” subject to review by the three judge
Pre-Trial Chamber. Article 15(3) states:
I f  the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed w ith an in­
vestigation, he or she shall subm it to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authori­
zation o f an investigation, together with any supporting material collected. Vic­
tims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with the
Ibid.
Ibid., 15(2).
” ®Ibid.
” ’ lbid.
” ^Ibid.
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Rules o f  Procedure and Evidence.’’  ̂ (emphasis added)
Once the Prosecutor has determined that a complaint shall go forward, the Pre-Trial 
Chamber m ust also agree “that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investiga­
tion, and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction o f  the Court,” in which case, 
“it shall authorize the commencement o f the investigation.” ’ Article 15(4) states:
I f  the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination o f  the request and the supporting ma­
terial, considers that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, 
and that the case appears to fall within the jurisdiction o f  the Court, it shall author­
ize the commencement o f  the investigation, without prejudice to subsequent de­
terminations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility o f  a 
case.” ^
Therefore, the requirement o f  a Pre-Trial Chamber review o f  a Prosecutor’s re­
quest to investigate acts as a check on Prosecutorial p o w er.^ o w ev e r, David Scheffer 
argues this check is inadequate since the Prosecutor need only convince two o f three 
judges for the investigation to continue, as set forth in Article 57.” ^ Moreover, even if  
the Pre-Trial Chamber rules to deny the commencement o f  an investigation. Article 
15(5) still enables the Prosecutor to submit new evidence to the Pre-Trial Chamber that 
could reopen the case:
“The refusal o f  the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize the investigation shall not pre­
clude the presentation o f  a subsequent request bv the Prosecutor based on new 
facts or evidence regarding the same situation.” *”
Ibid., Article 15(3). 
**"* Ibid., Article 15(4). 
” ^Ibid., Article 15(4). 
” ®Ibid., Article 57(1).
117 Ibid., Article 15(5).
127
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Thus, article 15(5) clearly contains the possibility o f  a case continuing even after 
the Pre-Trial Chamber rejects a petition for an investigation. The language o f  Articles 
15(5) and 15(6) grant authority to the Prosecutor to review new facts and evidence. A r­
ticle 15(5) and 15(6) also allow the Prosecutor to submit those new facts and evidence 
to the Pre-Trial Chamber for the purposes o f  having them reverse their previous deci­
sion to allow an investigation to continue. Specifically, Article 15(6) states:
If, after the preliminary examination referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Prose­
cutor concludes that the information provided does not constitute a reasonable ba­
sis for an investigation, he or she shall inform those who provided the information. 
This shall not preclude the Prosecutor from considering further information sub­
mitted to him or her regarding the same situation in the light o f  new facts or evi­
dence.***
The only thing it is reasonable to conclude the Prosecutor cannot do when his or
her request for further investigation has been denied is to collect new information.
However, delegates and scholars at the Rome Conference have represented Article 15 as
preventing a Prosecutor from investigating a situation if  the Pre-Trial Chamber rules to
deny the Prosecutor’s request. In fact, the language used by Professor Michael Scharf
suggests that the Prosecutor cannot even launch an investigation unless given approval
by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Appearing before the Senate Subcommittee on International
Operations on June 23, 1998, Professor Scharf, stated:
The safeguard against an independent prosecutor...is in article 15 which requires 
the approval o f  a three-judge pretrial panel before the independent prosecutor can 
launch an investigation...” *'^
"*Ib id ., Article 15(6).
* *’ “Statement o f Professor Michael P. Scharf before the Senate Subcommittee on 
International Operations,” in ICC Senate Hearing. 61.
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A careful examination o f article 15 reveals that S charf s statement is not entirely 
accurate. Article 15(1) and 15(2) clearly grants the Prosecutor the authority to launch an 
investigation into any situation around the globe regardless o f issues involving jurisdic­
tion, admissibility, or Pre-Trial Chamber review. In fact, the Prosecutor has a consider­
able degree o f  latitude in investigating any m atter involving potential violations o f  the 
ICC’s criminal subject matter. A ll procedural checks upon the Prosecutor come after an 
investigation has already commenced. After information has been gathered in an inves­
tigation, then the Prosecutor reviews the information and determines, on his or her own 
judgm ent whether or not to proceed with the investigation by requesting permission 
from the Pre-Trial Chamber. Since a Prosecutor has the authority to initiate investiga­
tions on his or her own, and can request information for any reliable source that the 
Prosecutor deems appropriate, a request to the Pre-Trial Chamber to investigate seems 
to be a mere formality.'^®
A num ber o f international scholars are fairly consistent in their opinion that Arti­
cle 15(4) indicates that a negative ruling by the Pre-Trial Chamber would prevent the 
Prosecutor from further investigation.^^’ Article 15(2) gives the power o f  the Prosecu­
tor to “analyze the seriousness o f  the information received (emphasis mine).” ’^̂  By
While the language o f  the ICC may not refer to evidence collection, including 
witness preparation as an “investigation.” it would appear a de facto investigation is occur­
ring when any prosecutor in any legal system is gathering and examining evidence, and 
interviewing witnesses.
Bassiouni, “Policy Perspectives Favoring the Establishment o f the International 
Criminal Court,” 798; Arsanjani, 26-29; Ball, 212; ICC Senate Hearing. 61.
“ICC Statute,” Article 15(2).
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writing into Article 15(2) the word received and not collected or gathered, it is reason­
able to conclude that the authors o f  the Statute intended for the Prosecutor’s investiga­
tion to cease once the Pre-Trial Chambers has denied his or her request for commencing 
an investigation.
However, by allowing the Prosecutor to review new facts and evidence submitted 
to him  or her, the Statute’s Articles 15(5) and 15(6) clearly authorizes the Prosecutor to 
accept new evidence. Permitting the Prosecutor to accept new evidence tacitly ac­
knowledges the right o f  parties to submit new information to the Prosecutor. W hat is 
the source o f  this new information? Referring back to Article 15(2), the source is “in­
formation from States, organs o f  the United Nations, intergovernmental or non- 
govemmental organizations, or any other reliable sources that he or she [Prosecutor] 
deems appropriate.. Additionally, the Prosecutor is given the power to review new 
facts and evidence, and thus while technically the Prosecutor is no longer investigating 
and gathering new facts and evidence, the Statute clearly assumes that someone is still 
gathering and collecting new evidence.
Some scholars have noted that Article 18 acts as a prosecutorial check. Article 18, 
which was proposed by the U.S., requires the Prosecutor to notify all states regarding a 
matter under review. I f  the state o f  the accused decided to investigate, the Prosecutor 
would have to defer to the state’s investigation unless the Pre-Trial Chamber decided 
otherwise.*^'* However, the language o f Article 18 is unclear regarding at what point the
123
Ibid., Article 18.
Ibid., Article 15(2).
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Prosecutor has to notify states o f  an on-going investigation. For example, i f  a Prosecu­
tor receives information on a crime in a particular country from one credible source is 
the Prosecutor bound to notify the parties identified in the crime at that juncture, or can 
the prosecutor attempt to verify the facts first before notifying parties? The Statute is 
unclear and vague on this question.
The Role o f  the Security Council
Leading up to start o f  the Rome Conference the central question still to be decided 
was the role o f  the Security Council. J ^ e  U.S. sought a criminal court that would have 
required a Security Council referral in addition to consent o f  the states to initiate ICC 
jurisdiction. The U.S. position was seen as too restrictive by many delegations and 
NG O’s who feared Security Council members would not refer situations involving their 
a l l i e s . M a n y  participants at the Rom e Conference believed that the real motivation
behind the U.S. policy for a Security Council controlled Court is the view “that it must
be able to veto any effort [by the Prosecutor] to investigate and prosecute.” ’ The U.S.,
Ibid., Article 18(1): “When a situation has been referred to the Court pursuant to 
article 13 (a) and the Prosecutor has determined that there would be a reasonable basis to 
commence an investigation, or the Prosecution initiates an investigation pursuant to arti­
cles 13 (c) and 15, the Prosecutor shall notify all States Parties and those States, which, 
taking into account the information available, would normally exercise jurisdiction over 
the crimes concerned.” See “ICC Statute,” Article 18(1).
Elisa Massimino, a member o f  the NGO, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 
commented that the U.S. position, which advocated a veto power for the Security Council, 
“would eviscerate the court’s effectiveness,” as cited in Ball, 199.
Norman Dorsen and Morton H. Halperin, “Justice After Genocide,” Washington 
Post. 13 M ay 1998, sec. A, p. 1.
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and the rest o f  the world realized that by requiring a Security Council referral to initiate 
investigations the U.S. could effectively block any investigation by the Prosecutor.
As the Rome Conference got under way in late June o f  1998, the delegates worked 
from an International Law Commission draft statute that preserved the Security Coun­
cil’s control over the activation o f  the Court. W ithout the consent o f  the all states 
with an interest in the case, the ICC needed a Security Council resolution to investigate. 
Article 23(1) o f  the PrepCom draft stated that only states that ratified the treaty and the 
Security Council could refer “situations” to the Prosecutors Office for investigation.'^^ 
Before the Rome Conference Singapore offered a compromise proposal that was 
ultimately accepted and written into the ICC Statute. Included in the Statute as Article 
16, it proposed giving the Security Council the authority to forestall ICC investigations 
and prosecutions for one year. Article 16 states:^
Article 16 
Deferral o f  investigation or prosecution 
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under 
this Statute for a period o f  12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution 
adopted under Chapter VII o f  the Charter o f  the United Nations, has requested the 
Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same 
conditions.'^®
|~Thus, unanimous consent is needed by all the permanent members plus a majority o f  the 
entire Security Council to pass a resolution to delay an investigation. In doing so, the
David J. Scheffer, “Developments in International Criminal Law: The United 
States and the International Criminal Court,” The American Journal o f  International Law 
93, (January 1999): 13.
Ball, 198.
“ICC Statute,” Article 16.
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balance o f  power shifts away from any one m em ber’s ability to block an investigation. 
Instead, all permanent mem bers must be in agreement to block an investigation, which 
is a considerably higher bar to achieve. Fifty-three nations supported the Singapore 
proposal’s one-year deferral; the United States and four other nations wanted a deferral 
time o f  an “unspecified num ber o f  y e a r s ." '^ ^
I The Security Council retains the right under Article 13 to refer situations to the 
Prosecutor. W hile the Prosecutor is obligated to investigate, he or she is not bound to 
submit the matter to the Pre-Trial Chamber to continue with Court proceedings. How­
ever, when the Security Council does refer a m atter there is no requirement that the 
states be parties to the treaty. Furthermore, states are bound by the terms o f  the U.N. 
Charter under the Security Council’s Chapter VU authority to comply with the dictates 
o f  the C o u n c i l . T h u s ,  with a Security Council referral state cooperation can be en­
forced with embargoes, the freezing o f  assets o f  heads-of-state and their supporters, 
and/or by authorizing the use o f  f o r c e . /
Ball, 213.
UN Charter, Chapter Vn, Article 39 states:
The Security Council shall determine the existence o f  any threat to the peace, breach 
o f the peace, or act o f  aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what meas­
ures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore interna­
tional peace and security.
Ibid.
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CHAPTER 5
ASSESSING U.S. OBJECTIONS FROM A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
This chapter focuses on problems o f  the ICC’s criminal definitions with respect to 
the principle o f  legality. In particular, this chapter will examine the problem o f  the 
ICC’s crimes from a theoretical perspective using legal theorist Lon Fuller’s analysis o f  
the rule o f  law. Prospects for the ICC’s success are made more difficult by definitional 
problems within the criminal subject matter o f  the Court. M ajor W illiam K. Lietzau, the 
Deputy Legal Counsel to the Chairman o f  the U.S. Joint Chiefs o f  Staff, has raised con­
cerns that the lack o f  clarity and preciseness in the ICC’s definition o f  crimes will cast 
doubt that the ICC is operating under the Rule o f  Law.' Consequently, M ajor Lietzau 
argues that greater effort and attention should be paid to defining precisely the crimes 
contained within the Statute.^
' William K. Lietzau, “Checks and Balances and Elements o f Proof: Structural Pil­
lars for the International Criminal Court.” Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999): 
478.
 ̂Ibid., 480.
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T he Problem : D efining C rim es W ith in  the IC C  S tatu te
In the early stages o f  the PrepCom negotiations, the U.S. delegates articulated the 
view that the long-term success o f  the Court would depend upon judicial integrity.^ Par­
ticipants must view the Court’s judicial procedures and mechanisms as producing impar­
tial and fair outcomes. The U.S. believes that i f  the Court fails to be perceived as impar­
tial, institutional credibility will be insufficient to secure state cooperation.
State cooperation with the Court is crucial to its institutional survival.'* Under the 
principle o f complementarity national courts retain the right o f  first jurisdiction with re­
spect to the alleged commission o f  crimes contained within the ICC.^ Complementarity 
is consistent with existing criminal law systems, which grants national courts primary 
jurisdiction over any crime committed within their borders.^ The ICC takes over juris­
diction when national courts cannot or will not prosecute, or have voluntarily given ju ­
risdiction to the ICC.^
In the event the ICC obtains jurisdiction, all Court requests, including investiga­
tions, ensuring evidence collection procedures, witness participation, the issuance o f ar­
 ̂Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relation, Subcommittee on International 
Operations, “Testimony o f  David Scheffer Before the Committee on Foreign Relations,”
Is A UN International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest?. 105* Cong, 2"̂ * sess., 
23 July 1998, 13 (hereafter cited as ICC Senate Hearing).
'* Ruti Teitel, et al, “Panel: The International Criminal Court; Contemporary Per­
spectives and Prospects for Ratification,” New York Law School Journal o f Human Rights 
16 (Spring 2000), 548-549.
 ̂United Nations, “Rome Statute o f  the International Criminal Court,” 17 July 1998, 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f an In­
ternational Criminal Court. U.N. GAOR, 53"^ sess., 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 
(hereafter cited as ICC Statute); Article 17(l)(a)(b).
 ̂Teitel, 505.
 ̂“ICC Statute,” Article 17(1)(2).
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rest warrants, and the apprehension o f  suspected criminals, require nation-state coopera­
tion to be carried out effectively.® On its own, the ICC has no authority or enforcement 
powers to compel state cooperation. Only the Security Council, using its Chapter V n  
enforcement powers o f  the UN Charter, can coerce states to participate in Court proceed­
ings. As it is likely that situations will arise that justify ICC investigation but not Secu­
rity Council participation, the need for state cooperation is even more important i f  the 
Court is to carry out effectively its mandate. Thus, the U.S. stressed the need for an im­
partial and fair Court with which states would be willing to cooperate.
In order to achieve the requisite judicial integrity, the U.S. made certain that the 
Court included in the ICC’s final draft an article that would more precisely define 
crimes, procedures, and rules for the use o f  evidence.^ Article 9 o f  the ICC Statute in­
serts into the Statute “Elements o f  Crime,” which are equivalent to the U.S. legal sys­
tem ’s “Elements o f  P ro o f’ that stipulate the necessary requirements necessary to obtain 
a conviction, including rules governing evidence, witnesses, and burden o f  proof stan­
dards.
The inclusion o f  the Elements o f  Crime and the Rules and Procedures for Evidence 
reflected the tension in creating the ICC Statute between the common law judicial sys­
tems o f  the U.S. and Great Britain, and the civil law judicial systems, as used throughout 
Europe and m any parts o f the w o r l d . T h e  tension between these two systems is most
® Ibid., Article s 86-102. 
 ̂Ibid., Article 9.
M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty o f Rome on the Establishment o f an 
International Criminal Court.” Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999): 443-469.
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evident in the emphasis both systems place on balancing the need to secure convictions 
versus the rights o f  the accused.
A minimum o f  procedural rights was included in the Statute to satisfy effectively 
the U.S. delegations as David Scheffer pointed out in his testimony before Congress.' ' 
The inclusion o f  the Elements and Procedures alleviates m uch o f  the due process proce­
dural concerns o f  the U.S. However, it does not satisfy the U.S. objections over the 
definition o f  crimes in the Statute. The problem  for the U.S. is the definitions are too 
vague and imprecise and thus violate core legal principles that comprise the western le­
gal traditions o f  the “rule o f  law.”
The U.S. contends that in failing to define sufficiently and adequately the Court’s 
crimes the ICC will deliver verdicts that are neither impartial, fair, nor follow interna­
tionally recognized m inimum rule o f law guarantees.*^ W ithout judicial integrity, states 
will be unwilling to cooperate with the ICC, resulting in a weak and ineffectual Court. 
To avoid this, the U.S. argues that the ICC crimes need more sufficient definitions to 
satisfy the principle o f the rule o f  law.
The Inner M orality o f Law
Lon Fuller makes the case that any legal system follows certain moral principles.'^ 
He refers to these legal principles as the “inner morality o f law.” He maintains that 
while a government can regulate and control behavior using any number o f  various
"  ICC Senate Hearing. 14. 
Lietzau, 478.
*̂  Lon L. Fuller, The M orality o f Law. 4* ed. (New Haven, CT; Yale University 
Press, 1969.)
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methods, it does not necessarily make that system a system o f  law. In interpreting how 
crimes are defined and applied, courts in the U.S. employ a clear-statement principle o f 
the “rule o f  law,”
As articulated by L. Fuller in The M orality o f  Law, the rule o f  law principle is pre­
sent in a legal system “in which legal rules exist, are clear rather than vague, do not ap­
ply retroactively, operate in the world as they do in the books, and do not contradict each 
o t h e r . A c c o r d i n g  to Fuller a legal system that lacks the “rule o f  law” violates the the­
ory o f  the inner morality o f  law, and is therefore a flawed, partial and unfair legal sys­
tem.
Fuller bases his theory on the idea that law is a system o f general rules designed to 
regulate and control conduct by humans endowed with the capacity for deliberation and 
choice. Fuller lists eight ways that a legal system can fail, and correspondingly, eight 
principles o f  the “inner morality o f  law, ” that cause a legal system to succeed.'^ The 
eight ways in which a legal system can fail are: (1) having no rules at all so that every­
thing relies on ad hoc decisions; (2) failure to make the laws public; (3) applying laws 
retroactively, which therefore offers no guidance regarding what is lawful and unlawful; 
(4) a failure to make rules understandable; ,(5) enacting rules that are contradictory; (6) 
issuing rules that are beyond people’s pow er to follow; (7) changing the rules so fre-
Cass R. Sunstein, “Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State.” Harvard Law 
Review 103 (December 1989): 471.
Fuller, 33-94.
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quently people cannot ascertain what conduct is expected o f  them; and, finally (8) in­
congruity between the rules as publicized and their administration.’^
Conversely, the eight demands o f  the inner morality o f  law are: (1) the generality 
o f  law, meaning the use o f  rules to govern human conduct; (2) rules must be publicly 
promulgated; (3) rules m ust be prospective and not retro-active; (4) rules must be de­
fined with clarity; (5) rule cannot contradict one another; (6) laws must be able to be fol­
lowed, meaning that they cannot require the impossible; (7) legislative inconstancy, that 
is changing laws too frequently must be avoided; and (8) congruency should exist be­
tween official action and the declared rule.’  ̂ I f  there is a total failure to provide any o f 
the eight demands. Fuller writes that it “does not simply result in a bad system o f  law; it 
results in something that is not properly called a legal system at all, except perhaps in a 
Pickwickian sense in which a void contract can still be said to be one kind o f  contract.” '® 
Fuller’s theory flatly rejects the legal positivism o f John Austin, which maintains 
that laws are laws because they are commands issued by a sovereign backed by the 
threat o f  sanction.'^ Austin m ade a central distinction between the question o f whether a 
law formed part o f  the positive law and whether or not it was a good or just law. Thus, 
“What is the law?” is quite distinct fi'om “W hat ought the law be?” On this subject 
Austin writes, “The existence o f  law is one thing; its merit or demerit another. W hether
Ibid., 39.
Ibid., 45-91.
Ibid., 39.
Andrew Altman, Arguing About Law. 2"** ed. (London: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company, 2001), 68.
Ibid.
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it be or be not is one inquiry; whether it be or not be conformable to an assumed stan­
dard, is a different inquiry.”
However, Fuller rejects the general characteristic o f  legal positivism that equates 
law “as a one-way projection o f  authority, originating with govemment.”^̂  Instead, 
Fuller notes that the law, i f  it is to function as a regulatory system, must take into ac­
count the relationship between citizens and governments. For example. Fuller raises the 
question o f what constitutes legitimacy “to a written constitution for a country just 
emerging from a period o f  violence and disorder in which any thread o f legal continuity 
with previous governments has broken.”^̂  The answer is found in the acceptance o f  the 
citizens o f  the constitution.
Similarly, Ronald Dworkin speaks o f  "law beyond law,"^"* a social consensus that 
inspires us continually to discern the "best route to a better future"^^ by defining "the 
people we want to be and the community we aim to have."^*^ It is within the bounds o f  
this kind o f  negotiated social consensus that transitional societies, which are frequently 
devoid of obvious shared normative values, must establish the legal legitimacy o f  their
J.W. Brown, ed., The Austinian Theory o f Law. (Littleton, CO; Rothman, 1983), 
71, cited in Altman, 68.
Fuller, 204.
Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law -  A  Reply To Professor Hart,” 
Harvard Law Review 91 (1958), 630.
Ronald Dworkin, Laws Empire (1986), 409; quoted in Charles Villa-Vicencio, 
“Why Perpetrators Should Not Always Be Prosecuted: Where the International Criminal 
Court and Truth Commissions Meet.” Emory Law Journal 49 (Winter 2000): 207.
Ibid., 413.
Ibid.
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new governments. An analogous circumstance is drawn in regard to the creation o f the 
ICC, which attempts to establish a wholly new international criminal justice system.
The ICC contains m any o f  the elements necessary for meeting the principle o f the 
rule o f  law. Article 24 states that laws will not be applied retroactively and that the rule 
o f  lenity, which requires Courts to resolve ambiguities in favor o f defendants, will ap- 
ply.^’ Article 22, contains the principle o f  nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without a 
punishment), which states that laws w ill not be applied retroactively.^® Article 20, con­
tains the principle o f  no bis in idem, or double jeopardy, which prevents trying a person 
twice for the same offense.^^
However, the m ain contention that is examined in this chapter is that inadequately 
defined crimes violate legal principles that require laws to be clear rather than vague. 
W hile not explicitly stated by the U.S., the implication o f  Fuller’s theoiy o f  the inner 
morality o f  law m ay lead to the conclusion that the ICC is a theoretically flawed Court. 
Therefore, if  the ICC contains crimes that are ill-defined and lack specificity, this 
strengthens the claim that the inner morality o f  law is violated by the ICC Statute, result­
ing in a theoretically flawed Court.
Criminal Liability for Ill-Defined Crimes
The United States Constitution states that vague or ill-defined criminal statutes vio­
late due process, and are therefore considered unconstitutional. In Lanzetta v. New Jer-
2 7 . ‘ICC Statute,” Article 24.
Ibid., Article 22. 
Ibid., Article 20.
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sev. the Supreme Court noted that the “Court has repeatedly stated that criminal statutes 
which fail to give due notice that an act has been made criminal before it is done are un­
constitutional deprivations o f  due process o f  law.” ®̂
In another case. Screws v. United States, the Supreme Court declared that due 
process requires statutory specificity “to give due notice that an act has been made 
criminal before it is done and to inform [the] accused o f  the nature o f  the offense 
charged, so that he may adequately prepare and make his defense.” *̂ Constitutional 
concerns over potential due process violations related to the ICC’s core crimes raise sev­
eral issues. Each separate issue is listed and then given more consideration in ensuing 
paragraphs.
Constitutional guarantees provided to accused persons by the United States Consti­
tution are not necessarily afforded to persons accused in other nations.^^ The Supreme 
Court ruled that American constitutional rights do not apply to crimes committed outside 
the United States, or to violations o f  laws o f  foreign nations.^^ In addition, the U.S. fed­
eral courts have also held that the Sixth Amendment is non-applicable to extradition 
hearings. In M arten v. Warden, the 11* Circuit federal court held that there is no due 
process right to a “speedy, extradition.” "̂* The 9* Circuit also held in P en  Yin-Chov v.
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 452 (1939).
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 ,128 (1954).
Kenneth J. Harris and Robert Kushen, “Prosecuting International Crime: Surren­
der o f  Fugitives to the W ar Crimes Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: Squaring Inter­
national Legal Obligations with the U.S. Constitution,” Criminal Law Forum 7, no. 3 
(1996): 561,597.
”  Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
"̂* Marten v. Warden, 993 F. 2d 824, 825 (1993).
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Robinson that the right to confront adverse witnesses does not apply to extradition/^ 
Therefore, the claim is advanced that there is no merit to the argument that the U.S. can­
not become a party to the ICC i f  U.S. constitutional protections are not included in the 
ICC Statute,
However, a second issue is the fact that any treaty which violates the Constitution 
cannot bind the United States. The Supreme Court held in Reid v. Covert that “no pro­
vision o f an [international] agreement m ay contravene any o f the prohibitions or lim ita­
tions o f the Constitution applicable to any exercise o f authority by the United States.”^̂  
The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee explained that it had no doubt whatsoever 
that “no treaty can override or conflict with the Constitution. The Constitution is para­
mount. [See] Reid v. Covert. 354, U.S. 1 (1957).”^̂  The Committee had made the above 
statement to explain the reservation attached to the ratification o f  the Genocide Conven­
tion.^* The Committee fully anticipated that at some future time the International Court 
o f Justice would interpret the Genocide Convention in a manner that would require the 
U.S. to adopt measures that would be unconstitutional.^^
In making a forceful statement restating the Supreme Court’s decision in Reid v. 
Covert, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was making it crystal clear that the U.S.
Oen Yin-Choy v. Robinson, 858 F. 2d 1400, 1406 (9* Circuit 1988).
Reid V. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); quoted in Congress, Senate, Report o f the Sen­
ate Foreign Relations on the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment 
o f the Crime o f  Genocide. Exec.O., 81®* Congress, 1®* sess.. Exec. Rep. 99-2,99**^ Cong.,
1®' sess., 1985; 20.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 20-21,
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Senate would never give its advice and consent to a treaty that could be perceived to vio­
late constitutional protections. The Senate’s stand has great significance for assessing 
U.S. objections to the ICC Statute. If  it can be affirmed that the ICC’s Statute would, in 
all likelihood violate constitutional due process, then the prospects o f the U.S. ratifying 
the treaty are seriously diminished.
One solution to the problem o f  the conflict between ICC provisions and the U.S. 
Constitution is to sidestep the issue altogether by describing the ICC as a non-Article HI 
court, which is not bound by U.S. law."*® The U.S. Constitution states:
[T]he judicial power o f  the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, 
and in such inferior courts as the Congress m ay from tim e to time ordain and estab­
lish. The Judges, both o f  the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices 
during good Behavior, and shall ..receive...a Compensation, which shall not be di­
minished during their Continuance in Office.'*'
As the ICC is not a creation o f  the U.S. Congress, nor does the President nominate its 
judges, the ICC is arguably a non-Article IH court.**  ̂ Legal scholar Paul Marquardt, in 
advocating for non-Article IQ status, claimed that since the ICC will exercise authority 
derived firom the international community o f  nation-states, the ICC would not merit A r­
ticle in court consideration.'*^ Marquardt also asserts that even if  the U.S. investigated 
and detained alleged w ar priminals for the ICC, it would still not warrant Article HI
'*" Paul D. Marquardt, “Law W ithout Borders: The Constitutionality o f  an Interna­
tional Criminal Court.” Columbia Journal o f  Transnational Law 33, no. 1 (1999): 104-106.
'*' U.S. Constitution, art. 3, sec. 1.
Daniel J. Brown, “The International Criminal Court and Trial in Abstentia.” 
Brooklvn Journal o f  International Law 24, no. 3 (1999): 789.
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status. In short, states Marquardt, “International courts are simply separate from the sys­
tem o f  United States courts governed by Article HI.”
M oreover, the Supreme Court ruling in Hirota v. M acAithur bolsters precedence 
for the ICC as a non-Article HI c o u r t I n  that case, the Supreme Court held that be­
cause the Tokyo Tribunal was created under the authority o f  U.S. Supreme Allied Com­
m ander General Douglas C. MacArthur, it “is not a tribunal o f  the United States.”
However, there are flaws in the above argument. The ICC is based on the principle 
o f  complementarity, which grants primary jurisdiction to national courts. As such, any 
proceedings o f  the ICC in the U.S. national courts would be operating not as interna­
tional courts but rather as U.S. courts. For example, while extradition proceedings in 
U.S. courts m ay not have to provide full constitutional guarantees, such as the right to a 
speedy trial, these courts are still Article HI courts operating as part o f  the U.S. judicial 
system. Thus, the question o f  whether or not the ICC proceedings in U.S. courts must 
provide all constitutional protections to defendants is a different question than whether 
the court is acting as an Article HI court. Any ICC proceedings in U.S. courts would 
arguably merit full constitutional protections o f  any criminal defendants, since any court 
operating in the U.S. would be national in character, and thus would have to be an Arti­
cle HI Court.
Theoretically, the tension between U.S. constitutional guarantees and the ICC Stat­
ute raises a larger issue. W ithin the framework o f  Fuller’s “inner morality o f  law” there
"^Ibid.
Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
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exists the possibility o f the theoretical incompatibility between the theories o f  the rule o f 
law as applied in accordance with the U.S. Constitution versus the rule o f  law ’s applica­
tion in countries with a civil law tradition.
Problems o f Definition
The ICC Statute lists four crimes as the subject matter jurisdiction o f  the Court,"*^ 
They are listed in Article 5, then given fuller consideration in Articles 6, 7, and 8. A rti­
cle 5 reads;
Crimes within the jurisdiction o f the Court 
1. The jurisdiction o f  the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes 
o f  concern to the international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction 
in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following crimes:
(a) The crime o f  genocide;
0?) Crimes against humanity;
(c) W ar crimes;
(d) The crime o f  aggression.
Article 6 o f the Statute defines genocide, which is taken from the original genocide con­
vention in 1949.'** However, Article 6 only contains a portion o f that original conven­
tion. Article 6 states:
For the purpose o f  this Statute, "genocide" means any o f  the following acts 
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members o f  the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or m ental harm to members o f the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions o f  life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
“ICC Statute,” Article 5.
'** “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f  Genocide,” 9 De­
cember 1948, Treaties and International Agreements Registered or Filed or Reported with 
the Secretariat o f  the United Nations 78, no. 277.
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(d) Imposing m easures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children o f the group to another group.**’
The crime contained within the Statute, including genocide, are restatements o f 
customary international humanitarian offenses, excepting some minor changes.^® The 
problem, however, is that simply restating the customary norm s as set forth in the geno­
cide convention is insufficient for the demands o f  criminal specificity.^’ Customary 
norms as contained within the Geneva and Hague Conventions, as well as other relevant 
treaties were created as general norms whose implementation, and subsequent precise­
ness was left for states to create with domestic legislation.^^
Leaving implementation o f  Geneva and Hague Convention norms to domestic leg­
islation causes two problems for the ICC. The ICC is based on the principle o f  comple­
mentarity, which means national courts will obtain primary jurisdiction and the ICC will 
prosecute cases only when countries are unwilling or unable to prosecute. W hile defer­
ring to national courts preserves their sovereign autonomy, the judicial results will vary 
fi-om country to country. Each country will have different judicial systems, rules, and 
procedures, as well as varying interpretations o f  the crimes contained within the ICC 
Statute. In one sense this preserves the original intent o f  the creators o f  the Geneva and 
Hague Conventions, who envisioned the implementation o f  the treaties’ provisions as 
being uniquely tailored to each nation. However, with the ICC designed to provide uni-
Ibid.
United Nations, Report o f  the Prepatorv Commission on the Establishment o f an 
International Criminal Court. U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, 1996, U.N. Doc. 
A /51 /22 ,16.
Lietzau, 482.
Ibid.
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fonnity and universality in interpreting the laws o f  war and peace it leaves the question 
unanswered o f  how the ICC will accept the national judicial decisions. In effect the 
Statute places the ICC in the role o f  a “supreme court” o f the world for war crimes.
Under the terms o f  Rome Statute, the ICC will have the power o f judicial review 
over national criminal justice systems, since the ICC determines when a nation is “un­
able or unwilling” to prosecute for war crimes.^'* Article 17(2) states:
2, In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall 
consider, having regard to the principles o f  due process recognized by international 
law, whether one or more o f  the following exist, as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was 
made for the purpose o f  shielding the person concerned from criminal re­
sponsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction o f  the Court referred to in arti­
cle 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circum­
stances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or im­
partially, and they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the cir­
cumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to 
justice.
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall con­
sider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or unavailability o f  its national 
judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence 
and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
But under the principle o f  complementarity the ICC leaves the responsibility o f  creating
more precise definitions o f  the customary qorms and treaties, which comprise the ICC’s
criminal subject m atter, up to individual nations within the international community.
Specifically, in order to m eet Rule o f  Law standards for criminal law specificity, these
customary norms m ust find expression as criminal provisions that transform the general
Paul Dubinsky, “Panel: The International Criminal Court: Contemporary Perspec­
tives and Prospects for Ratification,” New York Law School Journal o f Human Rights 16 
(Spring 2000): 535.
“ICC Statute,” Article 17(2).
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proscriptions into crimes with specificity accompanied by elements o f  p roo f Next, laws 
created at the macrolevel o f  states m ust be converted to the microlevel o f individuals to 
determine individual criminal culpability. Presumably the ICC will then bring these 
laws into a consistent international framework. These steps constitute the set o f general 
tasks associated with the application o f  international criminal law from the level o f the­
ory to practice.^^
The specific method required to perform this task is to review a multiplicity o f fac­
tual scenarios to attach guilt only when the accused is criminally liable in both deed and 
intent.^® The goal, from a military standpoint is to balance the prosecution o f genuine 
war crimes against preventing the prosecution for justifiably defensible military acts.
The difficulty o f  “enhancing certainty and predictability...[isjno easy task, especially in 
warfare scenarios where violence and aggression necessarily lie at the root o f  state ac­
tion.” How the ICC can accomplish that task without infringing upon the sovereignty 
o f  national judicial systems rem ains to be seen.
In relation to the definition o f  genocide. Article (6)(a) is reasonably straightfor­
ward; the reference to “killing” is the least vague part o f  the article.^* However, Article
(6)(b) states, “Causing serious bodily or m ental harm to members o f the group.”
There is no definition as to what constitutes “serious. ” or “mental harm.” The elements 
o f crim e which were created under the authority o f Article 9 contain no useful guideline.
Lietzau, 483. 
Ibid.
”  Ibid.
58 ICC Statute,” Article 6(a).
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Precedent is generally lacking, as the Genocide Convention was only applied for the first 
time in the Rwanda and Yugoslavia war tribunals. The criteria for commission o f geno­
cide is defined as “acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such.” ^
In the Elements o f  Crime, “whole or in part,” is clarified as “serious bodily or men­
tal harm  to one or more persons.” Strictly construed, genocide under the ICC Statute 
could occur if  only one person was subject to “serious m ental or physical harm” with a 
view toward causing the death o f that person. The Elements further define “killing” as 
stated in Article 6(a) as being interchangeable with the term “caused death.” Using 
the term “caused death” appears to create further difficulties. I f  an auto accident causes 
the death o f  a person o f  a protected group under the definition o f genocide, technically 
that conduct, i f  proven to be intentional, would constitute genocide.
Similarly, many other hypothetical scenarios could be drawn where “death” is 
caused, particular during an armed conflict. The qualifying statement that limits broad­
ness in the definition o f  genocide is the “intent” requirement “to destroy, in whole or in 
part.” Presumably, the qualifying statement was intended to prevent solitary deaths, 
but one individual technically is still a “part” o f  a protected group.
Ibid., 6-
United Nations, “Finalized Draft Text o f the Elements o f Crimes,” June 2000, 
Report o f  the Prepatorv Commission for the International Criminal Court. PCNICC/2000/ 
1/Add. 2; Article 6(b) (hereafter cited as Elements o f  Crimes).
Ibid., Article 6(a)(1), footnote 2.
“ICC Statute,” Article 6.
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Article 6 part (c) equates genocide with “deliberating inflicting on the group condi­
tions o f  life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.” ^  
Once again the Elements o f  Crimes stipulate that technically one need only cause the 
death o f  one person to m eet the definition o f  genocide.^^ Conceivably, Article (6)(c) 
could apply to a sanctions situation, such as in Iraq. However, just what constitutes the 
m eaning o f  “deliberating inflicting on the group conditions o f  life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or in part” is unknown. There is no guidance, 
and presumably ICC judges will decide on a case-by-case basis, which causes great con­
cern for the U.S.
Parts (d) and (e) o f  the definition o f genocide are equally vague in meaning. Part
(d) states that genocide exists when there is a campaign to reduce the rate o f  pregnancy 
in order to lim it population growth.^^ At least one international lawyer has questioned 
the forethought behind part (d), and believes that while the Statute’s drafters had some 
“paradigm o f  evil” in mind, they were not forthcoming in their meaning.®^ The vague­
ness o f  this definition leaves open the possibility o f  a variety o f  interpretations, ranging 
from Nazi-like forced sterilization to U.N. sponsored birth control programs. Moreover, 
discussion papers were not very helpful for clarifying the definition.^* One PrepCom
Ibid., Article 6(c).
“Elements o f Crimes,” Article 6(a)(1).
“ICC Statute,” Article 6(d).
George Fletcher, “The International Criminal Court: Contemporary Perspectives 
and Prospects for Ratification,” in Ruti Teitel, New York Law School Journal o f Human 
Rights 16 (Spring 2000), 525.
“U N  Prepatory Commission for International Criminal Court concludes first ses­
sion at HQ,” M2 Presswire. 2 March 1999, 1999 W est Law, 12607695, reprinted in David
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paper circulated in March o f  1999 stated “Genocide by preventing births would occur if  
the accused imposed measures that were intended to prevent births within a group.”
It would appear that the crime bears a relationship to the manner o f how measures 
to prevent pregnancies are imposed on a population. Thus, conceivably Planned Parent­
hood could be construed as imposing measures designed to prevent births by counseling 
all clients on forms o f  birth control. However, Planned Parenthood’s operation surely 
cannot be the type o f  activity the IC C ’s drafters had in mind when considering conduct 
that rises to the level o f  genocide.
Part(e) o f  the definition o f  genocide is equally problematic. Article 6(e) states, 
“forcibly transferring children o f  the group to another group.” As the definition now 
stands, the practice o f  finding hom es for children o f  one group and placing them with 
another would be consistent with the above definition. Professor George Fletcher states 
that drafters surely did not intend for this to be so, however they left the definition vague 
enough to allow for this form o f  strict reading. Professor Fletcher suggests that what the 
drafters had in m ind was an act sim ilar to the taking o f Aborigine children in Australia 
and forcing them to be raised in W hite homes in order to assimilate them into another 
culture.^®
Article 25, section 3, in conjunction with the definition o f  genocide raises specific 
U.S. constitutional questions. Article 25, section 3, provides for various forms o f  par-
Nill, “National Sovereignty; Must It Be Sacrificed to the International Criminal Court?’ 
BYU Journal o f  Public Law 14, no. 1 (1999): 119-150.
^^Ibid.
Fletcher, 526.
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ticipation in a criminal offense which render the person liable for criminal prosecution.’ ’ 
Article 25(3)(e) would appear to violate constitutionally protected free speech. Article 
25(3)(e) states:
e) In respect o f  the crime o f  genocide, directly and publicly incites 
others to com m it genocide.’^
In effect, writing or speaking o f  population transfers m ay violate this provision and 
render the person liable for the crime o f  genocide. The above article would invariably 
constitute a challenge to constitutionally protected free speech.’  ̂ Only in the circum­
stance where the speech or writing was likely to cause an imminent likelihood o f  inciting 
others to commit genocide would the above provision o f  the ICC Statute be permitted in 
U.S. law.
The definition o f  genocide in Article 6 is fairly representative o f  the imprecise na­
ture o f  the definition o f  crimes contained in the ICC Statute. Although the crimes 
against humanity in Article 7 are better defined than the Article 8 war crimes. Article 7 
still contains similar definitional problems. According to international law scholar 
M .Cherif Bassiouni, the language o f Article 7 is clear, and yet he acknowledges “some 
o f  the prohibited acts are mere labels whose elements will need to be established in the 
future.” The lack o f  specificity and elements clarifying crimes against humanity raises
”  “ICC Statute,” Article 25(3) 
Ibid., Article 25(3)(e).
73 U.S. Constitution, Amendment 1. 
Bassiouni, 461.
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“questions about their conformity to the requirements o f  the principles o f  legality con­
tained in Article 22,” which requires that laws be “strictly construed.”
Article 8 is more problematic owing to the fact that customary laws o f  war often 
reflect negotiated law o f  war treaties where consensus was more valued than clear, pre­
cise terminology.^^ M ilitaries are typically loath to bind their forces through restrictive 
precise language, and therefore the practice o f  the laws o f  war has been one o f  general 
proscriptions rather than narrowly tailored ones.^^
Some examples illustrate this point. In Article 8, one o f the first w ar crimes listed 
is that o f  “willfully causing great suffering, o r serious injury to body or health.”’® 
Agreement upon what exactly that means is completely lacking.’  ̂ The problem. Major 
Lietzau notes, is that “great suffering” is a common result o f  war, even among “pro­
tected” civilian persons.®® Other examples o f  ambiguous wording are “wounding 
treacherously,”®’ “attacking...buildings which are undefended,”®̂ and “persecution,” de­
fined as “intentional and severe deprivation o f  fundamental rights contrary to interna­
tional law by reason o f  the identity o f  the group or collectivity.” ®̂
75 Ibid. ; “ICC Statute,” Article 22.
Lietzau, 483.
”  Ibid.
’® “ICC Statute,” Article 8(2)(a)(iii).
Lietzau, 487.
®® Ibid., 488.
®’ “ICC Statute,” Article 8(2)(b)(xi).
®̂ Ibid., Article 8(2)(b)(v).
®̂ Ibid., Article 7(l)(h) and (2)(g).
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As this chapter concludes it is clear that the crimes examined here represent only a 
fraction o f the definitional difficulties that will need to be worked out to attain the level 
o f  specificity required by criminal justice systems operating under Fuller’s Rule o f Law 
requisites. However, the uniqueness o f the ICC is that there is no supra-legislator that 
can more adequately define the crimes. One scholar has stated that one o f  the things that 
the ICC may do very well is “provide clarity and uniform interpretation to international 
human rights and humanitarian law.”®̂ It is precisely because international humanitarian 
law is so lacking in clear and specific definitions that the United States is troubled by the 
ICC’s treatment o f  the criminal subject matter.
If  the ICC is establishing precedents as to uniform interpretations o f command re­
sponsibility, genocide, and war crimes, it will be doing so as a treaty organization that 
not all states will join. Advocates o f  the ICC would like to believe the precedents set in 
international law by the Court may ultim ately bind all states. Indeed as mentioned above, 
many scholars believe that the function o f  interpreting law is one o f  the advantages to­
ward creating the ICC.
However, the precedential value will occur without many states’ -  including the 
U .S .’s -  consent. That is deeply troubling^to the U.S. which feels such important matters 
should not be left up to judges operating w ithout proper and effective oversight in a 
treaty based organization that not all states w ill join.*^ Although the ICC tries to steer 
away from making the claim  that it w ill be creating binding law,^^ nevertheless, the deci-
Dubinsky, 535.
Leitzau, 512-529.
“ICC Statute,” Article 10 states:
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sions m ade by the ICC will come to occupy a space in international law as part o f  the 
evidence for the existence o f  customary international law, which is binding on all
states.*^
Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as lim iting or prejudicing in any way existing or 
developing rules o f  international law  for purposes other than this Statute.
Article 38 o f  the Statute o f  the International Court o f Justice identifies the sources 
o f  international law as deriving from four categories; (1) treaties, (2) international customs,
(3) general principles o f law common to all legal systems, and (4) judicial precedents 
along with the teachings o f international law experts. See J.L. Brierly, The Law o f Na­
tions. 5* ed. (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1955), 57-66.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION
On July 18, 1998 the Convention creating the ICC was opened for signature at II 
Campidoglio in Rome. W ithin two hours o f  the opening for signatures twenty-six coun­
tries had signed the Treaty.’ A little over a year later, by October 1999, eighty-nine 
states had signed and four states had ratified the Treaty.^ The rapidity with which na­
tion-states have jo ined the Treaty demonstrates the wide support the ICC enjoys among 
the world community. Perhaps with that in mind former President Clinton decided to 
sign the treaty on the last day it was open for signatures.^
However, the Senate has m ade it clear they will not ratify the treaty.'* C linton’s 
signing o f the ICC treaty does not bind the U.S. to the treaty until the Senate gives their 
advice and consent and ratifies the treaty. However, under the Vienna Law o f  Treaties,
’ M. Cherif Bassiouni, “Negotiating the Treaty o f  Rome on the Establishment o f an 
International Criminal Court.” Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999): 467.
 ̂United Nations, “Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court, Ratification 
Status,” United Nations Official Website, [ratification status on-line]; available jfrom 
http://www.un.org/ law /icc/statute/status.htm; Internet; accessed 16 May 2001.
 ̂On December 31,2000, on the last day the treaty was open for signature. Presi­
dent Clinton signed the ICC Statute.
Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relation, Subcommittee on International 
Operations, Is A U N  International Criminal Court in the U.S. National Interest? Sub­
committee on International Operations. 105**’ Cong, 2"'* sess., 23 July 1998 (hereafter 
cited as ICC Senate Hearing).
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a state’s signature does bind it to refrain fr-om defeating the purpose o f  that trea ty / The 
U.S. waited almost forty years to ratify the Genocide Convention, and given the wide­
spread support for the ICC, many scholars have predicted that the ICC will be opera­
tional long before the U.S. ever becomes a  state-party to the treaty.^
The reality that the U.S. will not be a party to the ICC Statute raises an impor­
tant question. Since the U.S. will not participate in the ICC why is it important to assess 
U.S. objections? At the outset, it is difficult to envision the efficient functioning o f  the 
ICC without U.S. participation. International legal scholars point out the example o f  the 
U.S. failure to participate in the League o f  Nations as one possibility that represents the 
worst-case scenario.^ At worst, the ICC will not only be ineffective, but also acerbate 
international tensions, potentially fueling conflicts and prolonging wars.
Nevertheless, advocates remain cautiously optimistic, seeing in the creation o f  the 
ICC a momentous step forward in institutionalizing international criminal justice 
mechanisms. Yet, they also realize the ICC is no panacea for all the ills o f  mankind.
The tendency among ICC advocates is to view the U.S. as refusing to hold their own 
conduct accountable to the same rule o f  law they impose on others. The ICC advocate’s 
viewS on U.S. opposition makes it easier for proponents o f  the ICC to dismiss U.S. ob­
jections without really analyzing their content. However, dismissing U.S. objections
 ̂United Nations, “Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties,” 23 May 1969, 
United Nations Treatv Series. 1115, Article 8 ,331, 336.
 ̂Christopher Blakesley and others, “Panel: Association o f  the American Law 
Schools Panel on the International Criminal Court,” American Criminal Law Review 36, 
no. 2 (Spring 1999): 223-254.
 ̂W illiam S. Shepard, “Restraining Gulliver: American Exceptionalism and the In­
ternational Criminal Court,” Mediterranean Quarterly 11, no. 1 (2000), 69.
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without fully considering their merits fails to appreciate the validity o f  those criticisms. 
Assessing U.S. objections to the ICC becomes important because their validity could act 
as a predictor o f future ICC results, allowing policy makers and leaders to anticipate the 
effect o f  those results and respond accordingly. For example, i f  it can be determined 
that in a particular instance the aggressive pursuit by the ICC o f  a suspected war crimi­
nal could lead to the destabilization o f  a region, the U.S. can use its power to prevent 
that particular ICC prosecution.
The paradox o f  the twentieth century is that although more international coopera­
tion and international treaties have been used to mitigate and prevent the violence o f 
war, it has also produced more death and destruction than any other century in history.® 
The treaties represented the w orld’s attempt through the use o f  the international law to 
reduce the horrors o f  war, the instability they produce, and the lives they destroy. Yet, 
repeatedly the attempts to reduce the sheer brutality o f  men toward other men have 
failed. The post-W orld W ar H war crimes trials at Nuremberg and Tokyo reflect hu­
m anity’s desire to right wrongs and punish international transgressors who commit hei­
nous acts that “shock the conscious o f  m ankind.” ^
® Professor Rudi Rummel documents that as many as 170 million persons have 
been murdered by their own governments. See Rudolph J. Pummel, Death Bv Govern­
ment 9 ,1994, as cited in Michael P. Scharf, “The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An Ap­
praisal o f  the First International W ar Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg,” Albanv Law Re­
view 60 (Spring 1997): 861.
® The Preamble to the ICC states:
M indful that during this century millions o f  children, women and men have been 
victims o f  unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience o f humanity.
See United Nations, “Rome Statute o f  the International Criminal Court,” 17 July 
1998, United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment o f
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W ill the passage and successful establishment o f a permanent international crimi­
nal court complete the m issing link in an international criminal justice system that be­
gan with the International M ilitary Tribunal (IMT) trials at Nuremberg? The U.S. has 
responded w ith a definite answer o f  no. It is the position o f the U.S. that the ICC 
adopted at Rome, and destined to become a fully functioning institution before long, 
suffers from institutional flaws that hinder, not support the application o f international 
justice. This study examined the thesis posited by the United States that deficiencies in 
the institutional structures o f  the ICC would render the criminal court inadequate to ac­
complish its stated objectives o f  punishing and deterring the worst forms o f  interna­
tional criminal atrocities.'®
The thesis analyzed particular institutional features o f  the ICC to assess the claims 
o f the U.S. against the actual language o f the Statute to determine if  the U.S. claims 
merited consideration. In testing the U.S. hypothesis this thesis confined the scope o f 
its inquiry to four features o f  the ICC Statute:
(1) The jurisdiction o f  the ICC;
(2) The authority and powers o f  the Office o f the Prosecutor;
(3) The role o f  the United Nations Security Council; and,
(4) The crimes that the ICC will be enforcing.
an International Criminal Court. U.N. GAOR, 53^ sess., 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 183/9 (hereafter cited as ICC Statute).
'® The Preamble to the ICC Statute articulates its objectives:
A ffirm ing that the most serious crimes o f  concern to the international community 
as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured 
by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.
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The m ethod used to assess the specific U.S. objections was a careful analysis o f  
the language o f  the disputed articles o f  the ICC Statute to ascertain whether or not U.S. 
claims are accurate. The materials that have been used in this study are derived from 
both prim ary and secondary sources. The primary source material is official govern­
ment documents pertaining to the ICC, including the treaty Statute that legally creates 
the Court, and U.S. and U N  documents. The secondary source materials come from 
books and academic journals.
To provide the context for the impetus behind the ICC creation, the thesis exam­
ined the history o f  twentieth century attempts at establishing international judicial 
mechanisms to prosecute the crimes o f  war, genocide, and crimes against humanity.
The historical chapters focused on the failed WWI war crimes trials, and the successful 
WWn trials in Nuremberg and Tokyo. The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials are not only 
the inspiration but also the source o f  the international law upon which the ICC is 
founded.
Before the twentieth century international law had nothing to say regarding in­
dividuals; it provided legal personality only to nations. Individuals were recognized in 
international law only in the context o f  their being a citizen o f  a country, such that when 
an individual was wronged it was really the citizen’s country that had rights to redress 
o f  grievances. An individual without a country possessed no rights recognized by inter­
national law. Consequently, citizens had no rights outside the context o f their national­
ity. Prior to, and throughout much o f  the twentieth century, i f  a citizen were wronged 
by their government, international law was silent.
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Then in 1899 the first Hague Conference was held. Nations assembled in recogni­
tion o f  their mutual benefit to regulate their conduct both to prevent wars and to miti­
gate the horrors that stemmed from wars. Credit falls to the Russian Czar Nicholas H 
for calling the first Hague Conference, as credit falls to the Hague Conference for pro­
ducing the first international codification o f  the laws o f  w ar.’ * At the second Hague 
Conference, another Russian, international jurist Feodor de Martens gets credit for writ­
ing into international law a whole new category o f  crimes that sets the revolutionary 
tone in international law in the twentieth century.’^
The Martens Clause, contained in the Preamble o f  the 1907 Hague Convention, 
moved onto the stage o f  international law the recognition and protection o f  the lives and 
rights o f  individuals. The M artens Clause gave recognition to the category o f  crimes 
against humanity, which brings protection to civilians in war.
The first test at implementing the laws o f  war erected at the Hague Conferences 
ended in failure as the “Guns o f August” erupted in the summer o f  1914 with the out­
break o f  WWI. The Hague represented the first international efforts to humanize the 
conduct o f the participants in war. Yet, the First W orld W ar was anything but human­
ized; it was the most brutal w ar ever fought up to that time. It was a war o f  metal and
* ’ James F. Willis, Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy o f  Punish­
ing W ar Criminals o f  the First W orld W ar (London: Greenwood Press, 1982), xi
The Martens’ Clause contained in the Preamble o f  the 1907 Hague Convention
reads:
Until a more complete code o f  the laws o f  war has been issued, the High Contract­
ing Parties deem it expedient to declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations 
adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under the protection and the 
mle o f  the principles o f  the law o f  nations, as they result from the usages established
162
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
machines that delivered men up to their deaths, not in the hundreds, but in the thou­
sands. W orld W ar I has become an iconographie symbol for the horrors o f  war evoking 
images o f trenches and barbed wire strewn battlefields littered with pockets o f  poison 
gas and the bodies o f  dead soldiers cut down by machine guns, their faces covered with 
gas m asks.’^
At last when the “Guns o f  August” were silent, the victorious Allies were in no 
mood to be conciliatory. They charged Kaiser W ilhelm II for violations o f  the laws o f 
nations and pursued his punishment before an international tribunal. Although the ef­
forts at war crimes were unsuccessful, the trials became the legal genesis behind the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. In 1943 the Allies created the United Nations W ar Crimes 
Commission (UNWCC) to investigate formally war crimes violations and explore pro­
posals for creating a war crimes c o u r t . U N W C C  examined the work o f the 1919 
Commission on the Responsibility o f  the Authors o f  the W ar and on Enforcement o f  
Penalties to determine the direction that the post-WWH trials should take.’  ̂ The 
UNW CC wanted to make sure the mistakes o f  W W I were not repeated.
among civilized peoples, fi-om the laws o f  humanity, and the dictates o f the public con­
science.
Howard Ball, Prosecuting W ar Crimes and Genocide (Kansas: University Press 
o f Kansas, 1999), 9-25.
Cherif M. Bassiouni, “From Versailles To Rwanda in Seventy-Five Years: The 
Need to Establish a Permanent International Criminal Court,” Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 10 (Spring 1997): 21-23.
“Commission on the Responsibility o f  the Authors o f  the W ar and on Enforce­
ment o f Penalties,” 29 March 1919, Report Presented to the Preliminary Peace Confer­
ence, American Journal o f  International Law 14, no. 1 (1920): 95-96 (hereafter cited as 
1919 Commission Report).
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The 1919 Commission recommended charging the Kaiser for initiating the war. 
The effort failed in the politically-charged atm osphere o f  post-W W I Europe, but it 
served as the basis for the idea behind charging the Germans and Japanese after W W n 
for waging an aggressive war.'® W orld W ar I also sought to punish Turkey for mass 
execution o f  Armenians in 1915, turning back centuries o f  tradition and international 
law that gave states the right to treat its own nationals as they willed. The effort failed, 
but it is significant for establishing the precedence for the idea that citizens are entitled 
to international protections even from their own governments. In bringing their charges 
against the Kaiser and Turkey, the Allies relied on the work o f  The Hague Conferences 
and the M artens Clause. W W I gave legal life to the ideas o f  The Hague; the task that 
lay before the world was making them binding international law.'^
Nuremberg served as the midway point between the failed application o f the ideas 
o f  war crimes after W W I and the successful finalization in 1998 o f  a treaty to create the 
w orld’s first permanent international criminal court. Nuremberg is instmmental for the 
developments in international law that m ake the ICC possible. The idea o f  a permanent 
criminal court was broached by the 1919 Commission but never really considered.'®
The idea was broached again after W W II but stalled in the post-W ar political stalemate 
o f  the Cold W ar.'^ Finally the idea w as brought to life in the 1990’s. Nuremberg cre­
'® Willis, xi.
'^Ibid., 3-6.
'® Ibid., 166.
Howard Ball, Prosecuting W ar Crimes and Genocide (Kansas: University Press 
o f Kansas, 1999), 86-93; Paul D Marquardt, “Law W ithout Borders: The Constitutionality 
o f  an International Criminal Court,” Columbia Journal o f  Transnational Law 33, no. 1 
(1995): 83-92.
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ated the international legal precedents upon which the ICC is based. “The lasting con­
tribution o f  Nuremberg was to make individuals responsible for their actions,” said Jutta 
Limback, president o f  Germany’s Supreme Court.^° In 1945 the victorious Allies cre­
ated the London Charter. Article 6 o f  that Charter created three categories o f  interna­
tional war crimes for which individuals, including heads-of-states and military leaders, 
could be held criminally liable, and therefore tried before a court o f  law. In 1946, the 
General Assembly o f  the newly-created United Nations affirmed and codified the gen­
eral principles behind the Nuremberg trials into international law. Article 6 o f  the N ur­
emberg’s Charter made three crimes punishable by the Nuremberg judges:
(a) C R IM E S A G A IN ST PE A C E : namely, planning, prepara­
tion, initiation or waging a w ar o f  aggression, or a war in violation o f  international 
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspir­
acy or the accomplishment o f  any o f the foregoing.
(b) W A R  C R IM E S : namely, violations o f the laws or customs
o f  war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment 
or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose o f  civilian population o f or 
in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment o f  prisoners o f war or persons on the 
seas, killing o f hostages, plunder o f public or private property, wanton destruction 
o f  cities, towns, o r villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.
(c) C R IM E S A G A IN ST H U M A N ITY : namely, murder, ex­
termination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against 
any civilian populations, before or during the war; or persecution on political, ra­
cial, or religious grounds in execution o f  or in connection with any crime within 
the jurisdiction o f  the tribunal, whether or not in violation o f  the domestic law o f 
the country where perpetrated.^'
Ball, 92.
United Nations, “Prosecution and Punishment o f M ajor W ar Criminals o f  the 
European Axis,” 8 August 1945, United Nations Treatv Series 279, 59,1946, Stat. 1544: 
82 (hereafter cited as London Charter); Article 6.
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The General Assembly codified these principles into international law in 1946 as well 
as the other legal precedents set at Nuremberg. The others principles codified by the 
General Assembly were:
Principle I: There is individual responsibility for war crimes.
Principle H; Individual responsibility lies in international law, regardless o f
whether domestic law has no such provisions.
Principle lU. “Head o f  State” is no longer an immunizing defense against war
crimes charges.
Principle IV. “Superior Orders” is no longer a defense against war crimes
charges, “provided a moral choice was in fact impossible.”
Principle V: A person charged with war crimes has “the right to a fair trial on
the facts and the law.”
Principle VII: Complicity in the commission o f the above war crimes is a crime in 
international law.
Revolutionary ideas in international law that began with the first attempts to cod­
ify crimes at The Hague, and continued with the legal precedence o f  efforts to punish a 
head-of-state, Kaiser W ilhelm n  after W WI, finally took international legal existence at 
the Nuremberg trials. W ith the Nuremberg Principles came the ushering in o f  a new era 
in international law. No longer was international law silent on how a nation treated its 
own citizens. Following in the line o f  logic contained in the 1907 M arten’s Clause, in­
ternational law now said that even in wartime there are limits “to what governments 
may use as a means o f  killing and what they m ay do even to their own citizens; such 
issues may appropriately be judged by an international tribunal and, most important, 
those who gave the orders and those who carried them  out both bear full responsibil-
Ball, 87.
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The Hague Conferences had begun a revolution in international law that at­
tempted to bring w ar under the rule o f  law/'*
The ICC brings together the unfinished legacy o f  the W orld W ar H tribunals, cre­
ating a permanent international criminal court to hear cases involving the most serious 
violations o f  the laws and customs o f  war that for whatever reason are not prosecuted 
by national criminal justice systems. The ICC however, is not a perfect institution. The 
specific objections addressed by the United States point out difficulties in the ICC’s 
ability to deliver on the promise o f finishing the legacy o f  Nuremberg. The largest con­
cern for the U.S. were the issues involving how the jurisdiction o f  the ICC could be 
triggered, whether the authority to refer cases to the Court would be vested in states par­
ties, the degree o f independence and authority exercised by the ICC Prosecutor, and 
whether the Security Council could control what cases came before the ICC.^^
In regard to the ICC’s jurisdiction the thesis addressed the following problem 
identified by the U.S. The way the ICC jurisdiction is framed, the worst forms o f vio­
lence committed by a nation against its own citizens will go unpunished unless the Se­
curity Council refers that case to the ICC. Does the ICC permit the worst forms o f  in­
ternational atrocities occurring within nations to go unpunished absent Security Council 
involvement, while exposing a nations peacekeepers operating in a humanitarian mis­
sion to the potential risk o f prosecution by the ICC?
"  Willis, xi.
Ibid., 5.
ICC Senate H earing . 1-32.
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The answer is yes. Article 12 only grants the ICC jurisdiction if  one o f  the parties, 
either the nation o f  the accused, or the nation where the crime was committed has either 
ratified the treaty or consented to the ICC having jurisdiction to try the case.^^ Since in 
all likelihood the leaders o f  nations most likely to comm it atrocities against their own 
citizens -  the Hitlers o f  the world -  will not jo in  the treaty, the only way the ICC can 
prosecute such crimes is i f  the Security Council, acting under Article 13(b), refers the 
situation to the Court.^^
The U.S. also cited concerns that a nation could jo in  the treaty, exercise the opt- 
out clause for war crimes and thereby exempt its forces from prosecution for that crime. 
Therefore, the U.S. claimed, a nation’s forces could commit w ar crimes with impunity 
while at the same time refer cases involving other nations to the ICC to stand trial. The 
analysis o f  the relevant ICC Articles 12 and 24 confirms that the U.S. claim is true. Ar­
ticle 124, the opt-out clause, in concert with Article 12 authorizes state-parties to the 
ICC treaty to refer situations o f  the armed forces o f  a non-state party to the ICC for 
prosecution while exempting its own nationals from prosecution for war crimes. There­
fore, the U.S. objection that the ICC Statute permits states to jo in  the treaty and enjoy
“ICC Statute,” Article 12.
The only way a non-party state can be prosecuted for crimes committed against 
its own nationals within its territory is by a referral from the Security Council as set forth 
in Article 13(b) o f the ICC Statute which states:
The Court m ay exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in arti­
cle 5 in accordance with the provisions o f  this Statute if:
A situation in which one or more o f  such crimes appears to have been committed 
is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII o f 
the Charter o f  the United Nations;
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temporary prosecution from war crimes while subjecting states that fail to ratify the 
Statute to the ICC’s jurisdiction is an accurate assessment.
There is also a practical problem with the way the ICC jurisdiction is framed. 
M any chroniclers o f  the Nuremberg trials have pointed out that one o f the keys to suc­
cess was the fact that the Allies had occupied Germany with over a million troops and 
thus had access to all witnesses and evidence.^® In the situation involving an atrocity 
such as the massacres in Cambodia, territorial occupation by a victorious army will not 
be the case. Cambodia would have not only to give up the accused for trial but also co­
operate to provide evidence. Another alternative would be i f  the nation, in this exam­
ple, Cambodia, were to prosecute the suspected war criminals themselves.
However, when these atrocities occur, the government that committed the crimes 
is typically still in power as was the case with Cambodia. In those cases the Security 
Council would have first to make a determination if  the situation was a threat to interna­
tional peace and security and then decide whether to pursue military options either to 
apprehend and/or overthrow the leaders and others responsible. W hile it m ay seem cal­
lous, arguably few situations would be so severe as to muster Security Council support 
for military options. Even in 1991, when the Security Council, led by U.S. troops, re­
pelled the Iraqi army from Kuwait, a ground offensive to occupy Baghdad and over­
throw Saddam Hussein was politically unfeasible. Similarly, the NATO operation in 
Kosovo could not generate support for a ground offensive to protect ethnic Albanians 
from Serbian forces.
Telford Tavlor. The Anatomy o f  the Nuremberg Trials (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1992), 57.
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The problem is an old one. It is one thing to declare that international law per­
mits prosecution o f  individuals for universally condemned crimes. It is quite another to 
have that person in custody and have access to all evidence. Once more it would appear 
that force alone can deliver the Saddam Hussein’s and Pol Pot’s to the world to stand 
trial. Moreover, without support from the w orld’s largest superpower, the U.S., it is 
hard to fathom how the ICC will solve this age-old problem.
The thesis also assessed the U.S. claim that the ICC Prosecutor’s authority is 
overly broad and contains too few checks and balances. Furthermore, the thesis as­
sessed the U.S. contention that too little authority is given to the Security Council in 
determining what cases come before the Court. Finally, the thesis examined theoretical 
problems associated with the lack o f  clarity and preciseness in the ICC’s definition o f 
crimes that would undermine the IC C ’s ability to operate under the Rule o f  Law.^^ 
Professor Bryan MacPherson acknowledges the broad authority granted to the Prosecu­
tor:
Rather than rigid rules that would undermine the international court, how­
ever, decisions on whether to proceed should be left to the prosecutor’s discretion, 
after considering the totality o f  the circumstances. W hen a state is actively inves­
tigating a matter, the prosecutor could consider, inter alia, the quality o f  the state 
investigation, the likelihood o f  a fair and successful prosecution, and whether the 
state or the international court will be better able to obtain relevant evidence and 
custody o f  the accused. The prosecutor might consider why the national court ac­
quitted the suspect or why national authorities declined to prosecute. If, for ex­
ample, the international court has obtained additional evidence that was not con­
sidered by the national authorities, an international trial might well be reasonable.
William K. Lietzau, “Checks and Balances and Elements o f  Proof: Structural Pil­
lars for the International Criminal Court, ’’ Cornell International Law Journal 32 (1999): 
478.
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I f  the consequence o f  not taking jurisdiction would be trial by a possibly biased 
state, international court jurisdiction should be strongly favored. ®
This thesis, after reviewing the Office o f  the Prosecutor, concludes that the U.S. claim 
regarding the overly broad scope o f  authority given to the Prosecutor is accurate, as 
Professor M acPherson affirms. Article 15 highlights the confirmation o f  the U.S. claim 
on the Prosecutor’s expansive powers.
Article 15(1) gives the Prosecutor the power to initiate investigations on his or her 
own.^‘ After initiating an investigation. Article 15(2) grants the Prosecutor the author­
ity to decide i f  the case warrants further investigation or should be dismissed.^^ If  the 
Prosecutor agrees that the case should go forward, then Article 15(3) states the Prosecu­
tor must submit a request to the Pre-Trial Chamber, “together with any material col­
lected.”^̂  Article 15(3) allows victims to also testify before the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
After the Prosecutor has submitted a request to the Pre-Trial Chamber, Article 15(4) 
authorizes the Pre-Trial Chamber judges to review the evidence, and determine whether 
“there is a  reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation.” '̂* The judges acting un­
der Article 15(4) m ust also decide if  the “case appears to fall within the jurisdiction o f 
the Court,” and if  the answer to both o f these determinations is in the affirmative, then 
the judges, “shall authorize the commencement o f  an investigation.”^̂
MacPherson, 41-42 .
“ICC Statute,” Article 15(1). 
Ibid., Article 15(2).
Ibid., Article 15(3).
Ibid., Article 15(4).
Ibid.
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However, Article 15(5) states that the judges’ refusal to allow an investigation to 
proceed does not prevent the Prosecutor from m aking a “subsequent request., .based on 
new facts or evidence regarding the same situation.”^̂  Article 15(6) says that i f  the 
Prosecutor, after a review o f  the evidence, concludes that there is no reasonable basis 
for an investigation, that decision m ust be communicated to those who provided the in­
formation.^^ The Prosecutor, pursuant to Article 15(6), reserves the right to consider 
additional information “submitted to him  or her.” ®̂ Additionally, the Prosecutor is 
given the power to review new facts and evidence, and thus while technically the Prose­
cutor is no longer investigating and gathering new facts and evidence, the Statute 
clearly permits the collection o f  further evidence.
Based on these Articles it is difficult to determine how the lack o f a Pre-Trial 
Chamber authorization for an investigation effectively prevents the Prosecutor from 
proceeding with gathering more evidence. I f  there is no reasonable basis to continue 
with an investigation, then why is the Prosecutor permitted to receive and submit new 
evidence and facts? In fact, it appears that the check on the Prosecutor’s ability to con­
tinue with an investigation by having obtained authorization o f  the Pre-Trial Chamber is 
largely illusory. This is because non-govemmental organizations and individuals are 
free to perform the Prosecutor’s “leg w ork” in finding new facts and evidence, and the 
Statute essentially allows the unlimited opportunity to continue to present and submit 
any new  facts or evidence found. Thus, for defendants, a Pre-Trial Chamber’s findings
Ibid., Article 15(5) 
Ibid., Article 15(6).
Ibid.
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that the evidence does not support further investigation, does not prevent anyone from 
unlimited investigations and inquiries in attempting to find the “smoking gun” that will 
convince the Pre-Trial judges finally to deliver an indictment.
In addition, this thesis finds that the U.S. claim regarding the inadequate role o f 
Security Council is the least problematic o f  U.S. claims examined. The Security Coun­
cil still has the authority to refer cases to the ICC for investigation, and is the only insti­
tution that can compel non-state parties to the treaties to cooperate with the Court under 
its Chapter VII powers.^^ In fact, it can be argued that the ICC grants to the Security 
Council a powerful instrument to use to influence recalcitrant nations. H O w ever, one 
m ajor weakness w ith the role designed by the ICC for the Security Council is what to 
do when one the perm anent members o f the Security Council is the nation that is being 
investigated. If  that scenario, i f  the investigation depends on a Security Council resolu­
tion to make it happen, the veto power will protect the nation from the ICC’s judicial 
scrutiny, thus potentially subverting justice.
However, in other cases involving other nations, the Security Council can wield 
the power o f an ICC prosecution and trial. For example, i f  Saddam Hussein commits 
atrocities against his own,citizens once the^ICC has gone into effect, the Security Coun­
cil could refer Saddam Hussein for investigation even if  Iraq failed to jo in  the treaty. If  
Iraq refused to comply with an investigation, or if  after a period the ICC ruled that a 
parallel Iraqi investigation was inadequate, the Security Council could use any o f  the 
enforcement measures, including military force, contained in Chapter VH o f the UN
“ICC Statute,” Article 13(b).
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Charter to force Iraq to comply. A  failure by Iraq to comply would also create interna­
tional public opinion against them such that they would be branded an outlaw and rogue 
nation.
To illustrate another example, if  another massacre occurred similar to the Khmer 
R ouge’s massacres in Cambodia in the late 1970’s, the Security Council could refer the 
killings to the ICC. Conceivably, any recalcitrance by the Khmer Rouge in cooperating 
with the ICC would incur Security Council enforcement measures, which may be 
enough to prevent further violence. Furthermore the gravest crimes would be less likely 
to m erit a veto from one o f the five permanent members especially with the end o f the 
Cold W ar superpower stalemate between the U.S. and the U S S R.
The U.S. would have required either the consent o f  the state o f  the accused or Se­
curity Council approval before a case could be heard before the ICC, and as such, the 
ICC, without U.S. consent, could never have investigated U.S. nationals. However, a 
case can go forward if  the state where the alleged crime occurred consents to ICC juris­
diction. In such a  case even if  the U.S. refused to agree with an ICC investigation, ac­
cording to the ICC treaty, the case could still go forward if  the country where the crime 
occurred agreed. The U.S. could shield it&nationals by getting the Security Council to 
defer the investigation for up to a year as provided for in  Article 16 o f the Statute. That 
Article provides;
No investigation or prosecution m ay be commenced or proceeded with under this 
Statute for a period o f  12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution 
adopted under Chapter VII o f  the Charter o f  the United Nations, has requested the 
Court to that effect; that request m ay be renewed by the Council under the same 
conditions.'*®
'*® “ICC Statute,” Article 16.
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There are several problems with using that Article as a shield, however. First, the Secu­
rity Council must act under Chapter VII. Chapter VO only applies if  the Security 
Council determines that there is “a  threat to the peace, breach o f  the peace or act o f ag­
gression.” *̂ Second, a majority o f  the Security Council, including all permanent mem­
bers, m ust be in favor o f  the twelve-month postponement.
Finally, this thesis examined possible theoretical difficulties contained within the 
Statute criminal subject m atter that m ay ultim ately determine whether the Court 
succeeds or fails. To appreciate fully the magnitude o f  the attempt to hold individuals, 
accountable on an international scale for the m ost serious crimes against humanity is 
difficult to assess from such a close historical vantage point. However, the U.S. has ap­
parently pointed out a central problem o f  the Court. The Court will never function as 
envisioned without acceptance o f  the legitimacy o f its decisions. Legitimacy requires 
following what Lon Fuller describes as the “inner morality o f law.” Two theoretical 
problems in particular are especially relevant to the ICC and Fuller’s theory o f  law. The 
(a) issue o f  clarity and (b) the congruency between the crimes as stated and the crimes 
as enforced will challenge the Court in its functioning.
For the first time, the world will attem pt consistently to apply and enforce cus­
tomary norms and treaties outlawing w ar crimes, genocide, and crimes against human­
ity. W ithout concise and clear definitions, ju st and equitable outcomes will depend on 
judges. Judicial interpretation has been generally one o f  the areas many observers have 
expected that the Court will do well. It is important to remember quantity is not quality.
41 UN Charter, Chapter VQ.
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Once the treaty goes into force, presumably the ICC judges will be quite active inter­
preting and setting precedents. The quantity o f  decisions will not be a concern; yet, 
how well the law evolves, and whether it reflects the high-minded principles the treaty 
was founded on, depends upon a great deal more than enlightened intention. Textual 
ambiguities and defining the elements necessary for the requirements o f  criminal prose­
cution, while not as controversial as the functions o f  the Prosecutor, invariably may 
prove to be the most important work that determines the Court’s success.
The ICC represents a worthy attempt to bring enforcement to international hu­
manitarian law. Unfortunately, the attempt to move the world toward international ju s­
tice may not yield the progress advocates envision. The Court, in order to be successful 
must earn its reputation for justice and equity; it must find its moral compass, its own 
inner morality o f  law. It is overly simplistic to believe that because the Court is built, 
justice will follow. As Lon Fuller points out, any functioning legal system requires the 
presence o f  certain elements in order to regulate and control human conduct success­
fully. Equally important is the degree o f  acceptance and willingness o f  participants to 
engage actively in the ongoing project o f  governing conduct between peoples. The ex­
tent to which communication and cooperation can occur between nation-states and the 
Court will, in the final analysis, determine if  the ICC matches its lofty goals with practi­
cal application.
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APPENDIX
R O M E  ST A T U T E  O F  T H E  IN T ER N A T IO N A L  C R IM IN A L  COURT*
Adopted by the United Nations Diplomatic Conference o f  Plenipotentiaries 
on the Establishment o f  an International Criminal Court on 17 July 1998
[* as corrected bv the procés-verbaux of 10 November 1998 and 12 July 1999]
PREAMBLE
The States Parties to this Statute.
Conscious that all peoples are united by common bonds, their cultures pieced together in a shared 
heritage, and concerned that this delicate mosaic may be shattered at any time.
Mindful that during this century millions of children, women and men have been victims of 
unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity,
Recognizing that such grave crimes threaten the peace, security and well-being of the world,
Affirming that the most serious crimes o f concern to the international community as a whole must 
not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures at the national 
level and by enhancing international cooperation.
Determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and thus to contribute to 
the prevention of such crimes.
Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible 
for international crimes.
Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles o f the Charter o f the United Nations, and in particular that 
all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes o f the United Nations,
Emphasizing in this connection that nothing in this Statute shall be taken as authorizing any State 
Party to intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal affairs of any State,
Determined to these ends and for the sake of present and future generations, to establish an 
independent permanent International Criminal Court in relationship with the United Nations system, with 
jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole,
Emphasizing that the International Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions,
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Resolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice,
Have agreed as follows
PART 1. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COURT
Article 1 
The Court
An International Criminal Court ("the Court") is hereby established. It shall be a permanent 
institution and shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of 
international concern, as referred to in this Statute, and shall be complementary to natioml criminal 
jurisdictions. The jurisdiction and functioning o f the Court shall be governed by the provisions of this 
Statute.
Article 2
Relationship of the Court with the United Nations
The Court shall be brought into relationship with the United Nations through an agreement to be 
approved by the Assembly of States Parties to this Statute and thereafter concluded by the President of the 
Court on its behalf.
Article 3 
Seat of the Court
1. The seat of the Court shall be established at The Hague in the Netherlands ("the host State").
2. The Court shall enter into a headquarters agreement with the host State, to be approved by the 
Assembly of States Parties and thereafter concluded by the President of the Court on its behalf.
3. The Court may sit elsewhere, whenever it considers it desirable, as provided in this Statute.
Article 4
Legal status and powers of the Court
1. The Court shall have international legal personality. It shall also have such legal capacity as may 
be necessary for the exercise o f its functions and the fulfilment o f its purposes.
2. The Court may exercise its functions and powers, as provided in this Statute, on the territory of 
any State Party and, by special agreement, on the territory of any other State.
PART 2. JURISDICTION, ADMISSIBILITY AND APPLICABLE LAW
Article 5
Crimes within the iurisdiction of the Court
1. The jurisdiction of the Court shall be limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community as a whole. The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with 
respect to the following crimes:
(a) The crime of genocide;
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(b) Crimes against humanity:
(c) War crimes;
(d) The crime of aggression.
2. The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in 
accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the 
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the 
relevant provisions o f the Charter of the United Nations.
Article 6 
Genocide
For the purpose of this Statute, "genocide" means any of the following acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Article 7 
Crimes against humanitv
1. For the purpose of this Statute, "crime against humanity" means any of the following acts when 
committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with 
knowledge of the attack:
(a) Murder;
(b) Extermination;
(c) Enslavement;
(d) Deportation or'forcible transfer of population;
(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental 
rules of international law;
(f) Torture;
(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any 
other form o f sexual violence o f comparable gravity;
(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally 
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in 
this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
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(i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
(j) The crime of apartheid;
(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious 
injury to body or to mental or physical health.
2. For the purpose of paragraph 1 :
(a) "Attack directed against any civilian population" means a course of conduct involving the 
multiple commission of acts referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant 
to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack;
(b) "Extermination" includes the intentional infliction o f conditions o f life, inter alia the 
deprivation of access to food and medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part o f a 
population;
(c) "Enslavement" means the exercise of any or all o f the powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over a person and includes the exercise o f such power in the course of trafficking in 
persons, in particular women and children;
(d) "Deportation or forcible transfer of population" means forced displacement o f the persons 
concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, 
without grounds permitted under international law;
(e) "Torture" means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, upon a person in the custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall 
not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions;
(f) "Forced pregnancy" means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, 
with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave 
violations of international law. This definition shall not in any way be interpreted as affecting 
national laws relating to pregnancy;
(g) "Persecution" means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary 
to international law by reason of the identity o f the group or collectivity;
(h) "The crime o f apartheid" means inhumane acts o f a character similar to those referred to in 
paragraph 1, committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and 
domination by one racial group over any other racial group or groups and committed with the 
intention of maintaining that regime;
(i) "Enforced disappearance o f persons" means the arrest, detention or abduction of persons 
by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, 
followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the 
fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the protection of 
the law for a prolonged period of time.
3. For the purpose of this Statute, it is tmderstood that the term "gender" refers to the two sexes, male 
and female, within the context of society. The term "gender" does not indicate any meaning different from 
the above.
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Article 8 
War crimes
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of
a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.
2. For the purpose of this Statute, "war crimes'* means:
(a) Grave breaches o f the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the 
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions o f the relevant Geneva 
Convention:
(i) Wilful killing;
(ii) Torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;
(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military 
necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(v) Compelling a prisoner o f war or other protected person to serve in the forces of a 
hostile Power;
(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair 
and regular trial;
(vii) Unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement;
(viii) Taking o f hostages.
(b) Other serious violations o f the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, 
within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are 
not military objectives;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against persormel, installations, material, units or 
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection 
given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, 
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly 
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated;
(v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or 
buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives;
(vi) Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no 
longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;
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(vii) Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the military insignia and 
uniform of the enemy or of the United Nations, as well as of the distinctive emblems of 
the Geneva Conventions, resulting in death or serious personal injuiy;
(viii) The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own 
civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all or 
parts of the population o f the occupied territory within or outside this territory;
(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, 
art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the 
sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives;
(x) Subjecting persons who are in the power of an adverse party to physical 
mutilation or to medical or scientiflc experiments of any kind which are neither justified 
by the medical, dental or hospital treatment o f the person concerned nor carried out in 
his or her interest, and wdiich cause death to or seriously endanger the health of such 
person or persons;
(xi) Killing or wounding treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation or 
army;
(xii) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy's property unless such destruction or seizure be 
imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
(xiv) Declaring abolished, suspended or inadmissible in a court of law the rights and 
actions of the nationals of the hostile party;
(xv) Compelling the nationals of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war 
directed against their own country, even if they were in the belligerent's service before 
the commencement of the war;
(xvi) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons;
(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, 
materials or devices;
(xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as 
bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with 
incisions;
(xx) Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods o f warfare which are 
o f a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently 
indiscriminate in violation of the international law o f armed conflict, provided that such 
weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are the subject of a 
comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to this Statute, by an 
amendment in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in articles 121 and 123;
(xxi) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment;
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(xxii) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as 
defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual 
violence also constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions;
(xxiii) Utilizing the presence of a civilian or other protected person to render certain 
points, areas or military forces immune from military operations;
(xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and 
transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in 
conformity with international law;
(xxv) Intentionally using starvation o f civilians as a method of warfare by depriving 
them of objects indispensable to their simvival, including wilfully impeding relief 
supplies as provided for imder the Geneva Conventions;
(xxvi) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the 
national armed forces or using them to participate actively in hostilities.
(c) In the case o f an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of
article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions o f 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including 
members of armed forces who have laid down dieir arms and those placed hors de combat by 
sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause;
(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture;
(ii) Conunitting outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment;
(iii) Taking o f hostages;
(iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous 
judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees 
which are generally recognized as indispensable.
(d) Paragraph 2 (c) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character and thus does 
not apply to situations o f internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence or other acts of a similar nature.
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an 
international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the 
following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and 
transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in 
conformity tvidi international law;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or 
vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance
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with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection 
given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law o f armed conflict;
(iv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, 
art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the 
sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives;
(v) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(vi) Committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as 
defined in article 7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual 
violence also constituting a serious violation of article 3 common to the four Geneva 
Conventions;
(vii) Conscripting or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into armed 
forces or groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities;
(viii) Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the 
conflict, unless the security o f the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so 
demand;
(ix) Killing or wounding treacherously a combatant adversary;
(x) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(xi) Subjecting persons who are in the power of another party to the conflict to 
physical mutilation or to medical or scientific experiments o f any kind which are neither 
justified by the medical, dental or hospital treatment of the person concerned nor carried 
out in his or her interest, and which cause death to or seriously endanger the health of 
such person or persons;
(xii) Destroying or seizing the property o f an adversary unless such destruction or 
seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities o f the conflict;
(f) Paragraph 2 (e) applies to armed conflicts not o f an international character and thus does 
not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts o f violence or other acts of a similar nature. It applies to armed conflicts that take place in 
the territory of a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental authorities 
and organized armed groups or between spch groups.
3. Nothing in paragraph 2 (c) and (e) shall affect the responsibility of a Government to maintain or 
re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the unity and territorial integrity of the State, by all 
legitimate means.
Article 9 
Elements of Crimes
1. Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and
8. They shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members o f the Assembly of States Parties.
2. Amendments to the Elements of Crimes may be proposed by:
(a) Any State Party;
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(b) The judges acting by an absolute majority;
(c) The Prosecutor.
Such amendments shall be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of States 
Parties.
3. The Elements o f Crimes and amendments thereto shall be consistent with this Statute.
Article 10
Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or prejudicing in any way existing or 
developing rules of international law for purposes other than this Statute.
Article 11 
Jurisdiction ratione temnoris
1. The Court has jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this 
Statute.
2. If a State becomes a Party to this Statute after its entry into force, the Court may exercise its 
jurisdiction only with respect to crimes committed after the entry into force of this Statute for that State, 
unless that State has made a declaration under article 12, paragraph 3.
Article 12
Preconditions to the exercise of iurisdiction
1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the jurisdiction of the Court with 
respect to the crimes referred to in article S.
2. In the case o f article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more
of the following States are Parties to this Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in 
accordance with paragraph 3:
(a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question occurred or, if the crime was 
committed on board a vessel or aircraft, the State o f registration of that vessel or aircraft;
(b) The State o f which the person accused of the crime is a national.
3. If the acceptance of a State which is not a Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, that 
State may, by declaration lodged with the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with 
respect to the crime in question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or 
exception in accordance with Part 9.
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Article 13 
Exercise of iurisdiction
The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in 
accordance with the provisions of tiiis Statute if;
(a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is 
referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in accordance with article 14;
(b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have been committed is 
referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations; or
(c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance with 
article 15.
Article 14 
Referral o f a situation bv a State Party
1. A State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more crimes within the 
jurisdiction o f the Court appear to have been committed requesting the Prosecutor to investigate the 
situation for the purpose of determining whether one or more specific persons should be charged with the 
commission o f such crimes.
2. As far as possible, a referral shall specify the relevant circumstances and be accompanied by such 
supporting documentation as is available to the State referring the situation.
Article 15 
Prosecutor
1. The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu on the basis o f information on crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. The Prosecutor shall analyse the seriousness of the information received. For this purpose, he or 
she may seek additional information from States, organs of the United Nations, intergovernmental or non- 
govemmental organizations, or other reliable sources that he or she deems appropriate, and may receive 
written or oral testimony at the seat o f the Court.
3. If the Prosecutor concludes that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, he or 
she shall submit to the Pre-Trial Chamber a request for authorization of an investigation, together with any 
supporting material collected. Victims may make representations to the Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance 
with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
4. If  the Pre-Trial Chamber, upon examination of the request and the supporting material, considers 
that there is a reasonable basis to proceed with an investigation, and that the case appears to fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Court, it shall authorize the commencement of the investigation, without prejudice to 
subsequent determinations by the Court with regard to the jurisdiction and admissibility of a case.
5. The refusal of the Pre-Trial Chamber to authorize the investigation shall not preclude the 
presentation o f a subsequent request by the Prosecutor based on new facts or evidence regarding the same 
situation.
6. If, after the preliminary examination referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, the Prosecutor concludes
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that the information provided does not constitute a reasonable basis for an investigation, he or she shall 
inform those who provided the information. This shall not preclude the Prosecutor from considering 
further information submitted to him or her regarding the same situation in the light of new facts or 
evidence.
Article 16 
Deferral o f investigation or prosecution
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this Statute for a 
period o f 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council 
under the same conditions.
Article 17 
Issues of admissibility
1. Having regard to paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1, the Court shall determine that a case 
is inadmissible where:
(a) The case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, 
unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution;
(b) The case has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the State has 
decided not to prosecute the person concerned, unless the decision resulted from the 
unwillingness or inability of the State genuinely to prosecute;
(c) The person concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of the 
complaint, and a trial by the Court is not permitted under article 20, paragraph 3;
(d) The case is not o f sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court.
2. In order to determine unwillingness in a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to 
the principles of due process recognized by international law, whether one or more of the following exist, 
as applicable:
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the 
purpose o f shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction o f the Court referred to in article 5;
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which in the circumstances is 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice;
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted independently or impartially, and 
they were or are being conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an 
intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
3. In order to determine inability in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total 
or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the 
accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or odierwise unable to carry out its proceedings.
Article 18
Preliminarv rulings regarding admissibilitv
1. When a situation has been referred to the Court pursuant to article 13 (a) and the Prosecutor has
determined that there would be a reasonable basis to commence an investigation, or the Prosecutor
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initiates an investigation pursuant to articles 13 (c) and 15, the Prosecutor shall notify all States Parties 
and those States which, taking into account the information available, would normally exercise 
jurisdiction over the crimes concerned. The Prosecutor may notify such States on a confidential basis and, 
where the Prosecutor believes it necessary to protect persons, prevent destruction of evidence or prevent 
the absconding of persons, may limit the scope o f the information provided to States.
2. Within one month of receipt o f that notification, a State may inform the Court that it is 
investigating or has investigated its nationals or others within its jurisdiction with respect to criminal acts 
which may constitute crimes referred to in article 5 and which relate to the information provided in the 
notification to States. At the request o f that State, the Prosecutor shall defer to the State's investigation of 
those persons unless the Pre-Trial Chamber, on the application o f the Prosecutor, decides to authorize the 
investigation.
3. The Prosecutor's deferral to a State's investigation shall be open to review by the Prosecutor six 
months after the date of deferral or at any time when there has been a significant change of circumstances 
based on the State's unwillingness or inability genuinely to carry out the investigation.
4. The State concerned or the Prosecutor may appeal to the Appeals Chamber against a ruling of the 
Pre-Trial Chamber, in accordance with article 82. The appeal may be heard on an expedited basis.
5. When the Prosecutor has deferred an investigation in accordance with paragraph 2, the Prosecutor 
may request that the State concerned periodically inform the Prosecutor of the progress o f its 
investigations and any subsequent prosecutions. States Parties shall respond to such requests without 
undue delay.
6. Pending a ruling by the Pre-Trial Chamber, or at any time when the Prosecutor has deferred an 
investigation under this article, the Prosecutor may, on an exceptional basis, seek authority from the Pre- 
Trial Chamber to pursue necessary investigative steps for the purpose of preserving evidence where there 
is a unique opportunity to obtain important evidence or there is a significant risk that such evidence may 
not be subsequently available.
7. A State which has challenged a ruling of the Pre-Trial Chamber under this article may challenge 
the admissibility of a case under article 19 on the grounds of additional significant facts or significant 
change of circumstances.
Article 19
Challenges to the iurisdiction of the Court 
or the admissibilitv of a case
1. The Court shall satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction in any case brought before it. The Court may, 
on its own motion, determine the admissibility o f a case in accordance with article 17.
2. Challenges to the admissibility of a case on the grounds referred to in article 17 or challenges to 
the jurisdiction o f the Court may be made by:
(a) An accused or a person for whom a warrant of arrest or a summons to appear has been 
issued under article 58;
(b) A State which has jurisdiction over a case, on the ground that it is investigating or 
prosecuting the case or has investigated or prosecuted; or
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(c) A State from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required under article 12.
3. The Prosecutor may seek a ruling from the Cotirt regarding a question of jurisdiction or 
admissibility. In proceedings with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility, those who have referred tie 
situation under article 13, as well as victims, may also submit observations to the Court.
4. The admissibility of a case or the jurisdiction o f the Court may be challenged only once by any 
person or State referred to in paragraph 2. The challenge shall take place prior to or at the commencement 
of the trial. In exceptional circumstances, the Court may grant leave for a challenge to be brought more 
than once or at a time later than the commencement of the trial. Challenges to the admissibili^ of a case, 
at the commencement of a trial, or subsequently with the leave o f the Court, may be based only on article 
17, paragraph 1 (c).
5. A State referred to in paragraph 2 (b) and (c) shall make a challenge at the earliest opportunity.
6. Prior to the confirmation of the charges, challenges to the admissibility of a case or challenges to 
the jurisdiction of the Court shall be referred to the Pre-Trial Chamber. After confirmation of the charges, 
they shall be referred to the Trial Chamber. Decisions with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility may be 
appealed to the Appeals Chamber in accordance with article 82.
7. If a challenge is made by a State referred to in paragraph 2 (b) or (c), the Prosecutor shall suspend 
the investigation until such time as the Court makes a determination in accordance with article 17.
8. Pending a ruling by the Court, the Prosecutor may seek authority from the Court:
(a) To pursue necessary investigative steps o f the kind referred to in article 18, paragraph 6;
(b) To take a statement or testimony from a witness or complete the collection and 
examination of evidence which had begun prior to the making o f the challenge; and
(c) In cooperation with the relevant States, to prevent the absconding of persons in respect of 
whom the Prosecutor has already requested a warrant of arrest under article 58.
9. The making of a challenge shall not affect the validity o f any act performed by the Prosecutor or 
any order or warrant issued by the Court prior to the making of the challenge.
10. If the Court has decided that a case is inadmissible under article 17, the Prosecutor may submit a 
request for a review of the decision when he or she is fully satisfied that new facts have arisen which 
negate the basis on which the case had previously been found inadmissible under article 17.
11. If the Prosecutor, having regard to the matters referred to in article 17, defers an investigation, 
the Prosecutor may request that the relevant State make available to the Prosecutor information on the 
proceedings. That information shall, at the request of the State concerned, be confidential. If the 
Prosecutor thereafter decides to proceed with an investigation, he or she shall notify the State to which 
deferral o f the proceedings has taken place.
Article 20 
Ne bis in idem
1. Except as provided in this Statute, no person shall be tried before the Court with respect to 
conduct which formed the basis of crimes for which the person has been convicted or acquitted by the 
Court.
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2. No person shall be tried by another court for a crime referred to in article 5 for which that person 
has already been convicted or acquitted by the Court.
3. No person who has been tried by another court for conduct also proscribed under article 6, 7 or 8
shall be tried by the Court with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court:
(a) Were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility for 
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court; or
(b) Otherwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms 
of due process recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the 
circumstances, was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.
Article 21 
Applicable law
1. The Court shall apply:
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of 
international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles o f law derived by the Court from national laws of legal 
systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally 
exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this 
Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.
2. The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.
3. The application and interpretation o f law pursuant to this article must be consistent with 
internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such 
as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or belief, political or 
other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status.
PART 3. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW
Article 22 
Nullum crimen sine lege
1. A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in question 
constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.
2. The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall not be extended by analogy. In case
of ambiguity, the definition shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or 
convicted.
3. This article shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under international law 
independently of this Statute.
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Article 23 
Nulla Doena sine lege
A person convicted by the Court may be punished only in accordance with this Statute.
Article 24 
Non-retroactivitv ratione personae
1. No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into 
force of the Statute.
2. In the event o f a change in the law applicable to a given case prior to a final judgement, the law 
more favourable to the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted shall apply.
Article 25 
Individual criminal responsibility
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.
2. A person who commits a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court shall be individually 
responsible and liable for punishment in accordance with this Statute.
3. In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment 
for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if  that person:
(a) Commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another 
person, regardless of whether that other person is criminally responsible;
(b) Orders, solicits or induces the commission of such a crime which in fact occurs or is 
attempted;
(c) For the purpose of facilitating the commission o f such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise 
assists in its commission or its attempted commission, including providing the means for its 
commission;
(d) In any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission o f such a crime 
by a group of persons acting with a common puipose. Such contribution shall be intentional and 
shall either:
(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the 
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission o f a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; or
(ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime;
(e) In respect o f the crime of genocide, directly and publicly incites others to commit 
genocide;
Attempts to commit such a crime by taking action that commences its execution by means 
of a substantial step, but the crime does not occur because of circumstances independent of the 
person’s intentions. However, a person who abandons the effort to commit the crime or otherwise 
prevents the completion of the crime shall not be liable for punishment under this Statute for the 
attempt to commit that crime if that person completely and voluntarily gave up the criminal 
purpose.
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4. No provision in this Statute relating to individual criminal responsibility shall affect the
responsibility of States under international law.
Article 26
Exclusion of iurisdiction over persons under eighteen
The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any person who was under the age of 18 at the time of 
the alleged commission of a crime.
Article 27 
Irrelevance of official caoacitv
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity. In 
particular, official capacity as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or parliament, 
an elected representative or a government official shall in no case exempt a person from criminal 
responsibility under this Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of a person, 
whether under national or international law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over 
such a person.
Article 28
Responsibilitv o f commanders and other superiors
In addition to other grounds of criminal responsibility under this Statute for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court:
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander shall be 
criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction o f the Court committed by forces under 
his or her effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case may be, 
as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such forces, where:
(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the circumstances at 
the time, should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such 
crimes; and
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and reasonable 
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the 
matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in paragraph (a), a 
superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court committed 
by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to 
exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly 
indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to commit such crimes;
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective responsibility and 
control of the superior; and
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(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within his or 
her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the matter to the 
competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.
Article 29
Non-apolicability o f statute of limitations 
The crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be subject to any statute of limitations.
Article 30 
Mental element
1. Unless otherwise provided, a person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for
a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are committed with intent and
knowledge.
2. For the purposes of this article, a person has intent where:
(a) In relation to conduct, that person means to engage in the conduct;
(b) In relation to a consequence, that person means to cause that consequence or is aware that
it will occur in the ordinary course of events.
3. For the purposes o f this article, "knowledge" means awareness that a circumstance exists or a 
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events, "Know" and "knowingly" shall be construed 
accordingly.
Article 31
Grounds for excluding criminal responsibilitv
1. In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute, a
person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that person's conduct;
(a) The person suffers from a mental disease or defect that destroys that person's capacity to 
appreciate the unlawfulness or nature o f his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her 
conduct to conform to the requirements of law;
(b) The person is in a state o f intoxication that destroys that person's capacity to appreciate the 
unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform 
to the requirements of law, unless the person has become voluntarily intoxicated under such 
circumstances that the person knew, or disregarded the risk, that, as a result of the intoxication, 
he or she was likely fo engage in conduct'constituting a crime within the jurisdiction o f the 
Court;
(c) The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another person or, in the case of 
war crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the person or another person or 
property which is essential for accomplishing a military mission, against an imminent and 
unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person or the other 
person or property protected. The fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation 
conducted by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding criminal responsibility 
under this subparagraph;
(d) The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has 
been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent 
serious bodily harm against that person or another person, and the person acts necessarily and
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reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the person does not intend to cause a greater harm 
than the one sought to be avoided. Such a threat may either be:
(i) Made by other persons; or
(ii) Constituted by other circumstances beyond that person's control.
2. The Court shall determine the applicability of the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility 
provided for in this Statute to the case before it.
3. At trial, the Court may consider a ground for excluding criminal responsibility other than those 
referred to in paragraph 1 where such a ground is derived from applicable law as set forth in article 21. 
The procedures relating to the consideration of such a ground shall be provided for in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.
Article 32 
Mistake of fact or mistake of law
1. A mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility only if it negates the 
mental element required by the crime.
2. A mistake of law as to whether a particular type of conduct is a crime within the jurisdiction of the 
Court shall not be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility. A mistake of law may, however, be a 
ground for excluding criminal responsibility if it negates the mental element required by such a crime, or 
as provided for in article 33.
Article 33 
Superior orders and prescription of law
1. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed by a person pursuant
to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of
criminal responsibility unless:
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders o f the Government or the superior 
in question;
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful; and
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful.
2. For the purposes o f this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are 
manifestly unlawful.
PART 4. COMPOSITION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE COURT
Article 34 
Organs of the Court
The Court shall be composed o f the following organs:
(a) The Presidency;
(b) An Appeals Division, a Trial Division and a Pre-Trial Division;
(c) The Office o f the Prosecutor;
(d) The Registry.
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Article 35 
Service o f iudees
1. Ail judges shall be elected as full-time members of the Court and shall be available to serve on 
that basis from the commencement of their terms of office.
2. The judges composing the Presidency shall serve on a full-time basis as soon as they are elected.
3. The Presidency may, on the basis of the workload of the Court and in consultation with its 
members, decide from time to time to what extent the remaining judges shall be required to serve on a 
full-time basis. Any such arrangement shall be without prejudice to the provisions of article 40.
4. The financial arrangements forjudges not required to serve on a full-time basis shall be made in 
accordance with article 49.
Article 36
Qualifications, nomination and election o f judges
1. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, there shall be 18 judges of the Court.
2. (a) The Presidency, acting on behalf of the Court, may propose an increase in the number of 
judges specified in paragraph 1, indicating the reasons why this is considered necessary and appropriate. 
The Registrar shall promptly circulate any such proposal to all States Parties.
(b) Any such proposal shall then be considered at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties to 
be convened in accordance with article 112. The proposal shall be considered adopted if approved at the 
meeting by a vote of two thirds of the members of the Assembly of States Parties and shall enter into force 
at such time as decided by the Assembly of States Parties.
(c) (i) Once a proposal for an increase in the number of judges has been adopted under
subparagraph (b), the election of the additional judges shall take place at the next session of the Assembly 
of States Parties in accordance with paragraphs 3 to 8, and article 37, paragraph 2;
(ii) Once a proposal for an increase in the number of judges has been adopted and brought 
into effect under subparagraphs (b) and (c) (i), it shall be open to the Presidency at any time thereafter, if 
the workload of the Court justifies it, to propose a reduction in the number o f judges, provided that the 
number o f judges shall not be reduced below that specified in paragraph 1. The proposal shall be dealt 
with in accordance with the procedure laid down ip subparagraphs (a) and (b). In the event that the 
proposal is adopted, the number o f judges shall be progressively decreased as the terms of office of 
serving judges expire, until the necessary number has been reached.
3. (a) The judges shall be chosen from among persons o f high moral character, impartiality and 
integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective States for appointment to the highest 
judicial oflfices.
(b) Every candidate for election to the Court shall:
(i) Have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the necessary 
relevant experience, whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar capacity, 
in criminal proceedings; or
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(ii) Have established competence in relevant areas of international law such as 
international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive experience in 
a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to the judicial work of the Court;
(c) Every candidate for election to the Court shall have an excellent knowledge of and be fluent 
in at least one of the working languages of the Court.
4. (a) Nominations o f candidates for election to the Court may be made by any State Party to this 
Statute, and shall be made either:
(i) By the procedure for the nomination of candidates for appointment to the highest 
judicial offices in the State in question; or
(ii) By the procedure provided for the nomination of candidates for the International 
Court of Justice in the Statute o f that Court.
Nominations shall be accompanied by a statement in the necessary detail specifying how the 
candidate fulfils the requirements o f paragraph 3.
(b) Each State Party may put forward one candidate for any given election who need not 
necessarily be a national of that State Party but shall in any case be a national of a State Party.
(c) The Assembly of States Parties may decide to establish, if appropriate, an Advisory 
Committee on nominations. In that event, the Committee's composition and mandate shall be established 
by the Assembly of States Parties.
5. For the purposes of the election, there shall be two lists o f candidates:
List A containing the names of candidates with the qualifications specified in paragraph 
3 (b) (i); and
List B containing the names of candidates with the qualifications specified in paragraph 
3(b)(ii).
A candidate with sufficient qualifications for both lists may choose on which list to appear. At the 
first election to the Court, at least nine judges shall be elected from list A and at least five judges from list 
B. Subsequent elections shall be so organized as to maintain the equivalent proportion on the Court of 
judges qualified on the two lists.
6. (a) The judges shall be elected by secret ballot at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties 
convened for that purpose under article 112. Subject to paragraph 7, the persons elected to the Court shall 
be the 18 candidates who obtqin the highest number of votes and a two-thirds majority of the States 
Parties present and voting.
(b) In the event that a sufficient number o f judges is not elected on the first ballot, successive 
ballots shall be held in accordance with the procedures laid down in subparagraph (a) until the remaining 
places have been filled.
7. No two judges may be nationals of the same State. A person who, for the purposes of membership 
of the Court, could be regarded as a national of more flian one State shall be deemed to be a national of 
the State in which that person ordinarily exercises civil and political rights.
8. (a) The States Parties shall, in the selection of judges, take into account the need, within the 
membership of the Court, for:
(i) The representation of the principal legal systems of the world;
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(ii) Equitable geographical representation; and
(iii) A fair representation o f female and male judges.
(b) States Parties shall also take into account the need to include judges with legal expertise on 
specific issues, including, but not limited to, violence against women or children.
9. (a) Subject to subparagraph (b), judges shall hold office for a term of nine years and, subject to 
subparagraph (c) and to article 37, paragraph 2, shall not be eligible for re-election.
(b) At the first election, one third of the judges elected shall be selected by lot to serve for a 
term of three years; one third of the judges elected shall be selected by lot to serve for a term of six years; 
and the remainder shall serve for a term of nine years.
(c) A judge who is selected to serve for a term of three years under subparagraph (b) shall be 
eligible for re-election for a full term.
10. Notwithstanding paragraph 9, a judge assigned to a Trial or Appeals Chamber in accordance with 
article 39 shall continue in office to complete any trial or appeal the hearing o f which has already 
commenced before that Chamber.
Article 37 
Judicial vacancies
1. In the event of a vacancy, an election shall be held in accordance with article 36 to fill the 
vacancy.
2. A judge elected to fill a vacancy shall serve for the remainder of the predecessor's term and, if that 
period is three years or less, shall be eligible for re-election for a full term under article 36.
Article 38 
The Presidency
1. The President and the First and Second Vice-Presidents shall be elected by an absolute majority of 
the judges. They shall each serve for a term of three years or until the end of their respective terms of 
office as judges, whichever expires earlier. They shall be eligible for re-election once.
2. The First Vice-President shall act in place of the President in the event that the President is 
unavailable or disqualified. The Second Vice-President shall act in place o f the President in the event that 
both the President and the First Vice-President are unavailable or disqualified.
3. The President, together with the First and Second Vice-Presidents, shall constitute the Presidency, 
which shall be responsible for:
and
(a) The proper administration of the Court, with the exception of the Office o f the Prosecutor;
(b) The other functions conferred upon it in accordance with this Statute.
In discharging its responsibility under paragraph 3 (a), the Presidency shall coordinate with and
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seek the concurrence o f the Prosecutor on all matters of mutual concern.
Article 39 
Chambers
1. As soon as possible after the election o f the judges, the Court shall organize itself into the 
divisions specified in article 34, paragraph (b). The Appeals Division shall be composed of the President 
and four other judges, the Trial Division of not less than six judges and the Pre-Trial Division o f not less 
than six judges. The assignment of judges to divisions shall be based on the nature of the functions to be 
performed by each division and the qualifications and experience of the judges elected to the Court, in 
such a way that each division shall contain an appropriate combination o f expertise in criminal law and 
procedure and in international law. The Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions shall be composed predominantly of 
judges with criminal trial experience.
2. (a) The judicial functions o f the Court shall be carried out in each division by Chambers.
(b) (i) The Appeals Chamber shall be composed of all the judges of the Appeals Division;
(ii) The functions o f the Trial Chamber shall be carried out by three judges of the Trial
Division;
(iii) The functions o f the Pre-Trial Chamber shall be carried out either by three 
judges of the Pre-Trial Division or by a single judge o f that division in accordance with 
this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(c) Nothing in this paragraph shall preclude the simultaneous constitution of more than one 
Trial Chamber or Pre-Trial Chamber when the efficient management o f the Court's workload so 
requires.
3. (a) Judges assigned to the Trial and Pre-Trial Divisions shall serve in those divisions for a
period of three years, and thereafter until the completion of any case the hearing of which has already 
commenced in the division concerned.
(b) Judges assigned to the Appeals Division shall serve in that division for their entire term of
office.
4. Judges assigned to the Appeals Division shall serve only in that division. Nothing in this article 
shall, however, preclude the temporary attachment, of judges from the Trial Division to the Pre-Trial 
Division or vice versa, if the Presidency considers that the efficient management o f the Court's workload 
so requires, provided that under no circumstances shall a judge who has participated in the pre-trial phase 
of a case be eligible to sit on the Trial Chamber hearing that case.
Article 40 
Independence o f the iudees
1. The judges shall be independent in the performance of their functions.
2. Judges shall not engage in any activity which is likely to interfere with their judicial functions or to 
affect confidence in their independence.
3. Judges required to serve on a full-time basis at the seat of the Court shall not engage in any other 
occupation of a professional nature.
198
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4. Any question regarding the application of paragraphs 2 and 3 shall be decided by an absolute 
majority of the judges. Where any such question concerns an individual judge, that judge shall not take 
part in the decision.
Article 41
Excusing and disqualification of iudees
1. The Presidency may, at the request o f a judge, excuse that judge from the exercise of a function 
under this Statute, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
2. (a) A judge shall not participate in any case in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be 
doubted on any ground. A judge shall be disqualified from a case in accordance with this paragraph if, 
inter alia, that judge has previously been involved in any capacity in that case before the Court or in a 
related criminal case at the national level involving the person being investigated or prosecuted. A judge 
shall also be disqualified on such other grounds as may be provided for in the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.
(b) The Prosecutor or the person being investigated or prosecuted may request the 
disqualification of a judge under this paragraph.
(c) Any question as to the disqualification of a judge shall be decided by an absolute majority of 
the judges. The challenged judge shall be entitled to present his or her comments on the matter, but shall 
not take part in the decision.
Article 42 
The Office of the Prosecutor
1. The Office of the Prosecutor shall act independently as a separate organ of the Court. It shall be 
responsible for receiving referrals and any substantiated information on crimes wi4iin the jurisdiction of 
the Court, for examining them and for conducting investigations and prosecutions before the Court. A 
member of the Office shall not seek or act on instructions from any external source.
2. The Office shall be headed by the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor shall have full authority over the 
management and administration of the Office, including the staff, facilities and other resources thereof. 
The Prosecutor shall be assisted by one or more Deputy Prosecutors, who shall be entitled to carry out any 
of the acts required o f the Prosecutor under this Statute. The Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall 
be of different nationalities. They shall serve on a full-time basis.
3. The Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall be persons of high moral character, be highly 
competent in and have extensive practical experience in the prosecution or trial of criminal cases. They 
shall have an excellent knowledge of and be fluent in at least one of the working languages of the Court.
4. The Prosecutor shall be elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority of the members of the 
Assembly of States Parties. The Deputy Prosecutors shall be elected in the same way from a list of 
candidates provided by the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor shall nominate three candidates for each position 
of Deputy Prosecutor to be filled. Unless a shorter term is decided upon at the time of their election, the 
Prosecutor and the Deputy Prosecutors shall hold office for a term o f nine years and shall not be eligible 
for re-election.
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5. Neither the Prosecutor nor a Deputy Prosecutor shall engage in any activity which is likely to 
interfere with his or her prosecutorial functions or to affect confidence in his or her independence. They 
shall not engage in any other occupation of a professional nature.
6 . The Presidency may excuse the Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor, at his or her request, from 
acting in a particular case.
7. Neither the Prosecutor nor a Deputy Prosecutor shall participate in any matter in which their 
impartiality might reasonably be doubted on any ground. They shall be disqualified from a case in 
accordance with this paragraph if, inter alia, they have previously been involved in any capacity in that 
case before the Court or in a related criminal case at the national level involving the person being 
investigated or prosecuted.
8. Any question as to the disqualification of the Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor shall be decided 
by the Appeals Chamber.
(a) The person being investigated or prosecuted may at any time request the disqualification of 
the Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor on the grounds set out in this article;
(b) The Prosecutor or the Deputy Prosecutor, as appropriate, shall be entitled to present his or 
her comments on the matter;
9. The Prosecutor shall appoint advisers with legal expertise on specific issues, including, but not 
limited to, sexual and gender violence and violence against children.
Article 43 
The Reeistrv
1. The Registry shall be responsible for the non-judicial aspects of the administration and servicing 
of the Court, without prejudice to the functions and powers of the Prosecutor in accordance with article 
42.
2. The Registry shall be headed by the Registrar, who shall be the principal administrative officer of 
the Court. The Registrar shall exercise his or her functions under the authority of the President o f the 
Court.
3. The Registrar and the Deputy Registrar shall be persons o f high moral character, be highly 
competent and have an excellent knowledge o f and be fluent in at least one of the working languages of 
the Court.
4. The judges shall elect the Registrar by an absolute majority by secret ballot, taking into account 
any recommendation by the Assembly of States Parties. If the need arises and upon the recommendation 
o f the Registrar, the judges shall elect, in the same manner, a Deputy Registrar.
5. The Registrar shall hold office for a term of five years, shall be eligible for re-election once and 
shall serve on a full-time basis. The Deputy Registrar shall hold office for a term of five years or such 
shorter term as may be decided upon by an absolute majority of the judges, and may be elected on the 
basis that the Deputy Registrar shall be called upon to serve as required.
6. The Registrar shall set up a Victims and Wimesses Unit within the Registry. This Unit shall 
provide, in consultation with the Office o f the Prosecutor, protective measures and security arrangements, 
counselling and other appropriate assistance for witnesses, victims who appear before the Court, and 
others who are at risk on account of testimony given by such witnesses. The Unit shall include staff with
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expertise in trauma, including trauma related to crimes of sexual violence.
Article 44 
Staff
1. The Prosecutor and the Registrar shall appoint such qualified staff as may be required to their 
respective offices. In the case of the Prosecutor, this shall include the appointment of investigators.
2. In the employment of staff, the Prosecutor and the Registrar shall ensure the highest standards of
efficiency, competency and integrity, and shall have regard, mutatis mutandis, to the criteria set forth in 
article 36, paragraph 8.
3. The Registrar, with the agreement of the Presidency and the Prosecutor, shall propose Staff 
Regulations which include the terms and conditions upon which the staff of the Court shall be appointed, 
remunerated and dismissed. The Staff Regulations shall be approved by the Assembly of States Parties.
4. The Court may, in exceptional circumstances, employ the expertise of gratis personnel offered by
States Parties, intergovernmental organizations or non-govemmental organizations to assist with the work 
of any of the organs of the Court. The Prosecutor may accept any such offer on behalf of the Office of the 
Prosecutor. Such gratis personnel shall be employed in accordance with guidelines to be established by 
the Assembly of States Parties.
Article 45 
Solemn undertaking
Before taking up their respective duties under this Statute, the judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy 
Prosecutors, the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar shall each make a solemn undertaking in open court to 
exercise his or her respective functions impartially and conscientiously.
Article 46 
Removal from office
1. A judge, the Prosecutor, a Deputy Prosecutor, the Registrar or the Deputy Registrar shall be 
removed from office if  a decision to this effect is made in accordance with paragraph 2, in cases where 
that person:
(a) Is found to have committed serious misconduct or a serious breach of his or her duties 
under this Statute, as provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; or
(b) Is unable to exercise the functions required by this Statute.
2. A decision as to the removal from office o f a judge, the Prosecutor or a Deputy Prosecutor under 
paragraph 1 shall be made by the Assembly o f States Parties, by secret ballot:
( a) In the case of a judge, by a two-thirds majority of the States Parties upon a 
recommendation adopted by a two-thirds majority of the other judges;
(b) In the case of the Prosecutor, by an absolute majority of the States Parties;
(c) In the case of a Deputy Prosecutor, by an absolute majority of the States Parties upon the 
recommendation of the Prosecutor.
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3. A decision as to the removal from office of the Registrar or Deputy Registrar shall be made by an 
absolute majority of the judges.
4. A judge. Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutor, Registrar or Deputy Registrar whose conduct or ability to 
exercise the functions o f the office as required by this Statute is challenged under this article shall have 
full opportunity to present and receive evidence and to make submissions in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. The person in question shall not otherwise participate in the consideration o f the 
matter.
Article 47 
Disciplinarv measures
A judge. Prosecutor, Deputy Prosecutor, Registrar or Deputy Registrar who has committed 
misconduct of a less serious nature than that set out in article 46, paragraph 1, shall be subject to 
disciplinary measures, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Article 48 
Privileges and immunities
1. The Court shall enjoy in the territory of each State Party such privileges and immunities as are 
necessary for the fulfilment o f its purposes.
2. The judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors and the Registrar shall, when engaged on or 
with respect to the business o f the Court, enjoy the same privileges and immunities as are accorded to 
heads o f diplomatic missions and shall, after the expiry o f their terms of office, continue to be accorded 
immunity from legal process o f every kind in respect of words spoken or written and acts performed by 
them in their official capacity.
3. The Deputy Registrar, the staff of the Office of the Prosecutor and the staff of the Registry shall 
enjoy the privileges and immunities and facilities necessary for the performance of their functions, in 
accordance with the agreement on the privileges and immunities of the Court.
4. Counsel, experts, witnesses or any other person required to be present at the seat of the Court shall 
be accorded such treatment as is necessary for the proper ftinctioning of the Court, in accordance with the 
agreement on the privileges and immunities o f the Court.
5. The privileges and immunities of:
(a) A judge or the Prosecutor may be waived by an absolute majority of the judges;
(b) The Registrar may be waived by the Presidency;
(c) The Deputy Prosecutors and staff of the Office of the Prosecutor may be waived by the 
Prosecutor;
(d) The Deputy Registrar and staff o f the Registry may be waived by the Registrar.
Article 49 
Salaries, allowances and expenses
The judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors, the Registrar and the Deputy Registrar shall 
receive such salaries, allowances and expenses as may be decided upon by the Assembly of States Parties.
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These salaries and allowances shall not be reduced during their terms of office.
Article 50 
Official and working languages
1. The official languages of the Court shall be Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and 
Spanish. The judgements o f the Court, as well as other decisions resolving fundamental issues before the 
Court, shall be published in the ofScial languages. The Presidency shall, in accordance with the criteria 
established by the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, determine which decisions may be considered as 
resolving fundamental issues for the purposes of this paragraph.
2. The working languages of the Court shall be English and French. The Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence shall determine the cases in which other official languages may be used as working languages.
3. At the request of any party to a proceeding or a State allowed to intervene in a proceeding, the 
Court shall authorize a language other than English or French to be used by such a party or State, 
provided that the Court considers such authorization to be adequately justified.
Article 51 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence
1. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence shall enter into force upon adoption by a two-thirds majority 
of the members o f the Assembly o f States Parties.
2. Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence may be proposed by:
(a) Any State Party;
(b) The judges acting by an absolute majority; or
(c) The Prosecutor.
Such amendments shall enter into force upon adoption by a two-thirds majority of the members of 
the Assembly of States Parties.
3. After the adoption o f the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, in urgent cases where the Rules do not 
provide for a specific situation before the Court, the judges may, by a two-thirds majority, draw up 
provisional Rules to be applied until adopted, amended or rejected at the next ordinary or special session 
of the Assembly o f States Parties.
4. The Rules of Procedure and Evidence, amendments thereto and any provisional Rule shall be 
consistent with this Statute. Amendments to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence as well as provisional 
Rules shall not be applied retroactively to the detriment of the person who is being investigated or 
prosecuted or who has been convicted.
5. In the event of conflict between the Statute and the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, the Statute 
shall prevail.
Article 52 
Regulations of the Court
1. The judges shall, in accordance with this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, adopt,
by an absolute majority, the Regulations of the Court necessary for its routine functioning.
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2. The Prosecutor and the Registrar shall be consulted in the elaboration of the Regulations and any 
amendments thereto.
3. The Regulations and any amendments thereto shall take effect upon adoption unless otherwise 
decided by the judges. Immediately upon adoption, they shall be circulated to States Parties for 
comments. If within six months there are no objections from a majority o f States Parties, they shall remain 
in force.
PART 5. INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION
Article 53 
Initiation of an investigation
1. The Prosecutor shall, having evaluated the information made available to him or her, initiate an 
investigation unless he or she determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed under this Statute. In 
deciding whether to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor shall consider whether;
(a) The information available to the Prosecutor provides a reasonable basis to believe that a 
crime within the jurisdiction o f the Court has been or is being committed;
(b) The case is or would be admissible under article 17; and
(c) Taking into account the gravity of the crime and the interests of victims, there are 
nonetheless substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of 
justice.
If the Prosecutor determines that there is no reasonable basis to proceed and his or her 
determination is based solely on subparagraph (c) above, he or she shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.
2. If, upon investigation, the Prosecutor concludes that there is not a sufficient basis for a prosecution 
because:
(a) There is not a sufficient legal or factual basis to seek a warrant or summons under article 
58;
(b) The case is inadmissible under article 17; or
(c) A prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the circumstances, 
including the gravity of the crime, the interests of victims and the age or infirmity of the alleged 
perpetrator, and his or her role in the alleged crime;
the Prosecutor shall inform the Pre-Trial Chamber and the State making a refeiral under article 14 or the 
Security Council in a case under article 13, paragraph (b), of his or her conclusion and the reasons for the 
conclusion.
3. (a) At the request of the State making a referral under article 14 or the Security Council under 
article 13, paragraph (b), the Pre-Trial Chamber may review a decision of the Prosecutor under paragraph 
1 or 2 not to proceed and may request the Prosecutor to reconsider that decision.
(b) In addition, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, on its own initiative, review a decision of the 
Prosecutor not to proceed if it is based solely on paragraph 1 (c) or 2 (c). In such a case, the decision of 
the Prosecutor shall be effective only if confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber.
4. The Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to initiate an investigation or
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prosecution based on new facts or information.
Article 54
Duties and powers o f the Prosecutor with respect to investigations
1. The Prosecutor shall;
(a) In order to establish the truth, extend the investigation to cover all facts and evidence 
relevant to an assessment of whether there is criminal responsibility under this Statute, and, in 
doing so, investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally;
(b) Take appropriate measures to ensure the effective investigation and prosecution of crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court, and in doing so, respect the interests and personal 
circumstances o f victims and witnesses, including age, gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 
3, and health, and take into account the nature of the crime, in particular where it involves sexual 
violence, gender violence or violence against children; and
(c) Fully respect the rights of persons arising under this Statute.
2. The Prosecutor may conduct investigations on the territory of a State:
(a) In accordance with the provisions of Part 9; or
(b) As authorized by the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 57, paragraph 3 (d).
3. The Prosecutor may:
(a) Collect and examine evidence;
(b) Request the presence of and question persons being investigated, victims and witnesses;
(c) Seek the cooperation of any State or intergovernmental organization or arrangement in 
accordance with its respective competence and/or mandate;
(d) Enter into such arrangements or agreements, not inconsistent with this Statute, as may be
necessary to facilitate the cooperation o f a State, intergovernmental organization or person;
(e) Agree not to disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or information that the 
Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating 
new evidence, unless the provider of the infoimation consents; and
(f) Take necessary measures, or request that necessary measures be taken, to ensure the 
confidentiality o f information, the protection o f any person or the preservation of evidence.
Article 55
Rights o f persons during an investigation
1. In respect of an investigation under this Statute, a person:
(a) Shall not be compelled to incriminate himself or herself or to confess guilt;
(b) Shall not be subjected to any form of coercion, duress or threat, to torture or to any other 
form o f cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(c) Shall, if  questioned in a language other than a language the person fully understands and 
speaks, have, fi'ee of any cost, the assistance o f a competent interpreter and such translations as 
are necessary to meet the requirements of fairness; and
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(d) Shall not be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention, and shall not be deprived of his or 
her liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedures as are established in 
this Statute.
2. Where there are grounds to believe that a person has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court and that person is about to be questioned either by the Prosecutor, or by national authorities 
pursuant to a request made under Part 9, that person shall also have the following rights of which he or 
she shall be informed prior to being questioned;
(a) To be informed, prior to being questioned, that there are grounds to believe that he or she 
has committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
(b) To remain silent, without such silence being a consideration in the determination of guilt or 
innocence;
(c) To have legal assistance of the person's choosing, or, if  the person does not have legal 
assistance, to have legal assistance assigned to him or her, in any case where the interests of 
justice so require, and without payment by the person in any such case if the person does not 
have sufficient means to pay for it; and
(d) To be questioned in the presence of counsel unless the person has voluntarily waived his or 
her right to counsel.
Article 56
Role o f the Pre-Trial Chamber in relation 
to a unique investigative opportunity
1. (a) Where the Prosecutor considers an investigation to present a unique opportunity to take
testimony or a statement from a witness or to examine, collect or test evidence, which may not be 
available subsequently for the purposes of a trial, the Prosecutor shall so inform the Pre-Trial Chamber.
(b) In that case, the Pre-Trial Chamber may, upon request of the Prosecutor, take such 
measures as may be necessary to ensure the efficiency and integrity of the proceedings and, in particular, 
to protect the rights of the defence.
(c) Unless the Pre-Trial Chamber orders otherwise, the Prosecutor shall provide the relevant 
information to the person who has been arrested or appeared in response to a summons in connection with 
the investigation referred to in subparagraph (a), in order that he or she may be heard on the matter.
2. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 (b) may include:
(a) Making recommendations or orders regarding procedures to be followed;
(b) Directing that a record be made of the proceedings;
(c) Appointing an expert to assist;
(d) Authorizing counsel for a person who has been arrested, or appeared before the Court in 
response to a summons, to participate, or where there has not yet been such an arrest or 
appearance or counsel has not been designated, appointing another counsel to attend and 
represent the interests o f the defence;
(e) Naming one o f its members or, if  necessary, another available judge of the Pre-Trial or 
Trial Division to observe and make recommendations or orders regarding the collection and 
preservation of evidence and the questioning of persons;
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(f) Taking such other action as may be necessary to collect or preserve evidence.
3. (a) Where the Prosecutor has not sought measures pursuant to this article but the Pre-Trial 
Chamber considers that such measures are required to preserve evidence that it deems would be essential 
for the defence at trial, it shall consult with the Prosecutor as to whether there is good reason for the 
Prosecutor’s failure to request the measures. If upon consultation, the Pre-Trial Chamber concludes that 
the Prosecutor’s failure to request such measures is unjustified, the Pre-Trial Chamber may take such 
measures on its own initiative.
(b) A decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to act on its own initiative under this paragraph may be 
appealed by the Prosecutor. The appeal shall be heard on an expedited basis.
4. The admissibility of evidence preserved or collected for trial pursuant to this article, or the record 
thereof, shall be governed at trial by article 69, and given such weight as determined by the Trial 
Chamber.
Article 57
Functions and powers of the Pre-Trial Chamber
1. Unless otherwise provided in this Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall exercise its functions in
accordance with the provisions of this article.
2 . (a) Orders or rulings o f the Pre-Trial Chamber issued under articles 15, 18, 19, 54, paragraph 2,
61, paragraph 7, and 72 must be concurred in by a majority o f its judges.
(b) In all other cases, a single judge of the Pre-Trial Chamber may exercise the functions 
provided for in this Statute, unless otherwise provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence or by a 
majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber.
3. In addition to its other functions under this Statute, the Pre-Trial Chamber may:
(a) At the request of the Prosecutor, issue such orders and warrants as may be required for the 
purposes of an investigation;
(b) Upon the request of a person who has been arrested or has appeared pursuant to a 
summons under article 58, issue such orders, including measures such as those described in 
article 56, or seek such cooperation pursuant to Part 9 as may be necessary to assist the person in 
the preparation of hi; or her defence;
(c) Where necessary, provide for the protection and privacy of victims and witnesses, the 
preservation o f evidence, the protection o f persons who have been arrested or appeared in 
response to a summons, and the protection of national security information;
(d) Authorize the Prosecutor to take specific investigative steps within the territory of a State 
Party without having secured the cooperation of that State under Part 9 if, whenever possible 
having regard to the views of the State concerned, the Pre-Trial Chamber has determined in that 
case that the State is clearly unable to execute a request for cooperation due to the unavailability 
of any authority or any component of its judicial system competent to execute the request for 
cooperation under Part 9.
(e) Where a warrant o f arrest or a summons has been issued under article 58, and having due 
regard to the strength o f the evidence and the rights of the parties concerned, as provided for in 
this Statute and the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, seek the cooperation of States pursuant to
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article 93, paragraph 1 (k), to take protective measures for the purpose of forfeiture, in particular 
for the ultimate benefit o f victims.
Article 58
Issuance bv the Pre-Trial Chamber of a warrant o f arrest 
or a summons to appear
1. At any time aAer the initiation of an investigation, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the application 
of the Prosecutor, issue a warrant of arrest of a person if, having examined the application and die 
evidence or other information submitted by the Prosecutor, it is satisfied that:
(a) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court; and
(b) The arrest of the person appears necessary:
(i) T0  ensure the person's appearance at trial,
(ii) To ensure that the person does not obstruct or endanger the investigation or the 
court proceedings, or
(iii) Where applicable, to prevent the person from continuing with the commission of 
that crime or a related crime which is within the jurisdiction of the Court and which 
arises out of the same circumstances.
2. The application of the Prosecutor shall contain:
(a) The name of the person and any other relevant identifying information;
(b) A specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court which the person is 
alleged to have committed;
(c) A concise statement o f the facts which are alleged to constitute those crimes;
(d) A summary of the evidence and any other information which establish reasonable grounds 
to believe that the person committed those crimes; and
(e) The reason why the Prosecutor believes that the arrest o f the person is necessary.
3. The warrant of arrest shall contain:
(a) The name of the person and any other relevant identifying information;
(b) A specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction o f the Court for which the 
person’s arrest is sought; and
(c) A concise statement o f the facts which are alleged to constitute those crimes.
4. The warrant o f  arrest shall remain in effect until otherwise ordered by the Court.
5. On the basis o f the warrant of arrest, the Court may request the provisional arrest or the arrest and
surrender of the person under Part 9.
6. The Prosecutor may request the Pre-Trial Chamber to amend the warrant of arrest by modifying or 
adding to the crimes specified therein. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall so amend the warrant if it is satisfied 
that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed the modified or additional crimes.
7. As an alternative to seeking a warrant o f arrest, the Prosecutor may submit an application
208
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
requesting that the Pre-Trial Chamber issue a summons for the person to appear. If the Pre-Trial Chamber 
is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person committed the crime alleged and 
that a summons is sufHcient to ensure the person's appearance, it shall issue the summons, with or without 
conditions restricting liberty (other than detention) if provided for by national law, for the person to 
appear. The summons shall contain:
(a) The name of the person and any other relevant identifying information;
(b) The specified date on which the person is to appear;
(c) A specific reference to the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court which the person is
alleged to have committed; and
(d) A concise statement o f the facts which are alleged to constitute the crime.
The summons shall be served on the person.
Article 59
Arrest proceedings in the custodial State
1. A State Party which has received a request for provisional arrest or for arrest and surrender shall 
immediately take steps to arrest the person in question in accordance with its laws and the provisions of 
Part 9.
2. A person arrested shall be brought promptly before the competent judicial authority in the
custodial State which shall determine, in accordance with the law of that State, that:
(a) The warrant applies to that person;
(b) The person has been arrested in accordance with the proper process; and
(c) The person's rights have been respected.
3. The person arrested shall have the right to apply to the competent authority in the custodial State 
for interim release pending surrender.
4. In reaching a decision on any such application, the competent authority in the custodial State shall 
consider whether, given the gravity of the alleged crimes, there are urgent and exceptional circumstances 
to justify interim release and whether necessary safeguards exist to ensure that the custodial State can 
fulfil its duty to surrender the person to the Court. It shall not be open to the competent authority of the 
custodial State to consider whether the warrant of m est was properly issued in accordance with article 58, 
paragraph 1 (a) and (b).
5. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall be notified of any request for interim release and shall make 
recommendations to the competent authority in the custodial State. The competent authority in the 
custodial State shall give full consideration to such recommendations, including any recommendations on 
measures to prevent the escape o f the person, before rendering its decision.
6. If the person is granted interim release, the Pre-Trial Chamber may request periodic reports on the 
status o f the interim release.
7. Once ordered to be surrendered by the custodial State, the person shall be delivered to the Court as
soon as possible.
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Article 60 
Initial proceedings before the Court
1. Upon the surrender of the person to the Court, or the person's appearance before the Court 
voluntarily or pursuant to a summons, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the person has been 
informed of the crimes which he or she is alleged to have committed, and of his or her rights under this 
Statute, including the right to apply for interim release pending trial.
2. A person subject to a warrant of arrest may apply for interim release pending trial. If the Pre-Trial 
Chamber is satisfied that the conditions set forth in article 58, paragraph 1, are met, the person shall 
continue to be detained. If it is not so satisfied, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall release the person, with or 
without conditions.
3. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall periodically review its ruling on the release or detention of the 
person, and may do so at any time on the request of the Prosecutor or the person. Upon such review, it 
may modify its ruling as to detention, release or conditions of release, if  it is satisfied that changed 
circumstances so require.
4. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall ensure that a person is not detained for an unreasonable period prior 
to trial due to inexcusable delay by the Prosecutor. If such delay occurs, the Court shall consider releasing 
the person, with or without conditions.
5. If necessary, the Pre-Trial Chamber may issue a warrant of arrest to secure the presence of a 
person who has been released.
Article 61
Confirmation of the charges before trial
1. Subject to the provisions o f paragraph 2, within a reasonable time after the person’s surrender or 
voluntary appearance before the Court, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall hold a hearing to confirm the charges 
on which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial. The hearing shall be held in the presence of the Prosecutor 
and the person charged, as well as his or her counsel.
2. The Pre-Trial Chamber may, upon request of the Prosecutor or on its own motion, hold a hearing
in the absence of the person charged to confirm the charges on which the Prosecutor intends to seek trial 
when the person has:
(a) Waived his or her right to be present; or
(b) Fled or cannot.be found and all reasonable steps have been taken to secure his or her 
appearance before the Court and to inform the person of the charges and that a hearing to 
confirm those charges will be held.
In that case, the person shall be represented by counsel where the Pre-Trial Chamber determines 
that it is in the interests of justice.
3. Within a reasonable time before the hearing, the person shall:
(a) Be provided with a copy of the document containing the charges on which the Prosecutor 
intends to bring the person to trial; and
(b) Be informed o f the evidence on which the Prosecutor intends to rely at the hearing.
The Pre-Trial Chamber may issue orders regarding the disclosure of information for the purposes 
of the hearing.
4. Before the hearing, the Prosecutor may continue the investigation and may amend or withdraw any
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charges. The person shall be given reasonable notice before the hearing of any amendment to or 
withdrawal o f charges. In case o f a withdrawal of charges, the Prosecutor shall notify the Pre-Trial 
Chamber of the reasons for the withdrawal.
5. At the hearing, the Prosecutor shall support each charge with sufficient evidence to establish 
substantial grounds to believe that the person committed the crime charged. The Prosecutor may rely on 
documentary or summary evidence and need not call the witnesses expected to testify at the trial.
6. At the hearing, the person may:
(a) Object to the charges;
(b) Challenge the evidence presented by the Prosecutor; and
(c) Present evidence.
7. The Pre-Trial Chamber shall, on the basis o f the hearing, determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence to establish substantial grounds to believe that the person committed each of the crimes charged. 
Based on its determination, the Pre-Trial Chamber shall:
(a) Confirm those charges in relation to which it has determined that there is sufficient 
evidence, and commit the person to a Trial Chamber for trial on the charges as confirmed;
(b) Decline to confirm those charges in relation to which it has determined that there is 
insufficient evidence;
(c) Adjourn the hearing and request the Prosecutor to consider:
(i) Providing further evidence or conducting further investigation with respect to a 
particular charge; or
(ii) Amending a charge because the evidence submitted appears to establish a 
different crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.
8. Where the Pre-Trial Chamber declines to confirm a charge, the Prosecutor shall not be precluded 
from subsequently requesting its confirmation if the request is supported by additional evidence.
9. After the charges are confirmed and before the trial has begun, the Prosecutor may, with the 
permission of the Pre-Trial Chamber and after notice to the accused, amend the charges. If the Prosecutor 
seeks to add additional charges or to substitute more serious charges, a hearing under this article to 
confirm those charges must be held. After commencement of the trial, the Prosecutor may, with the 
permission of the Trial Chamber, withdraw the charges.
10. Any warrant previously issued shall cease to have effect with respect to any charges which have 
not been confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber or which have been withdrawn by the Prosecutor.
11. Once the charges have been confirmed in accordance with this article, the Presidency shall 
constitute a Trial Chamber which, subject to paragraph 9 and to article 64, paragraph 4, shall be 
responsible for the conduct o f subsequent proceedings and may exercise any function of the Pre-Trial 
Chamber that is relevant and capable of application in those proceedings.
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PART 6. THE TRIAL
Article 62 
Place of trial
Unless otherwise decided, the place of the trial shall be the seat of the Court.
Article 63 
Trial in the presence of the accused
1. The accused shall be present during the trial.
2. If the accused, being present before the Court, continues to disrupt the trial, the Trial Chamber 
may remove the accused and shall make provision for him or her to observe the trial and instruct counsel 
from outside the courtroom, through the use of communications technology, if required. Such measures 
shall be taken only in exceptional circumstances after other reasonable alternatives have proved 
inadequate, and only for such duration as is strictly required.
Article 64
Functions and powers o f the Trial Chamber
1. The functions and powers o f the Trial Chamber set out in this article shall be exercised in 
accordance with this Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
2. The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and is conducted with full 
respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.
3. Upon assignment o f a case for trial in accordance with this Statute, the Trial Chamber assigned to 
deal with the case shall:
(a) Confer with the parties and adopt such procedures as are necessary to facilitate the fair and 
expeditious conduct of the proceedings;
(b) Determine the language or languages to be used at trial; and
(c) Subject to any other relevant provisions of this Statute, provide for disclosure of 
documents or information not previously disclosed, sufficiently in advance of the commencement 
of the trial to enable adequate preparation for trial.
4. The Trial Chamber may, if necessary for its effective and fair functioning, refer preliminary issues 
to the Pre-Trial Chamber or, if  necessary, to another available judge of the Pre-Trial Division.
5. Upon notice to the parties, the Trial Chamber may, as appropriate, direct that there be joinder or 
severance in respect of charges against more than one accused.
6. In performing its functions prior to trial or during the course of a trial, the Trial Chamber may, as 
necessary:
(a) Exercise any functions o f the Pre-Trial Chamber referred to in article 61, paragraph 11 ;
(b) Require the attendance and testimony of witnesses and production of documents and other 
evidence by obtaining, if necessary, the assistance o f States as provided in this Statute;
(c) Provide for the protection of confidential information;
212
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(d) Order the production of evidence in addition to that already collected prior to the trial or 
presented during the trial by the parties;
(e) Provide for the protection of the accused, witnesses and victims; and
(f) Rule on any other relevant matters.
7. The trial shall be held in public. The Trial Chamber may, however, determine that special 
circumstances require that certain proceedings be in closed session for the purposes set fbrdi in article 68, 
or to protect confidential or sensitive information to be given in evidence.
8. (a) At the commencement o f the trial, the Trial Chamber shall have read to the accused the 
charges previously confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the 
accused understands the nature o f the charges. It shall afford him or her the opportunity to make an 
admission of guilt in accordance with article 65 or to plead not guilty.
(b) At the trial, the presiding judge may give directions for the conduct of proceedings, 
including to ensure that they are conducted in a fair and impartial manner. Subject to any directions of the 
presiding judge, the parties may submit evidence in accordance with the provisions of this Statute.
9. The Trial Chamber shall have, inter alia, the power on application of a party or on its own motion 
to:
(a) Rule on the admissibility or relevance of evidence; and
(b) Take all necessary steps to maintain order in the course of a hearing.
10. The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a complete record of the trial, which accurately reflects the 
proceedings, is made and that it is maintained and preserved by the Registrar.
Article 65 
Proceedings on an admission of guilt
1. Where the accused makes an admission of guilt pursuant to article 64, paragraph 8 (a), the Trial
Chamber shall determine whether;
(a) The accused understands the nature and consequences of the admission of guilt;
(b) The admission is voluntarily made by the accused after sufficient consultation with defence 
counsel; and
(c) The admission'of guilt is supported by the facts o f the case that are contained in:
(i) The charges brought by the Prosecutor and admitted by the accused;
(ii) Any materials presented by the Prosecutor which supplement the charges and 
which the accused accepts; and
(iii) Any other evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses, presented by the 
Prosecutor or the accused.
2. Where the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the matters referred to in paragraph 1 are established, it 
shall consider the admission of guilt, together with any additional evidence presented, as establishing all 
the essential facts that are required to prove the crime to which the admission of guilt relates, and may 
convict the accused of that crime.
3. Where the Trial Chamber is not satisfied that the matters referred to in paragraph 1 are 
established, it shall consider the admission of guilt as not having been made, in which case it shall order
213
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
that the trial be continued under the ordinary trial procedures provided by this Statute and may remit the 
case to another Trial Chamber.
4. Where the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that a more complete presentation of the facts of the 
case is required in the interests o f justice, in particular the interests of the victims, the Trial Chamber may:
(a) Request the Prosecutor to present additional evidence, including the testimony of 
witnesses; or
(b) Order that the trial be continued under the ordinary trial procedures provided by this 
Statute, in which case it shall consider the admission of guilt as not having been made and may 
remit the case to another Trial Chamber.
5. Any discussions between the Prosecutor and the defence regarding modification of the charges, the 
admission o f guilt or the penalty to be imposed shall not be binding on the Court.
Article 66 
Presumption of innocence
1. Everyone shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty before the Court in accordance with the
applicable law.
2. The onus is on the Prosecutor to prove the guilt of the accused.
3. In order to convict the accused, the Court must be convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
Article 67 
Rights of the accused
1. In the determination o f any charge, the accused shall be entitled to a public hearing, having regard
to the provisions of this Statute, to a fair hearing conducted impartially, and to the following minimum 
guarantees, in full equality:
(a) To be informed promptly and in detail of the nature, cause and content of the charge, in a 
language which the accused fully understands and speaks;
(b) To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence and to communicate 
freely with counsel o f the accused's choosing in confidence;
(c) To be tried without undue delay; ^
(d) Subject to article 63, paragraph 2, to be present at the trial, to conduct the defence in 
person or through legal assistance o f the accused's choosing, to be informed, if the accused does 
not have legal assistance, o f this right and to have legal assistance assigned by the Court in any 
case where the interests of justice so require, and without payment if the accused lacks sufficient 
means to pay for it;
(e) To examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him or her and to obtain the 
attendance and examination of witnesses on his or her behalf under the same conditions as 
witnesses against him or her. The accused shall also be entitled to raise defences and to present 
other evidence admissible under this Statute;
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(f) To have, free o f any cost, the assistance of a competent interpreter and such translations as 
are necessary to meet the requirements of fairness, if any of the proceedings of or documents 
presented to the Court are not in a language which the accused fiilly understands and speaks;
(g) Not to be compelled to testify or to confess guilt and to remain silent, without such silence 
being a consideration in the determination of guilt or iimocence;
(h) To make an unsworn oral or written statement in his or her defence; and
(i) Not to have imposed on him or her any reversal of the burden of proof or any onus of 
rebuttal.
2. In addition to any other disclosure provided for in this Statute, the Prosecutor shall, as soon as
practicable, disclose to the defence evidence in the Prosecutor's possession or control which he or she 
believes shows or tends to show the innocence o f the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the accused, or 
which may affect the credibility o f prosecution evidence. In case of doubt as to the application of this 
paragraph, the Court shall decide.
Article 68
Protection of the victims and witnesses and their 
participation in the proceedings
1. The Court shall take appropriate measures to protect the safety, physical and psychological well­
being, dignity and privacy of victims and witnesses. In so doing, the Court shall have regard to all relevant 
factors, including age, gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, and health, and the nature o f the crime, 
in particular, but not limited to, where the crime involves sexual or gender violence or violence against 
children. The Prosecutor shall take such measures particularly during the investigation and prosecution of 
such crimes. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a 
fair and impartial trial.
2. As an exception to the principle of public hearings provided for in article 67, the Chambers of the 
Court may, to protect victims and witnesses or an accused, conduct any part of the proceedings in camera 
or allow the presentation of evidence by electronic or other special means. In particular, such measures 
shall be implemented in the case of a victim of sexual violence or a child who is a victim or a witness, 
unless otherwise ordered by the Court, having regard to all the circumstances, particularly the views of the 
victim or witness.
3. Where the personal interests of the victims are affected, the Court shall permit their views and 
concerns to be presented and considered at stages of the proceedings determined to be appropriate by the 
Court and in a manner which is not prejudicial to or inconsistent with the rights of the accused and a fair 
and impartial trial. Such views and concerns may be presented by the legal representatives of the victims 
where the Court considers it appropriate, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
4. The Victims and Witnesses Unit may advise the Prosecutor and the Court on appropriate 
protective measures, security arrangements, counselling and assistance as referred to in article 43, 
paragraph 6.
5. Where the disclosure o f evidence or information pursuant to this Statute may lead to the grave 
endangerment o f the security of a witness or his or her family, the Prosecutor may, for the purposes of any 
proceedings conducted prior to the commencement of the trial, withhold such evidence or information and 
instead submit a summary thereof. Such measures shall be exercised in a manner which is not prejudicial 
to or inconsistent with the rights o f the accused and a fair and impartial trial.
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6. A State may make an application for necessary measures to be taken in respect of the protection of
its servants or agents and the protection of confidential or sensitive information.
Article 69 
Evidence
1. Before testifying, each witness shall, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
give an undertaking as to the truthfulness o f the evidence to be given by that witness.
2. The testimony of a witness at trial shall be given in person, except to the extent provided by the 
measures set forth in article 68 or in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. The Court may also permit the 
giving o f viva voce (oral) or recorded testimony of a witness by means of video or audio technology, as 
well as the introduction of documents or written transcripts, subject to this Statute and in accordance with 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. These measures shall not be prejudicial to or inconsistent with the 
rights o f the accused.
3. The parties may submit evidence relevant to the case, in accordance with article 64. The Court 
shall have the authority to request the submission of all evidence that it considers necessary for the 
determination o f the truth.
4. The Court may rule on the relevance or admissibility of any evidence, taking into account, inter 
alia, the probative value of the evidence and any prejudice that such evidence may cause to a fair trial or 
to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness, in accordance with the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.
5. The Court shall respect and observe privileges on confidentiality as provided for in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.
6. The Court shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but may take judicial notice of 
them.
7. Evidence obtained by means o f a violation of this Statute or internationally recognized human 
rights shall not be admissible if;
(a) The violation casts substantial doubt on the reliability of the evidence; or
(b) The admission o f the evidence would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the 
integrity o f the proceedings.
8. When deciding on the relevance or admissibility o f evidence collected by a State, the Court shall 
not rule on the application o f the State's national law.
»
Article 70
Offences against the administration of justice
1. The Court shall have jurisdiction over the following offences against its administration of justice
when committed intentionally:
(a) Giving false testimony when under an obligation pursuant to article 69, paragraph 1, to tell 
the truth;
(b) Presenting evidence that the party knows is false or forged;
(c) Corruptly influencing a witness, obstructing or interfering with the attendance or testimony 
of a witness, retaliating against a witness for giving testimony or destroying, tampering with or 
interfering with the collection of evidence;
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(d) Impeding, intimidating or corruptly influencing an official of the Court for the purpose of 
forcing or persuading the official not to perform, or to perform improperly, his or her duties;
(e) Retaliating against an official of the Court on account of duties performed by that or 
another official;
(f) Soliciting or accepting a bribe as an official o f the Court in connection with his or her 
official duties.
2. The principles and procedures governing the Court’s exercise o f jurisdiction over offences under 
this article shall be those provided for in the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence. The conditions for 
providing international cooperation to the Court with respect to its proceedings under this article shall be 
governed by the domestic laws of the requested State.
3. In the event o f conviction, the Court may impose a term of imprisonment not exceeding five years, 
or a fine in accordance with the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, or both.
4. (a) Each State Party shall extend its criminal laws penalizing offences against the integrity of its 
own investigative or judicial process to offences against the administration of justice referred to in this 
article, committed on its territory, or by one of its nationals;
(b) Upon request by the Court, whenever it deems it proper, the State Party shall sübmit the case 
to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. Those authorities shall treat such cases with 
diligence and devote sufficient resources to enable them to be conducted effectively.
Article 71
Sanctions for misconduct before the Court
1. The Court may sanction persons present before it who commit misconduct, including disruption of 
its proceedings or deliberate refüsal to comply with its directions, by administrative measures other than 
imprisonment, such as temporary or permanent removal from the courtroom, a fine or other similar 
measures provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
2. The procedures governing the imposition of the measures set forth in paragraph I shall be those 
provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Article 72
Protection of national security information
1. This article applies in any case where the disclosure of the information or documents of a State 
would, in the opinion of that State, prejudice its national security interests. Such cases include those 
falling within the scope of article 56, paragraphs 2 and 3, article 61, paragraph 3, article 64, paragraph 3, 
article 67, paragraph 2, article 68, paragraph 6, article 87, paragraph 6 and article 93, as well as cases 
arising at any other stage of the proceedings where such disclosure may be at issue.
2. This article shall also apply when a person who has been requested to give information or 
evidence has refused to do so or has referred the matter to the State on the ground that disclosure would 
prejudice the national security interests o f a State and the State concerned confirms that it is of the opinion 
that disclosure would prejudice its national security interests.
3. Nothing in this article shall prejudice the requirements of confidentiality applicable under article 
54, paragraph 3 (e) and (f), or the application of article 73.
4. If a State leams that information or documents of the State are being, or are likely to be, disclosed 
at any stage of the proceedings, and it is o f the opinion that disclosure would prejudice its national
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security interests, that State shall have the right to intervene in order to obtain resolution of the issue in 
accordance with this article.
5. If, in the opinion of a State, disclosure of information would prejudice its national security 
interests, all reasonable steps will be taken by the State, acting in conjunction with the Prosecutor, the 
defence or the Pre-Trial Chamber or Trial Chamber, as the case may be, to seek to resolve the matter by 
cooperative means. Such steps may include:
(a) Modification or clarification o f the request;
(b) A determination by the Court regarding the relevance of the information or evidence 
sought, or a determination as to whether the evidence, though relevant, could be or has been 
obtained from a source other than the requested State;
(c) Obtaining the information or evidence from a different source or in a different form; or
(d) Agreement on conditions under which the assistance could be provided including, among 
other things, providing summaries or redactions, limitations on disclosure, use of  in camera or ex 
parte proceedings, or other protective measures permissible under the Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence.
6. Once all reasonable steps have been taken to resolve the matter through cooperative means, and if 
the State considers that there are no means or conditions under which the information or documents could 
be provided or disclosed without prejudice to its national security interests, it shall so notify the 
Prosecutor or the Court of the specific reasons for its decision, unless a specific description of the reasons 
would itself necessarily result in such prejudice to the State's national security interests.
7. Thereafter, if the Court determines that the evidence is relevant and necessary for the 
establishment of the guilt or innocence o f the accused, the Court may undertake the following actions:
(a) Where disclosure of the information or document is sought pursuant to a request for 
cooperation under Part 9 or the circumstances described in paragraph 2, and the State has 
invoked the ground for refusal referred to in article 93, paragraph 4:
(i) The Court may, before making any conclusion referred to in subparagraph 7 (a)
(ii), request further consultations for the purpose of considering the State's 
representations, which may include, as appropriate, hearings in camera and ex parte:
(ii) If the Court concludes that, by invoking the ground for refusal under article 93, 
paragraph 4, in the circumstances of the case, the requested State is not acting in 
accordance with its obligations under this Statute, the Court may refer the matter in 
accordance with article 87, paragraph 7, specifying the reasons for its conclusion; and
(iii) The Court may make such inference in the trial o f the accused as to the existence 
or non-existence of a fact, as may be appropriate in the circumstances; or
(b) In all other circumstances:
(i) Order disclosure; or
(ii) To the extent it does not order disclosure, make such inference in the trial of the 
accused as to the existence or non-existence of a fact, as may be appropriate in the 
circumstances.
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Article 73 
Third-party information or documents
If  a State Party is requested by the Court to provide a document or information in its custody, 
possession or control, which was disclosed to it in confidence by a State, intergovernmental organization 
or international organization, it shall seek the consent of the originator to disclose that document or 
information. If the originator is a State Party, it shall either consent to disclosure of the information or 
document or undertake to resolve the issue o f disclosure with the Court, subject to the provisions of article 
72. If  the originator is not a State Party and refuses to consent to disclosure, the requested State shall 
inform the Court that it is unable to provide the document or information because of a pre-existing 
obligation o f confidentiality to the originator.
Article 74 
Requirements for the decision
1. All the judges of the Trial Chamber shall be present at each stage of the trial and throughout their 
deliberations. The Presidency may, on a case-by-case basis, designate, as available, one or more alternate 
judges to be present at each stage of the trial and to replace a member of the Trial Chamber if that 
member is unable to continue attending.
2. The Trial Chamber’s decision shall be based on its evaluation of the evidence and the entire 
proceedings. The decision shall not exceed the facts and circumstances described in the charges and any 
amendments to the charges. The Court may base its decision only on evidence submitted and discussed 
before it at the trial.
3. The judges shall attempt to achieve unanimity in their decision, failing which the decision shall be 
taken by a majority of the judges.
4. The deliberations of the Trial Chamber shall remain secret.
5. The decision shall be in writing and shall contain a full and reasoned statement of the Trial
Chamber's findings on the evidence and conclusions. The Trial Chamber shall issue one decision. When 
there is no unanimity, the Trial Chamber's decision shall contain the views of the majority and the 
minority. The decision or a summary thereof shall be delivered in open court.
Article 75 
Reparations to victims
1. The Court shall establish principles relating to reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including
restitution, compensation and rehabilitation. On this basis, in its decision the Court may, either upon 
request or on its own motion in exceptional circumstances, determine the scope and extent of any damage, 
loss and injury to, or in respect of, victims and will state the principles on which it is acting.
2. The Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.
Where appropriate, the Court may order that the award for reparations be made through the Trust 
Fund provided for in article 79.
3. Before making an order under this article, the Court may invite and shall take account of 
representations from or on behalf of the convicted person, victims, other interested persons or interested 
States.
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4. In exercising its power under this article, the Court may, after a person is convicted of a crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Court, determine whether, in order to give effect to an order which it may 
make under this article, it is necessary to seek measures under article 93, paragraph 1.
5. A State Party shall give effect to a decision under this article as if the provisions o f article 109 
were applicable to dûs article.
6. Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights o f victims under national or 
international law.
Article 76 
Sentencing
1. In the event o f a conviction, the Trial Chamber shall consider the appropriate sentence to be 
imposed and shall take into account the evidence presented and submissions made during the trial that are 
relevant to the sentence.
2. Except where article 65 applies and before the completion of the trial, the Trial Chamber may on 
its own motion and shall, at the request of the Prosecutor or the accused, hold a further hearing to hear any 
additional evidence or submissions relevant to the sentence, in accordance with the Rides of Procedure 
and Evidence.
3. Where paragraph 2 applies, any representations under article 75 shall be heard during the further 
hearing referred to in paragraph 2 and, if necessary, during any additional hearing.
4. The sentence shall be pronounced in public and, wherever possible, in the presence of the accused.
PART 7. PENALTIES
Article 77 
Applicable penalties
1. Subject to article 110, the Court may impose one of the following penalties on a person convicted 
of a crime referred to in article 5 o f this Statute:
(a) Imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not exceed a maximum of 30 
years; or
(b) A term o f life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the 
individual circumstances o f the convicted person.
2. In addition to imprisonment, the Court may order:
(a) A fine under the criteria provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(b) A forfeiture o f proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from that crime, 
without prejudice to ftie rights of bona fide third parties.
Article 7g 
Determination of the sentence
1. In determining the sentence, the Court shall, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, take into account such factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of 
the convicted person.
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2. In imposing a sentence of imprisonment, the Court shall deduct the time, if any, previously spent 
in detention in accordance with an order of the Court. The Court may deduct any time otherwise spent in 
detention in connection with conduct underlying the crime.
3. When a person has been convicted of more than one crime, the Court shall pronounce a sentence 
for each crime and a joint sentence specifying the total period of imprisonment. This period shall be no 
less than the highest individual sentence pronounced and shall not exceed 30 years imprisonment or a 
sentence of life imprisonment in conformity with article 77, paragraph 1 (b>
Article 79 
Trust Fund
1. A Trust Fund shall be established by decision of the Assembly of States Parties for the benefit of 
victims of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court, and of the families of such victims.
2. The Court may order money and other property collected through fines or forfeiture to be 
transferred, by order of the Court, to the Trust Fund.
3. The Trust Fund shall be managed according to criteria to be determined by the Assembly of States 
Parties.
Article 80
Non-preiudice to national application of 
penalties and national laws
Nothing in this Part affects the application by States of penalties prescribed by their national law, 
nor the law of States which do not provide for penalties prescribed in this Part.
PART 8. APPEAL AND REVISION 
Article 81
Appeal against decision of acquittal or conviction 
or against sentence
1. A decision under article 74 may be appealed in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence as follows:
(a) The Prosecutor may make an appeal on any of the following grounds:
(i) Procedural error,
(ii) Error of fact, or
(iii) Error of law;
(b) The convicted person, or the Prosecutor on that person’s behalf, may make an appeal on 
any of the following grounds:
(i) Procedural error,
(ii) Error of fact,
(iii) Error of law, or
221
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
(iv) Any other ground that affects the fairness or reliability of the proceedings or 
decision.
2. (a) A sentence may be appealed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, by
the Prosecutor or the convicted person on the ground of disproportion between the crime and the 
sentence;
(b) If on an appeal against sentence the Court considers that there are grounds on which the 
conviction might be set aside, wholly or in part, it may invite the Prosecutor and the convicted person to 
submit grounds under article 81, paragraph 1 (a) or (b), and may render a decision on conviction in 
accordance with article 83;
(c) The same procedure applies when the Court, on an appeal against conviction only, 
considers that there are grounds to reduce the sentence under paragraph 2 (a).
3. (a) Unless the Trial Chamber orders otherwise, a convicted person shall remain in custody
pending an appeal;
(b) When a convicted person's time in custody exceeds the sentence of imprisonment imposed, 
that person shall be released, except that if  the Prosecutor is also appealing, the release may be subject to 
the conditions under subparagraph (c) below;
(c) In case o f an acquittal, the accused shall be released immediately, subject to the following;
(i) Under exceptional circumstances, and having regard, inter alia, to the concrete risk 
o f flight, the seriousness of the offence charged and the probability of success on 
appeal, the Trial Chamber, at the request of the Prosecutor, may maintain the detention 
o f the person pending appeal;
(ii) A decision by the Trial Chamber under subparagraph (c) (i) may be appealed in 
accordance with the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.
4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 (a) and (b), execution of the decision or sentence shall be 
suspended during the period allowed for appeal and for the duration of the appeal proceedings.
Article 82 
Anneal against other decisions
1. Either party may appeal any of the following decisions in accordance with the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence:
(a) A decision with respect to jurisdiction or admissibility;
(b) A decision granting or denying relelase of the person being investigated or prosecuted;
(c) A decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber to act on its own initiative under article 56, paragraph
3;
(d) A decision that involves an issue that would significantly affect the fair and expeditious 
conduct o f the proceedings or the outcome o f the trial, and for which, in the opinion of the Pre- 
Trial or Trial Chamber, an immediate resolution by the Appeals Chamber may materially 
advance the proceedings.
2. A decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 57, paragraph 3 (d), may be appealed against by 
the State concerned or by the Prosecutor, with the leave o f the Pre-Trial Chamber. The appeal shall be 
heard on an expedited basis.
3. An appeal shall not o f itself have suspensive effect unless the Appeals Chamber so orders, upon 
request, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
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4. A legal representative o f the victims, the convicted person or a bona fide owner of property 
adversely affected by an order under article 75 may appeal against the order for reparations, as provided 
in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
Article 83 
Proceedings on appeal
1. For the purposes of proceedings under article 81 and this article, the Appeals Chamber shall have 
all the powers o f the Trial Chamber.
2. If  the Appeals Chamber finds that the proceedings appealed from were unfair in a way that 
affected the reliability o f the decision or sentence, or that the decision or sentence appealed from was 
materially affected by error of fact or law or procedural error, it may;
(a) Reverse or amend the decision or sentence; or
(b) Order a new trial before a different Trial Chamber.
For these purposes, the Appeals Chamber may remand a factual issue to the original Trial 
Chamber for it to determine the issue and to report back accordingly, or may itself call evidence to 
determine the issue. When the decision or sentence has been appealed only by the person convicted, or the 
Prosecutor on that person's behalf, it cannot be amended to his or her detriment.
3. If in an appeal against sentence the Appeals Chamber finds that the sentence is disproportionate to 
the crime, it may vary the sentence in accordance with Part 7.
4. The judgement o f the Appeals Chamber shall be taken by a majority of the judges and shall be 
delivered in open court. The judgement shall state the reasons on which it is based. When there is no 
unanimity, the judgement o f the Appeals Chamber shall contain the views of the majority and the 
minority, but a judge may deliver a separate or dissenting opinion on a question of law.
5. The Appeals Chamber may deliver its judgement in the absence of the person acquitted or 
convicted.
Article 84 
Revision of conviction or sentence
1. ' The convicted person or, after death, spouses, children, parents or one person alive at the time of
the accused's death who has been given express written instructions from the accused to bring such a 
claim, or the Prosecutor on the person’s behalf, may apply to the Appeals Chamber to revise the final 
judgement o f conviction or sentence on the grounds that:
(a) New evidence has been discovered that:
(i) Was not available at the time of trial, and such unavailability was not wholly or 
partially attributable to the party making application; and
(ii) Is sufficiently important that had it been proved at trial it would have been likely 
to have resulted in a different verdict;
(b) It has been newly discovered that decisive evidence, taken into account at trial and upon 
which the conviction depends, was false, forged or falsified;
(c) One or more of the judges who participated in conviction or confirmation of the charges 
has committed, in that case, an act of serious misconduct or serious breach of duty of sufficient 
gravity to justify the removal of that judge or those judges from office under article 46.
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2. The Appeals Chamber shall reject the application if  it considers it to be unfounded. If it determines 
that the application is meritorious, it may, as appropriate:
(a) Reconvene the original Trial Chamber;
(b) Constitute a new Trial Chamber; or
(c) Retain jurisdiction over the matter,
with a view to, after hearing the parties in the manner set forth in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, 
arriving at a determination on whether the judgement should be revised.
Article 85
Compensation to an arrested or convicted person
1. Anyone who has been the victim o f unlawful arrest or detention shall have an enforceable right to 
compensation.
2. When a person has by a final decision been convicted of a criminal offence, and when 
subsequently his or her conviction has been reversed on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact 
shows conclusively that there has been a miscarriage of justice, the person who has suffered punishment 
as a result o f such conviction shall be compensated according to law, unless it is proved that the non­
disclosure of the unknown fact in time is wholly or partly attributable to him or her.
3. In exceptional circumstances, where the Court finds conclusive facts showing that there has been a 
grave and manifest miscarriage of justice, it may in its discretion award compensation, according to the 
criteria provided in the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence, to a person who has been released from 
detention following a final decision of acquittal or a termination o f the proceedings for that reason.
PART 9. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE
Article 86 
General obligation to cooperate
States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Statute, cooperate fully with the 
Court in its investigation and prosecution o f crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.
Article 87
. Requests for cooperation: general provisions
1. (a) The Court shall have the authority to make requests to States Parties for cooperation. The 
requests shall be transmitted through the diplomatic channel or any other appropriate channel as may be 
designated by each State Party upon ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
Subsequent changes to the designation shall be made by each State Party in accordance with the 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
(b) When appropriate, without prejudice to the provisions of subparagraph (a), requests may 
also be transmitted through the International Criminal Police Organization or any appropriate regbnal 
organization.
2. Requests for cooperation and any documents supporting the request shall either be in or be 
accompanied by a translation into an official language of the requested State or one of the working
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languages o f the Court, in accordance with the choice made by that State upon ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession.
Subsequent changes to this choice shall be made in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.
3. The requested State shall keep confidential a request for cooperation and any documents 
supporting the request, except to the extent that the disclosure is necessary for execution of the request.
4. In relation to any request for assistance presented under this Part, the Court may take such 
measures, including measures related to the protection o f information, as may be necessary to ensure the 
safety or physical or psychological well-being of any victims, potential witnesses and their families. The 
Court may request that any information that is made available under this Part shall be provided and 
handled in a manner that protects the safety and physical or psychological well-being of any victims, 
potential witnesses and their families.
5. (a) The Court may invite any State not party to this Statute to provide assistance under this Part
on the basis o f an ad hoc arrangement, an agreement with such State or any other appropriate basis.
(b) Where a State not party to this Statute, which has entered into an ad hoc arrangement or an 
agreement with the Court, fails to cooperate with requests pursuant to any such arrangement or agreement, 
the Court may so inform the Assembly of States Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter 
to the Court, the Security Council.
6. The Court may ask any intergovernmental organization to provide information or documents. The
Court may also ask for other forms of cooperation and assistance which may be agreed upon with such an 
organization and which are in accordance with its competence or mandate.
7. Where a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by the Court contrary to the 
provisions of this Statute, thereby preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under 
this Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer the matter to the Assembly of States 
Parties or, where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the Security Council.
Article 88
Availability of procedures under national law
States Parties shall ensure that there are procedures available under their national law for all of the 
forms of cooperation which are specified under this Part.
Article 89 
Surrender of persons to the Court
1. The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and surrender of a person, together with the 
material supporting the request outlined in article 91, to any State on the territory of which that person 
may be found and shall request the cooperation o f that State in the arrest and surrender o f such a person. 
States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and the procedure under their national 
law, comply with requests for arrest and surrender.
2. Where the person sought for surrender brings a challenge before a national court on the basis of 
the principle of ne bis in idem as provided in article 20, the requested State shall immediately consult with 
the Court to determine if there has been a relevant ruling on admissibility. If the case is admissiHe, the 
requested State shall proceed with the execution of the request. If an admissibility ruling is pending, the
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requested State may postpone the execution o f the request for surrender of the person until the Court 
mdces a determination on admissibility.
3. (a) A State Party shall authorize, in accordance with its national procedural law, transportation
through its territory o f a person being surrendered to the Court by another State, except where transit 
through that State would impede or delay the surrender.
(b) A request by the Court for transit shall be transmitted in accordance with article 87. The 
request for transit shall contain:
(i) A description o f the person being transported;
(ii) A brief statement of the facts o f the case and their legal characterization; and
(iii) The warrant for arrest and surrender;
(c) A person being transported shall be detained in custody during the period of transit;
(d) No authorization is required if the person is transported by air and no landing is scheduled 
on the territory o f the transit State;
(e) If an unscheduled landing occurs on the territory of the transit State, that State may require a 
request for transit from the Court as provided for in subparagraph (b). The transit State shall detain the 
person being transported until the request for transit is received and the transit is effected, provided that 
detention for purposes o f this subparagraph may not be extended beyond 96 hours from the unscheduled 
landing unless the request is received witiiin that time.
4. If the person sought is being proceeded against or is serving a sentence in the requested State for a 
crime different from that for which surrender to the Court is sought, the requested State, after making its 
decision to grant the request, shall consult with the Court.
Article 90 
Competing requests
1. A State Party which receives a request from the Court for the surrender of a person under article 
89 shall, if  it also receives a request from any other State for the extradition of the same person for the 
same conduct which forms the basis o f the crime for which the Court seeks the person's surrender, notify 
the Court and the requesting State o f that fact.
2. Where the requesting State is a State Party, the requested State shall give priority to the request 
from the Court if:
(a) The Court has, pursuant to article 18 or 19, made a determination that the case in respect of 
which surrender is sought is admissible and that determination takes into account the 
investigation or prosecution conducted by the requesting State in respect of its request for 
extradition; or
(b) The Court makes the determination described in subparagraph (a) pursuant to the requested 
State’s notification under paragraph 1.
3. Where a determination under paragraph 2 (a) has not been made, the requested State may, at its 
discretion, pending the determination of the Court under paragraph 2 (b), proceed to deal with the request 
for extradition from the requesting State but shall not extradite the person until the Court has determined 
that the case is inadmissible. The Court's determination shall be made on an expedited basis.
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4. If  the requesting State is a State not Party to this Statute the requested State, if it is not under an 
international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State, shall give priority to the request for 
surrender from the Court, if  the Court has determined tliat the case is admissible.
5. Where a case under paragraph 4 has not been determined to be admissible by the Court, the 
requested State may, at its discretion, proceed to deal with the request for extradition from the requesting 
State.
6. In cases where paragraph 4 ^p lies  except that the requested State is under an existing 
international obligation to extradite the person to the requesting State not Party to this Statute, the 
requested State shall determine whether to surrender the person to the Court or extradite the person to the 
requesting State. In making its decision, the requested State shall consider all the relevant factors, 
including but not limited to:
(a) The respective dates of the requests;
(b) The interests o f the requesting State including, where relevant, whether the crime was
committed in its territory and the nationality o f the victims and of the person sought; and
(c) The possibility o f subsequent surrender between the Court and the requesting State.
7. Where a State Party which receives a request from the Court for the surrender of a person also 
receives a request from any State for the extradition of the same person for conduct other than that which 
constitutes the crime for which the Court seeks the person's surrender:
(a) The requested State shall, if  it is not under an existing international obligation to extradite 
the person to the requesting State, give priority to the request from the Court;
(b) The requested State shall, if  it is under an existing international obligation to extradite the 
person to the requesting State, determine whether to surrender the person to the Court or to 
extradite the person to the requesting State. In making its decision, the requested State shall 
consider all the relevant factors, including but not limited to those set out in paragraph 6, but 
shall give special consideration to the relative nature and gravity of the conduct in question.
8. Where pursuant to a notification under this article, the Court has determined a case to be 
inadmissible, and subsequently extradition to the requesting State is refused, the requested State shall 
notify the Court o f this decision.
Article 91
Contents o f request for arrest and surrender
1. A request for arrest an,d surrender shall be made in writing. In urgent cases, a request may be made 
by any medium capable of delivering a written record, provided that the request shall be confirmed 
through the charuiel provided for in article 87, paragraph 1 (a).
2. In the case of a request for the arrest and surrender of a person for whom a warrant of arrest has 
been issued by the Pre-Trial Chamber under article 58, the request shall contain or be supported by:
(a) Information describing the person sought, sufficient to identify the person, and information 
as to that person’s probable location;
(b) A copy of the warrant of arrest; and
(c) Such documents, statements or information as may be necessary to meet the requirements 
for the surrender process in the requested State, except that those requirements should not be 
more burdensome than those applicable to requests for extradition pursuant to treaties or
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arrangements between the requested State and other States and should, if possible, be less 
burdensome, taking into account the distinct nature of the Court.
3. In the case of a request for the arrest and surrender of a person already convicted, the request shall 
contain or be supported by:
(a) A copy of any warrant of arrest for that person;
(b) A copy of the judgement o f conviction;
(c) Information to demonstrate that the person sought is the one referred to in the judgement of 
conviction; and
(d) If the person sought has been sentenced, a copy o f the sentence imposed and, in the case of 
a sentence for imprisonment, a statement of any time already served and the time remaining to be 
served.
4. Upon the request o f the Court, a State Party shall consult with the Court, either generally or with 
respect to a specific matter, regarding any requirements under its national law that may apply under 
paragraph 2 (c). During the consultations, the State Party shall advise the Court of the specific 
requirements of its national law.
Article 92 
Provisional arrest
1. In urgent cases, the Court may request the provisional arrest of the person sought, pending 
presentation of the request for surrender and the documents supporting the request as specified in article 
91.
2. The request for provisional arrest shall be made by any medium capable of delivering a written 
record and shall contain:
(a) Information describing the person sought, sufficient to identify the person, and information 
as to that person's probable location;
(b) A concise statement o f the crimes for which the person's arrest is sought and of the facts 
which are alleged to constitute those crimes, including, where possible, the date and location of 
the crime;
(c) A statement o f the existence of a warrant of arrest or a judgement of conviction against the 
person sought; and
(d) A statement that a request for surrender of the person sought will follow.
« ^
3. A person who is provisionally arrested may be released from custody if the requested State has not 
received the request for surrender and the documents supporting the request as specified in article 91 
within the time limits specified in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. However, the person may consent 
to surrender before the expiration of this period if permitted by the law of the requested State. In such a 
case, the requested State shall proceed to surrender the person to the Court as soon as possible.
4. The fact that the person sought has been released from custody pursuant to paragraph 3 shall not 
prejudice the subsequent arrest and surrender of that person if the request for surrender and the documents 
supporting the request are delivered at a later date.
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Article 93 
Other forms of cooperation
1. States Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Part and under procedures of national 
law, comply with requests by the Court to provide the following assistance in relation to investigations or 
prosecutions:
(a) The identification and whereabouts o f persons or the location of items;
(b) The taking o f evidence, including testimony under oath, and the production of evidence, 
including expert opinions and reports necessary to the Court;
(c) The questioning of any person being investigated or prosecuted;
(d) The service o f documents, including judicial documents;
(e) Facilitating the voluntary appearance o f persons as witnesses or experts before the Court;
(f) The temporary transfer o f persons as provided in paragraph 7;
(g) The examination of places or sites, including the exhumation and examination of grave 
sites;
(h) The execution of searches and seizures;
(i) The provision o f records and documents, including official records and documents;
(j) The protection o f victims and witnesses and the preservation of evidence;
(k) The identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and assets and
instrumentalities of crimes for the purpose of eventual forfeiture, without prejudice to the rights 
of bona fide third parties; and
(1) Any other type of assistance which is not prohibited by the law of the requested State, with 
a view to facilitating the investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court.
2. The Court shall have the authority to provide an assurance to a witness or an expert appearing 
before the Court that he or she will not be prosecuted, detained or subjected to any restriction of personal 
freedom by the Court in respect o f any act or omission that preceded the departure of that person from the 
requested State.
3. Where execution o f a particular measure of assistance detailed in a request presented under 
paragraph 1, is prohibited in the requested State on the basis of an existing fundamental legal principle of 
general application, the requested State shall promptly consult with the Court to try to resolve the matter. 
In the consultations, consideration should be given to whether the assistance can be rendered in another 
manner or subject to conditions. If after consultations the matter cannot be resolved, the Court shall 
modify the request as necessary.
4. In accordance with article 72, a State Party may deny a request for assistance, in whole or in part, 
only if the request concerns the production of any documents or disclosure of evidence which relates to its 
national security.
5. Before denying a request for assistance under paragraph 1 (1), the requested State shall consider 
whether the assistance can be provided subject to specified conditions, or whether the assistance can be 
provided at a later date or in an alternative manner, provided that if the Court or the Prosecutor accepts 
the assistance subject to conditions, the Court or the Prosecutor shall abide by them.
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6. If a request for assistance is denied, the requested State Party shall promptly inform the Court or 
the Prosecutor o f the reasons for such denial.
7. (a) The Court may request the temporary transfer of a person in custody for purposes of 
identification or for obtaining testimony or other assistance. The person may be transferred if the 
following conditions are fulfilled:
(i) The person freely gives his or her informed consent to the transfer; and
(ii) The requested State agrees to the transfer, subject to such conditions as that State 
and the Court may agree.
(b) The person being transferred shall remain in custody. When the purposes of the transfer 
have been fulfilled, the Court shall return the person without delay to the requested State.
8. (a) The Court shall ensure the confidentiality of documents and information, except as required
for the investigation and proceedings described in the request.
(b) The requested State may, when necessary, transmit documents or information to the 
Prosecutor on a confidential basis. The Prosecutor may then use them solely for the purpose of generating 
new evidence.
(c) The requested State may, on its own motion or at the request of the Prosecutor, subsequently 
consent to the disclosure of such documents or information. They may then be used as evidence pursuant 
to the provisions of Parts 5 and 6 and in accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.
9. (a) (i) In the event that a State Party receives competing requests, other than for surrender or
extradition, from the Court and from another State pursuant to an international obligation, the State Party 
shall endeavour, in consultation with the Court and the other State, to meet both requests, if necessary by 
postponing or attaching conditions to one or the other request.
(ii) Failing that, competing requests shall be resolved in accordance with the principles 
established in article 90.
(b) Where, however, the request from the Court concerns information, property or persons 
which are subject to the control o f a third State or an international organization by virtue of an 
international agreement, the requested States shall so inform the Court and the Court shall direct its 
request to the third State or international organization.
10. (a) The Court may, upon request, cooperate with and provide assistance to a State Party
conducting an investigation into or trial in respect o f conduct which constitutes a crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Court or which constitutes a serious crime under the national law of the requesting 
State.
(b) (i) The assistance provided under subparagraph (a) shall include, inter alia:
a. The transmission of statements, documents or other types of evidence 
obtained in the course of an investigation or a trial conducted by the Court; and
b. The questioning o f any person detained by order of the Court;
(ii) In the case of assistance under subparagraph (b) (i) a:
a. If the documents or other types of evidence have been obtained with the 
assistance of a State, such transmission shall require the consent of that State;
b. If the statements, documents or other types of evidence have been 
provided by a witness or expert, such transmission shall be subject to the 
provisions of article 68.
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(c) The Court may, under the conditions set out in this paragraph, grant a request for assistance 
under this paragraph from a State which is not a Party to this Statute.
Article 94
Postponement of execution of a request in respect 
of ongoing investigation or prosecution
1. If  the immediate execution o f a request would interfere with an ongoing investigation or 
prosecution of a case different from that to which the request relates, the requested State may postpone the 
execution of the request for a period of time agreed upon with the Court. However, the postponement 
shall be no longer than is necessary to conq>lete the relevant investigation or prosecution in the requested 
State. Before making a decision to postpone, the requested State should consider whether the assistance 
may be immediately provided subject to certain conditions.
2. If  a decision to postpone is taken pursuant to paragraph 1, the Prosecutor may, however, seek 
measures to preserve evidence, pursuant to article 93, paragraph 1 (j).
Article 95
Postponement of execution o f a request in 
respect o f an admissibility challenge
Where there is an admissibility challenge under consideration by the Court pursuant to article 18 
or 19, the requested State may postpone the execution of a request under this Part pending a determination 
by the Court, unless the Court has specifically ordered that the Prosecutor may pursue the collection of 
such evidence pursuant to article 18 or 19.
Article 96 
Contents of request for other forms of 
assistance under article 93
1. A request for other forms o f assistance referred to in article 93 shall be made in writing. In urgent 
cases, a request may be made by any medium capable of delivering a written record, provided that the 
request shall be confirmed through the channel provided for in article 87, paragraph I (a).
2. The request shall, as applicable, contain or be supported by the following:
(a) A concise statement of the purpose of the request and the assistance sought, including the 
legal basis and the grounds for the request;
(b) As much detailed information as possible about the location or identification of any person 
or place that must be found or identified in order for the assistance sought to be provided;
(c) A concise statement o f  the essential facts underlying the request;
(d) The reasons for and details of any procedure or requirement to be followed;
(e) Such information as may be required under the law of the requested State in order to
execute the request; and
(f) Any other information relevant in order for the assistance sou^t to be provided.
3. Upon the request of the Court, a State Party shall consult with the Court, either generally or with 
respect to a specific matter, regarding any requirements under its national law that may apply under 
paragraph 2 (e). During the consultations, the State Party shall advise the Court of the specific 
requirements of its national law.
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4. The provisions of this article shall, where applicable, also apply in respect of a request for 
assistance made to the Court.
Article 97 
Consultations
Where a State Party receives a request under this Part in relation to which it identifies problems 
which may impede or prevent the execution of the request, that State shall consult with the Court without 
delay in order to resolve the matter. Such problems may include, inter alia:
(a) Insufficient information to execute the request;
(b) In the case o f a request for surrender, the fact that despite best efforts, the person sought 
cannot be located or that the investigation conducted has determined that the person in the 
requested State is clearly not the person named in the warrant; or
(c) The fact that execution of the request in its current form would require the requested State 
to breach a pre-existing treaty obligation undertaken with respect to another State.
Article 98
Cooperation with resoect to waiver of immunitv 
and consent to surrender
1. The Couii may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the 
requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State 
or diplomatic immunity of a person or property o f a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the 
cooperation o f that third State for the waiver of the immunity.
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State 
to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a 
sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain 
the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender.
Article 99
Execution of requests under articles 93 and 96
1. Requests for assistance shall be executed in accordance with the relevant procedure under the law 
of the requested State and, unless prohibited by such law, in the manner specified in the request, including 
following any procedure outlined therein or permitting persons specified in the request to be present at 
and assist in the execution process.
2. In the case of an urgent request, the documents or evidence produced in response shall, at the 
request of the Court, be sent urgently.
3. Replies from the requested State shall be transmitted in their original language and form.
4. Without prejudice to other articles in this Part, where it is necessary for the successful execution of
a request which can be executed without any compulsory measures, including specifically the interview of 
or taking evidence from a person on a voluntary basis, including doing so without the presence of the 
authorities of the requested State Party if it is essential for the request to be executed, and the examination
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without modification of a public site or other public place, the Prosecutor may execute such request 
directly on the territory of a State as follows:
(a) When the State Party requested is a State on the territory of which the crime is alleged to 
have been committed, and there has been a determination of admissibility pursuant to article 18 
or 19, the Prosecutor may directly execute such request following all possible consultations with 
the requested State Party;
(b) In other cases, the Prosecutor may execute such request following consultations with the 
requested State Party and subject to any reasonable conditions or concerns raised by that State 
Party. Where the requested State Party identifies problems with the execution of a request 
pursuant to this subparagraph it shall, without delay, consult with the Court to resolve the matter.
5. Provisions allowing a person heard or examined by the Court under article 72 to invoke 
restrictions designed to prevent disclosure of confidential information connected with national security 
shall also apply to the execution of requests for assistance under this article.
Article 100 
Costs
1. The ordinary costs for execution of requests in the territory of the requested State shall be borne
by that State, except for the following, which shall be borne by the Court:
(a) Costs associated with the travel and security of witnesses and experts or the transfer under 
article 93 of persons in custody;
(b) Costs o f translation, interpretation and transcription;
(c) Travel and subsistence costs of the judges, the Prosecutor, the Deputy Prosecutors, the 
Registrar, the Deputy Registrar and staff of any organ of the Court;
(d) Costs of any expert opinion or report requested by the Court;
(e) Costs associated with the transport of a person being surrendered to the Court by a
custodial State; and
(f) Following consultations, any extraordinary costs that may result from the execution of a 
request.
2. The provisions o f paragraph 1 shall, as appropriate, apply to requests from States Parties to the 
Court. In that case, the Court shall bear the ordinary costs o f execution.
Article 101 
Rule of snecialitv
1. A person surrendered to the Court under this Statute shall not be proceeded against, punished or 
detained for any conduct committed prior to surrender, other than the conduct or course of conduct which 
forms the basis of the crimes for which that person has been surrendered.
2. The Court may request a waiver o f the requirements o f paragraph 1 from the State which 
surrendered the person to the Court and, if  necessary, the Court shall provide additional information in 
accordance with article 91. States Parties shall have the authority to provide a waiver to the Court and 
should endeavour to do so.
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Article 102 
Use of terms
For the purposes of this Statute;
(a) "surrender" means the delivering up o f a person by a State to the Court, pursuant to this 
Statute.
(b) "extradition" means the delivering up of a person by one State to another as provided by treaty, 
convention or national legislation.
PART 10. ENFORCEMENT
Article 103 
Role of States in enforcement of 
sentences of imprisonment
1. (a) A sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a State designated by the Court from a list of
States which have indicated to the Court their willingness to accept sentenced persons.
(b) At the time of declaring its willingness to accept sentenced persons, a State may attach 
conditions to its acceptance as agreed by the Court and in accordance with this Part.
(c) A State designated in a particular case shall promptly inform the Court whether it accepts the 
Court's designation.
2. (a) The State of enforcement shall notify the Court of any circumstances, including the exercise
of any conditions agreed under paragraph 1, which could materially affect the terms or extent of the 
imprisonment. The Court shall be given at least 45 days' notice of any such known or foreseeable 
circumstances. During this period, the State of enforcement shall take no action that might prejudice its 
obligations under article 110.
(b) Where the Court carmot agree to the circumstances referred to in subparagraph (a), it shall 
notify the State of enforcement and proceed in accordance with article 104, paragraph 1.
3. In exercising its discretion to make a designation under paragraph 1, the Court shall take into 
account the following:
(a) The principle that States Parties should share the responsibility for enforcing sentences of 
imprisonment, in accordance with principles o f equitable distribution, as provided in the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence;
(b) The application of widely accepted international treaty standards governing the treatment of 
prisoners;
(c) The views o f the sentenced person;
(d) The nationality of the sentenced person;
(e) Such other factors regarding the circumstances of the crime or the person sentenced, or the 
effective enforcement of the sentence, as may be appropriate in designating the State of enforcement.
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4. If no State is designated under paragraph 1, the sentence of imprisonment shall be served in a
prison facility made available by the host State, in accordance with the conditions set out in the 
headquarters agreement referred to in article 3, paragraph 2. In such a case, the costs arising out of the 
enforcement of a sentence of imprisonment shall be borne by the Court.
Article 104
Change in designation o f State of enforcement
1. The Court may, at any time, decide to transfer a sentenced person to a prison of another State.
2. A sentenced person may, at any time, apply to the Court to be transferred from the State of 
enforcement.
Article 105 
Enforcement of the sentence
1. Subject to conditions which a State may have specified in accordance with article 103, paragraph 
1 (b), the sentence o f imprisonment shall be binding on the States Parties, which shall in no case modify 
it.
2. The Court alone shall have the right to decide any application for appeal and revision. The State of
enforcement shall not impede the making of any such application by a sentenced person.
Article 106 
Supervision of enforcement of sentences and 
conditions o f imprisonment
1. The enforcement o f a sentence of imprisonment shall be subject to the supervision of the Court 
and shall be consistent with widely accepted international treaty standards governing treatment of 
prisoners.
2. The conditions of imprisonment shall be governed by the law of the State of enforcement and shall 
be consistent with widely accepted international treaty standards governing treatment of prisoners; in no 
case shall such conditions be more or less favourable than those available to prisoners convicted of similar 
offences in the State of enforcement.
3. Communications between a sentenced person and the Court shall be unimpeded and confidential.
Article 107
Transfer of the person upon completion of sentence
1. Following completion o f the sentence, a person who is not a national of the State of enforcement 
may, in accordance with the law o f the State of enforcement, be transferred to a State which is obliged to 
receive him or her, or to another State which agrees to receive him or her, taking into account any wishes 
of the person to be transferred to that State, unless the State of enforcement authorizes the person to 
remain in its territory.
2. If no State bears the costs arising out of transferring the person to another State pursuant to 
paragraph 1, such costs shall be borne by the Court.
3. Subject to the provisions o f article 108, the State of enforcement may also, in accordance with its 
national law, extradite or otherwise surrender the person to a State which has requested the extradition or
235
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
surrender of the person for purposes of trial or enforcement of a sentence.
Article 108
Limitation on the prosecution or punishment of other offences
1. A sentenced person in the custody of the State of enforcement shall not be subject to prosecution 
or punishment or to extradition to a third State for any conduct engaged in prior to that person's delivery 
to the State o f enforcement, unless such prosecution, punishment or extradition has been approved by the 
Court at the request o f the State of enforcement.
2. The Court shall decide the matter after having heard the views of the sentenced person.
3. Paragraph 1 shall cease to apply if the sentenced person remains voluntarily for more than 30 days 
in the territory o f the State o f enforcement after having served the full sentence imposed by the Court, or 
returns to the territory of that State after having left it.
Article 109 
Enforcement of fines and forfeiture measures
1. States Parties shall give effect to fines or forfeitures ordered by the Court under Part 7, without 
prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties, and in accordance with the procedure of their national 
law.
2. If a State Party is unable to give effect to an order for forfeiture, it shall take measures to recover 
the value of the proceeds, property or assets ordered by the Court to be forfeited, without prejudice to the 
rights of bona fide third parties.
3. Property, or the proceeds of the sale o f real property or, where appropriate, the sale of other 
property, which is obtained by a State Party as a result of its enforcement of a judgement of the Court 
shall be transferred to the Court.
Article 110
Review bv the Court concemine reduction of sentence
1. The State of enforcement shall not release the person before expiry of the sentence pronounced by
the Court.
2. The Court alone shall have the right to decide any reduction of sentence, and shall rule on the 
matter after having heard the person.
3. When the person has served two thirds of the sentence, or 25 years in the case of life 
imprisonment, the Court shall review the sentence to determine whether it should be reduced. Such a 
review shall not be conducted before that time,
4. In its review under paragraph 3, the Court may reduce the sentence if it finds that one or more of 
the following factors are present;
(a) The early and continuing willingness of the person to cooperate with the Court in its 
investigations and prosecutions;
(b) The voluntary assistance of the person in enabling the enforcement of the judgements and 
orders of the Court in other cases, and in particular providing assistance in locating assets subject 
to orders of fine, forfeiture or reparation which may be used for the benefit of victims; or
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(c) Other factors establishing a clear and significant change of circumstances sufficient to 
justify the reduction of sentence, as provided in the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.
5. If  the Court determines in its initial review under paragraph 3 that it is not appropriate to reduce 
the sentence, it shall thereafter review the question of reduction o f sentence at such intervals and applying 
such criteria as provided for in the Rules o f Procedure and Evidence.
Article 111 
Escape
If  a convicted person escapes fi-om custody and flees the State of enforcement, that State may, 
after consultation with the Court, request the person’s surrender from the State in which the person is 
located pursuant to existing bilateral or multilateral arrangements, or may request that the Court seek the 
person’s surrender, in accordance with Part 9. It may direct that the person be delivered to the State in 
which he or she was serving the sentence or to another State designated by the Court.
PART 11. ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES
Article 112 
Assemblv of States Parties
1. An Assembly of States Parties to this Statute is hereby established. Each State Party shall have one
representative in the Assembly who may be accompanied by alternates and advisers. Other States which 
have signed this Statute or the Final Act may be observers in the Assembly.
2. The Assembly shall:
(a) Consider and adopt, as appropriate, recommendations of the Preparatory Commission;
(b) Provide management oversight to the Presidency, the Prosecutor and the Registrar 
regarding the administration of the Court;
(c) Consider the reports and activities of the Bureau established under paragraph 3 and take 
appropriate action in regard thereto;
(d) Consider and decide the budget for the Court;
(e) Decide whether to alter, in accordance with article 36, the number of judges;
(f) Consider pursuant to article 87, paragraphs 5 and 7, any question relating to non­
cooperation;
(g) Perform any other function consistent with this Statute or the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence.
3. (a) The Assembly shall have a Bureau consisting of a President, two Vice-Presidents and 18 
members elected by the Assembly for three-year terms.
(b) The Bureau shall have a representative character, taking into account, in particular, 
equitable geographical distribution and the adequate representation of the principal legal systems of the 
world.
(c) The Bureau shall meet as often as necessary, but at least once a year. It shall assist the 
Assembly in the discharge of its responsibilities.
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4. The Assembly may establish such subsidiary bodies as may be necessary, including an 
independent oversight mechanism for inspection, evaluation and investigation of the Court, in order to 
enhance its efficiency and economy.
5. The President o f the Court, the Prosecutor and the Registrar or their representatives may 
participate, as appropriate, in meetings of the Assembly and of the Bureau.
6. The Assembly shall meet at the seat of the Court or at the Headquarters of the United Nations once 
a year and, when circumstances so require, hold special sessions. Except as otherwise specified in this 
Statute, special sessions shall be convened by the Bureau on its own initiative or at the request of one 
third o f the States Parties.
7. Each State Party shall have one vote. Every effort shall be made to reach decisions by consensus 
in the Assembly and in the Bureau. If  consensus cannot be reached, except as otherwise provided in the 
Statute:
(a) Decisions on matters of substance must be approved by a two-thirds majority of those 
present and voting provided that an absolute majority of States Parties constitutes the quorum for 
voting;
(b) Decisions on matters o f procedure shall be taken by a simple majority of States Parties 
present and voting.
8. A State Party which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions towards the costs of 
the Court shall have no vote in the Assembly and in the Bureau if the amount of its arrears equals or 
exceeds the amount o f the contributions due from it for the preceding two full years. The Assembly may, 
nevertheless, permit such a State Party to vote in the Assembly and in the Bureau if it is satisfied that the 
failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the State Party.
9. The Assembly shall adopt its own rules of procedure.
10. The official and working languages o f the Assembly shall be those of the General Assembly of 
the United Nations.
PART 12. FINANCING
Article 113 
Financial Regulations
Except as otherwise specifically provided, all financial matters related to the Court and the 
meetings of die Assembly o f States Parties, including its Bureau and subsidiary bodies, shall be governed 
by this Statute and the Financial Regulations and Rules adopted by the Assembly of States Parties.
Article 114 
Pavment of expenses
Expenses o f the Court and the Assembly o f States Parties, including its Bureau and subsidiary 
bodies, shall be paid from the funds of the Court.
Article 115
Funds of the Court and of the Assemblv of States Parties
The expenses of the Court and the Assembly of States Parties, including its Bureau and subsidiary 
bodies, as provided for in the budget decided by the Assembly of States Parties, shall be provided by the 
following sources:
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(a) Assessed contributions made by States Parties;
(b) Funds provided by the United Nations, subject to the approval of the General Assembly, in 
particular in relation to the expenses incurred due to referrals by the Security Council.
Article 116 
Voluntarv contributions
Without prejudice to article 115, the Court may receive and utilize, as additional funds, voluntary 
contributions from Governments, international organizations, individuals, corporations and other entities, 
in accordance with relevant criteria adopted by the Assembly of States Parties.
Article 117 
Assessment o f contributions
The contributions o f States Parties shall be assessed in accordance with an agreed scale of 
assessment, based on the scale adopted by the United Nations for its regular budget and adjusted in 
accordance with the principles on which that scale is based.
Article 118 
Annual audit
The records, books and accounts of the Court, including its annual financial statements, shall be 
audited annually by an independent auditor.
PART 13. FINAL CLAUSES
Article 119 
Settlement of disputes
1. Any dispute concerning the judicial functions of the Court shall be settled by the decision of the 
Court.
2. Any other dispute between two or more States Parties relating to the interpretation or application 
of this Statute which is not settled through negotiations within three months of their commencement shall 
be referred to the Assembly of States Parties. The Assembly may itself seek to settle the dispute or may 
make recommendations on further means of settlement of the dispute, including referral to the 
International Court o f Justice in conformity with the Statute o f that Court.
% >
Article 120 
Reservations
No reservations may be made to this Statute.
Article 121 
Amendments
1. After the expiry o f seven years from the entry into force of this Statute, any State Party may 
propose amendments thereto. The text o f any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary- 
General of the United Nations, who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties.
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2. No sooner than three months from the date o f notification, the Assembly of States Parties, at its 
next meeting, shall, by a majority of those present and voting, decide whether to take up the proposal. The 
Assembly may deal with the proposal directly or convene a Review Conference if the issue involved so 
warrants.
3. The adoption of an amendment at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Review 
Conference on which consensus cannot be reached shall require a two-thirds majority of States Parties.
4. Except as provided in paragraph 5, an amendment shall enter into force for all States Parties one 
year after instruments of ratification or acceptance have been deposited with the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations by seven-eighths of them.
5. Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 o f this Statute shall enter into force for those States 
Parties which have accepted the amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification 
or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not 
exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when committed by that State 
Party's nationals or on its territory.
6. If  an amendment has been accepted by seven-eighths o f States Parties in accordance with 
paragraph 4, any State Party which has not accepted the amendment may withdraw from this Statute with 
immediate effect, notwithstanding article 127, paragraph 1, but subject to article 127, paragraph 2, by 
giving notice no later than one year after the entry into force of such amendment.
7. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall circulate to all States Parties any amendment 
adopted at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Review Conference.
Article 122
Amendments to provisions of an institutional nature
1. Amendments to provisions o f this Statute which are of an exclusively institutional nature, namely, 
article 35, article 36, paragraphs 8 and 9, article 37, article 38, article 39, paragraphs 1 (first two 
sentences), 2 and 4, article 42, paragraphs 4 to 9, article 43, paragraphs 2 and 3, and articles 44, 46, 47 
and 49, may be proposed at any time, notwithstanding article 121, paragraph 1, by any State Party. The 
text o f any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations or 
such other person designated by the Assembly o f States Parties who shall promptly circulate it to all States 
Parties and to others participating in the Assembly.
2. Amendments under this article on which consensus carmot be reached shall be adopted by the 
Assembly of States Parties or by a Review Conference, by a two-thirds majority of States Parties. Such 
amendments shall enter into force for all States Parties six months after their adoption by the Assembly or, 
as the case may be, by the Conference.
Article 123 
Review of the Statute
1. Seven years after the entry into force o f this Statute the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
shall convene a Review Conference to consider any amendments to this Statute. Such review may include, 
but is not limited to, the list o f crimes contained in article 5. The Conference shall be open to those 
participating in the Assembly o f States Parties and on the same conditions.
2. At any time thereafter, at the request of a State Party and for the purposes set out in paragraph 1,
the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall, upon approval by a majority of States Parties, convene 
a Review Conference.
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3. The provisions o f article 121, paragraphs 3 to 7, shall apply to the adoption and entry into force of 
any amendment to the Statute considered at a Review Conference.
Article 124 
Transitional Provision
Notwithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becoming a party to this Statute, may 
declare that, for a period o f seven years after the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it 
does not accept the jurisdiction o f the Court with respect to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 
when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory. A declaration under 
this article may be withdrawn at any time. The provisions o f this article shall be reviewed at the Review 
Conference convened in accordance with article 123, paragraph 1.
Article 125
Signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Statute shall be open for signature by all States in Rome, at the headquarters of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, on 17 July 1998. Thereafter, it shall remain open for 
signature in Rome at the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs of Italy until 17 October 1998. After that date, the 
Statute shall remain open for signature in New York, at United Nations Headquarters, until 31 December 
2000.
2. This Statute is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States. Instruments of 
ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
3. This Statute shall be open to accession by all States. Instruments of accession shall be deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Article 126 
Entry into force
1. This Statute shall enter into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the 
date o f the deposit of the 60th instrument o f ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations.
2. For each State ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this Statute after the deposit of the 
60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, the Statute shall enter into force on the 
first day of the month after the 60th day following the deposit by such State of its instrument of 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
Article 127 
Withdrawal
1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, withdraw from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of 
the notification, unless the notification specifies a later date.
2. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this 
Statute while it was a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its 
withdrawal shall not affect any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and 
proceedings in relation to which the withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were 
commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way 
the continued consideration of any matter which was already under consideration by the Court prior to the
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date on which the withdrawal became effective.
Article 128 
Authentic texts
The original of this Statute, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish 
texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall 
send certified copies thereof to all States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective 
Governments, have signed this Statute.
DONE at Rome, this 17th day of July 1998.
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